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Abstract
This study examines whether the Christian faith played a pacifying or inspiring role in
racialized politics following the death of Michael Brown and subsequent uprisings in
Ferguson, Missouri. To evaluate the role of religion in responding to racialized crisis, the
author examines both the attitudes of individual citizens and the actions of faith leaders.
Using data gathered from two exit-polls conducted by the author in Ferguson and the
surrounding area during the period between the death of Michael Brown and the
decision not to indict the officer who killed him and then again after the grand jury
decision, the author finds religious and racial gaps in the acceptance of narratives about
the death of Michael Brown. The analysis of exit-poll data also shows a racial cleavage in
perceptions of congregational response to the Ferguson Moment. The author then uses
interviews with clergy from across the St. Louis region to analyze the various ways faith
leaders responded to the racial crisis and the doctrinal, demographic, and place-based
variables that may have influenced these responses.
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“Submit yourselves for the Lord’s sake to every human institution, whether to a king as
the one in authority, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and
the praise of those who do right.” 1 Peter 2:13-14

“Open your mouth for the mute, for the rights of all who are destitute. Open your mouth,
judge righteously, defend the rights of the poor and needy.” Proverbs 31: 8-9

“Both read the Bible day and night,
But thou read’st Black where I read white.” – William Blake
Chapter 1: Introduction
The day before Michael Brown’s funeral, John Eligon, wrote a story for The New
York Times describing how Michael Brown Jr., just weeks before his death, reportedly
saw an angel. According to Eligon, “It was 1 a.m. and Michael Brown Jr. called his father,
his voice trembling. He had seen something overpowering. In the thick gray clouds that
lingered from a passing storm this past June, he made out an angel. And he saw Satan
chasing the angel and the angel running into the face of God.” Eligon went on to write,
“Michael Brown…was no angel” (Eligon 2014). These last words immediately became
the subject of controversy.
Christopher Massie, writing for the Columbia Journalism Review, summed up the
criticism by saying, “Teenagers, white and Black, rich and poor, are often emotionally
volatile, dabble with drugs, listen to rap, attempt to rap, and commit petty crimes. Does
that mean they deserve to be shot? Of course not, and… when they’re white, they very
rarely are” (Massie 2014). The term “no angel” is one that has commonly been applied
to Black victims of state-sanctioned violence. Author and television host, Touré,
6

responded by writing, “It’s as if a Black person must be a perfect victim to escape being
thuggified, an angel with an unblemished history in order to warrant justice” (Touré
2014).
In what was probably a well-intentioned journalistic eulogy (there is no reason to
doubt Eligon’s intentions), the New York Times perpetuated a racist idea that puts an
impossible burden on Black people by implying that in order to survive one must be so
without fault as to be considered divine. Furthermore, although it is discussed less,
calling him “no angel” publicly robs the deceased Michael Brown Jr. of status within the
Christian afterlife because popular depictions of the Christian afterlife are harbored in
the concept of resurrection of the dead into heavenly or angelic bodies. In his National
Book Award winning book, Ibram X. Kendi argues that racist ideas are put into place to
justify racist policies (Kendi 2016). Perhaps the “no angel” narrative is an example of one
such idea used to justify state-sanctioned violence. Regardless of intention, it evokes the
language of the Christian faith in a way that justifies the killing of young Black men in
America.
This project seeks to address the ways in which the Christian religion helps
Americans to interpret the prominence of police killings of Black people that, since the
advent of online streaming and the ability to quickly share video footage, have become
prevalent in the American social conscience. Broadly, this paper will address how race,
religion, and politics - three of the most polarizing forces in American life - intersect in
modern America. More specifically, this paper will use the Ferguson Moment and
continuing racial unrest in the St. Louis region as a case study to examine how religious
7

attitudes and religious institutions help to influence responses to racialized state
violence.
Ultimately, this paper will argue that while faith may seem to play a subtle role
in responses to racialized politics, it can work as both a force stymieing progress for
racial equity in criminal justice or inspiring advocacy for racial progress. Many factors
including doctrinal beliefs, religious practices, congregational community, tradition and
denomination, personal characteristics, and location seem can work as indicators for
which of these paths a member of the clergy might take in his or her response to
racialized violence. Additionally, this paper will show how many citizens in the Ferguson
area perceive that their religious congregation is taking action to fight racial injustice,
even to the point of encouraging civil disobedience. While at the same time, some
religious institutions can act as centers of the white dominant political status quo.

1.1: Defining the Problem
According to Noll (2008), “Together, race and religion make up, not only the
nation’s deepest and most enduring moral problem, but also its broadest and most
enduring political influence” (Noll 2008;1). Both forces divide Americans and shape
American culture. Religion is a very significant wedge in American politics, perhaps
second only to race, and this cleavage permeates throughout many areas of American
life. Green (2010) found that in the 2004 presidential election, the gap between the
Democratic and Republican candidates based on religious affiliation and religious
attendance was greater than on income, region, rural/urban divide, gender, generation
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and education; while the only gap shown to be larger was the race gap (Green 2010;
17). The influence of religious belief on American politics should not be underestimated.
Therefore, it is likely that both race and religion may influence how individuals
respond to the Ferguson moment. Beyond the “No Angel” comment, many instances
point toward the importance of religion in the world’s reaction to Michael Brown’s
death including, among others: Michael Brown’s family’s church falling victim to arson1,
a group of Tibetan monks standing in solidarity with Ferguson protestors, and, most
importantly for this study, the large number of religious leaders speaking out about
Brown’s death and the proper ways for their disciples to respond (Hafiz 2014; Lowery
2014; Religion and Politics 2014). The connection between racial tensions and religion
in modern American life was made tragically clear when, less than a year after Michael
Brown’s death, Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, a historic Black church in
Charleston, South Carolina, was the site of a racially charged mass shooting.
There is evidence that clergy played a strong supportive role in the
demonstrations following the killing of Michael Brown. Leah Gunning-Francis (2015)
uses interviews and other qualitative evidence to show how mainline protestant clergy
became involved in the Ferguson demonstrations (Francis 2015). Francis shows that
clergy actively demonstrated and provided resources to the young activists that led the

1

This parallels the fact that there were 40 Black churches burned in Mississippi in the
early summer of 1964, and is part of a trend of several Black churches falling victim to
arson in 2015.
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demonstrations, but they most often did not take on leadership roles themselves
(Francis 2015).
However, the media have shown examples of how other religious leaders in the
St. Louis area responded to Michael Brown’s death. One notable example is Ferguson
resident and professional jazz musician, Brian Owens, who, according to The Christian
Chronicle, proclaimed “Worship is our protest” at the predominantly African American
Ferguson Heights Church of Christ, going on to say, according to The Christian
Chronicle’s paraphrase, that it was “the fight for hearts and souls –not the fight in the
streets—that matters” (Ross 2015). The implication here is that spiritual revitalization is
more powerful than political reform or perhaps that it will be the only way to achieve
political reform.
These accounts represent two perspectives on the role of the church in response
to Michael Brown’s death and exemplify a continuing debate on the role of Christianity
in African American political advancement. The two theories, as described by Harris
(1999), are the opiate theory, in which an otherworldly focus turns religious institutions
into “an instrument of political pacification and fatalism”, and inspiration theory, which
argues that Christianity has been a powerful and positive force in Black American
politics (Harris 1999). Sociologist Christian Smith sums up the dichotomy quite well
saying, “Religion can help to keep everything in its place. But it can also turn the world
upside-down” (Smith 1996; 1). While there is evidence of both faces of religion within
the history of the Civil Rights Movement and Black political advancement in America,
the question this dissertation seeks to address is which of these theories better
10

describes the way that religion worked in the aftermath of Michael Brown Jr.’s death
and the continuing racialized conflict in the St. Louis region. If it can be assumed that it
probably works for both ends, then we must ask how.
In this work, I will try to answer these questions using a mixed method approach.
First, I examine the question at the level of individual citizens, the rank-and-file faithful. I
ask, in what ways do the religious beliefs and behaviors of individuals play into racialized
attitudes within Ferguson. Second, I examine the question from the perspective of faith
leaders. I ask in what ways did religious leaders within Ferguson and throughout the St.
Louis region respond to the killing of Michael Brown? This two-level approach will help
social scientists to better understand how both the clergy and the faithful rank-and-file
responded to the death of Michael Brown. However, this study will also have important
consequences for those doing racial justice work or those involved with Christian
ministry.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
In the introduction of this work, I discussed the significance of religion in the
political realm in the United States. However, exactly how these two significant forces
interact is up for debate. In this section, I will provide a brief sampling of the discussion
on the role of religion in civic life, how political scientists measure religiosity among
individuals, and the various gaps in political attitudes associated with variation in
religious belief and practice in the United States. Having established this necessary
context, I will then move on to a discussion of the theoretical framework on which this
study is based: opiate and inspiration theory. Throughout the years this basic dichotomy
has been discussed using various frameworks. I will relay a sample of those frameworks.
I will also discuss how religion has been seen as an inspiring force for racial progress as
well as a pacifying force working against racial progress throughout history and within
the academy. Finally, I will describe some theological factors that may shape the
influence of religion in politics under each theory.

2.1 Religion and Government
The roles of religion and government in public life have been discussed for
centuries amongst philosophers, theologians, judges, politicians, and, of course, social
scientists. Prominent writings on the relationship of church and state include Augustine
of Hippo’s City of God, H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture, and the writings of
Thomas Jefferson among myriad others. Augustine’s position is that the political sphere
is corrupted and can never be perfectly just, although it sometimes serves divine
purposes (Augustine 426). In the second position, Niebuhr discusses several approaches
12

that one might take to understanding the two spheres including pitting them against
each other and the idea that they are not separate spheres at all (Niebuhr 1951). Finally,
Thomas Jefferson describes the ideal relationship between church and state as a “high
wall of separation” between the two spheres. This forms the basis of the American
constitutional answer to the question (Jefferson 1802). The debate continues. The wall
of separation is not as high as many secularists would prefer, and yet for many members
of American faith communities it is too high. However, it is certain that mobilized
religious interests are often able to influence elections, court decisions, and policy
outcomes in the United States, and that personal religious sentiments and ideals are
able to influence the civic lives and political decisions of individual citizens and policy
makers. In this section, I will briefly discuss how scholars of religion choose to study
religion’s relationship to American civic life. Later, I will discuss religion’s role in social
movements in more depth.
In the United States, religiously grounded moral arguments have been a force in
major historical debates on abolitionism, immigration policy, prohibition, race politics,
and the role of women in society, among many others (Morone 2003). Indeed, Morone
describes the history of the United States in terms of morality. As he explains, “The
nation develops not from religious to secular but from revival to revival” (Morone 2003;
3). For Morone, the defining force for change in the history of our nation has been a
series of what he calls “jeremiads.” A term that references long mournful complaints
such as that of the prophet Jeremiah, jeremiads are calls for cultural repentance that
are often grounded in faith. However, these jeremiads are not always directed toward
13

equity. According to Morone, American faith has often moralized oppression, especially
based on race, yet at other times the faithful lead campaigns for social justice. Indeed,
faith and morality were motivators for both abolition and for slavery. While it is likely
clear to the casual observer that moralizing has taken place in the modern context of
Black Lives Matter and racial justice, regardless through which frame one observes the
events surrounding the death of Michael Brown and other racialized acts of police
brutality, the question remains: has the church response looked more like a call for
repentance to inequitable systems of criminal justice or has it moralized the oppression
of Black people?
Religion is clearly a powerful force across platforms of influence in the United
States. Since the early days of the nation, religious groups have effectively used the
courts to pursue their legal goals (Witte and Nichols 2011). Religion is also a powerful
force in American elections. This is evident by the religious mobilization on both the
ideological left and the right. Political elites take great care in trying to reach religiously
mobilized voters. According to Djupe and Calfano (2014), politicians often use religious
communication, specifically, “implicit, coded cues” in order to target religious
constituencies (Djupe and Calfano 2014; 45). These cues are not recognizable to those
outside the target religious constituency, often evangelicals, but are both recognizable
to evangelicals and effective in persuading them (Djupe and Calfano 2014; 45). Djupe
and Cafano deem this phenomena “god talk”. The concept is important and leaves us
with many questions, including: Are leaders using religiously coded calls to action when
they talk about responses to Ferguson? Why or why not? While Djupe and Calfano test
14

their god talk theory in a variety of policy arenas they do not address the question of
whether religiously coded messages are effective when it comes to promoting
progressive or conservative stances on racial justice.2 While this study will not address
how political leaders use religious messages, it will be evaluating the effectiveness of
religious messages on creating political responses.
Americans are divided by religion in at least two ways. They are divided by the
differing religious affiliations they identify with and by how religious they are. Likely the
first sociological study of religion and politics, Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, discusses how varying religious traditions promoted diverging
economic outcomes. Specifically, Weber argues that the development of the
theological tradition of Calvinism helped foster the rise of capitalism, causing protestant
nation-states to be more prosperous than their Roman Catholic counterparts (Weber
1958). This approach of viewing outcomes through the lens of religious traditions has
continued on into modern studies of social science including the field of political
science. Today, scholars often study social and political atittudes in the United States

2

Throughout this text I will often use the terms progressive and conservative. These
words have different meanings if we are talking about politics, theology, or Black
political and social advancement. Most often the term progressive used in this work will
refer to racially progressive ideas, policies, or actions. I use Christian historian and writer
Jemar Tisby’s definition to ground my usage: "When racial inequality gets inscribed into
policy those policies must change. Racial progress in the political realm necessarily
implies "progressive" policies. Even though "progressive" has taken on a political and
cultural significance all its own, in this context it simply means progressing beyond the
harmful rules and practices that create and maintain racial inequality.” (Tisby 2021). If
the terms “progressive” or “conservative” are used in terms of politics or theology that
will be indicated by the context.
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through the lens of the four main Christian traditions which dominate the American
culture: Evangelical Protestantism, Mainline Protestantism, Black Protestantism, and
Catholicism (Fowler et al. 2010). While these traditions dominate the American
religious landscape, a considerable effort has also been given in recent years to the
study of those who have no religious affiliation. Also known as religious “nones”, this
religious demographic has become more important to scholars of American religion as it
has steadily grown over the last decade or so, and is a large voting bloc of the
Democratic Party (Chaves 2011). Of course, these traditions, while being the most
dominant, do not account for the entirety of the religious diversity in the United States.
Additionally, studies can be divided down further into viewing denominational or
congregational relationships with political attitudes.
Political scientists have found that individuals from different religious traditions
are mobilized on different issues and prefer to participate in politics in different ways.
For example, evangelical Protestants are more closely associated with political
conservatism while mainline Protestants are more associated with political
progressivism. According to Fowler et al., the Catholic tradition plays an important
strategic role in American politics as its members tend to be “swing voters”, often being
sought as an ally by those from both the mainline and evangelical tradition (Fowler et al.
2010; 40). Accordingly, Catholics tend to be less politically unified than evangelicals or
Black Protestants. Black Protestants, while theologically very similar to evangelicals,
vote overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party. According to Fowler et al. Catholics
make up the largest percentage of the voting age population by religious tradition (25
16

percent), followed closely by White Evangelical Protestants at 23 percent, the religiously
unaffiliated or “nones” at 15 percent, White Mainline Protestants at 14 percent and
Black Protestants at 9 percent, with other traditions making up the rest of the
population (Fowler et al. 2010; 83). Understanding religious tradition is necessary for
understanding the interaction of faith and politics.
Going deeper, many scholars of religion (Nancy Ammerman is among the most
notable) have turned to the study of individual congregations. The seminal study on
religion and place is Ammerman’s Congregation and Community (1997). In this work,
Ammerman takes an ecological approach in order to describe how religious institutions
respond to community change whether economic, cultural, or otherwise. According to
Ammerman, congregations are “a part of a community’s institutional infrastructure, a
part of the structures and connections that make social life possible” (Ammerman 1997,
346). Ammerman goes on to point out that religious communities help maintain the
communal life of neighborhoods within urban areas because they provide for “collective
public commitment with particularistic belonging…[and] allow the full range of U.S.
pluralism to be expressed (Ammerman 1997, 355). Congregations are important to the
study of local politics because they are entities firmly grounded within the geography of
a city that also sponsor a particular worldview that congregants use in interpreting their
civic life. Ammerman’s study is essential for this paper because of her focus on both
congregation and place since this paper’s main goal is to understand how congregations
and faith elites (as well as individual beliefs and attitudes) helped to shape the public
response to the Ferguson moment.
17

In addition to studying how political attitudes relate to religious traditions, many
political scientists study differences in political behavior across values of religiosity.
Religiosity, the measure of the intensity of religious belief and practice, is employed in
several studies of human behavior. It is measured either through the frequency of
attendance of religious services or a scale composed by adding the intensity of various
religious behaviors. Olson and Green provide evidence of this type of religious division
within denominations, or what they call “The Religion Gap”, by showing that frequency
of attendance of religious services is a positive indicator of political conservatism and
Republican party identification (Olson and Green 2006). This gap exists within
denominations and individual churches. In social science studies, religiosity has been
used as an indicator of young marriages (Uecker 2014), contraceptive use in adolescents
(Studer and Thornton 1987), and mood states of those coping with cancer (Fehring et. al
1997) to name just a few. In the field of political science, it has been used as an indicator
of several important political traits including: authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996),
conservatism (Olson and Green 2006), Republican Party identification, intolerance and
even good neighborliness (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Religiosity can also be used as
an indicator of attitudes on several policy positions including: attitudes toward
members of the LGBTQ community and on the issues of abortion, divorce, the use of
contraceptives, gambling, pornography, welfare, the environment, and attitudes toward
suicide and euthanasia. Because of its broad application, religiosity is clearly a useful
tool in the understanding of religion and politics. Additionally, because of its
relationship with politicized issues across party politics, it is worth examining as an
18

indicator of racialized attitudes within Ferguson which have also been deeply divided by
party politics.
Some scholars of religion and politics have gone beyond just divisions in
religiosity and tradition as indicators of social cleavages. For example, instead of
focusing on differences in tradition or intensity, Guth et al. examines differences based
on the concepts of orthodoxy and modernism. Guth et al. finds that religious orthodoxy
and modernism among protestant clergy are becoming increasingly connected to where
they fit on the political ideology spectrum, (Guth et al. 1998). Others have studied
cleavages across individualistic and communitarian religion. Using evidence from the
2006 and 2008 American National Election Study, a large annual national survey of
voters in the United States, Mockabee et al. were able to find a statistical indicator of
whether one’s religious belief is likely to lead to affiliation with either the Religious Left
or the Religious Right (Mockabee et al. 2009). That indicator was two different factors
of religiosity. The first, which is typically used in studies of religiosity, is the
individualistic factor, developed using variables such as frequency of church attendance,
frequency of prayer, etc. The second, the communitarian religiosity factor is not as
widely used. It focuses on measuring an individual's attitudes toward collective worship
practices. The factor uses variables on belief in substantiation through the Eucharist,
and a variable asking “when you [try] to be a good Christian, which did you try to do
more: avoid doing sinful things yourself, or help other people?.” In this study
Mockabee et al. found that the typical individualistic measure of religiosity has a
positive relationship with Republican Party identification, while the communitarian
19

factor has a negative relationship with Republican Party identification (Mockabee et al.
2009). The individual religiosity factor also had positive coefficients on scales measuring
views on abortion, gay rights, and the role of women while the communitarian
religiosity factor had negative but weaker coefficients on all three of the topics
(Mockabee et al. 2009). The concept of communitarian and individualistic religiosity is
one that I do not believe has been given enough attention within the larger field of
religion and politics, perhaps due to the fact that scholars might think that what is being
measured does not indicate differences in factors of religiosity, but simply religious
tradition. However, Mockabee et al.’s framework allows scholars to examine
communitarian and individualistic pulls of religion within individuals who are imbedded
in traditions. I suspect that these factors will play a role in how people react to instances
of racial injustice and perhaps may prove to be better indicators of political attitudes
than religious tradition or religiosity.
The examining of differences in religious tradition, congregation, and personal
religiosity (among individuals), as well as theological differences across the orthodoxymodernism spectrum and the communitarian and individualistic religion factors, are all
examples of tools that will be used in this paper to help us understand how institutions
and people of faith responded to the killing of Michael Brown. With the exception of
the communitarian and individualistic religion factors, they all have been widely used
throughout political science and sociological studies of religion. However, this project
also looks for gaps in racialized attitudes that may be related to other theological beliefs

20

beyond these measures including eschatological beliefs and conceptions of the mission
of Jesus.

2.2 Opiate and Inspiration: Religion and Black Political Advancement in America
This project is interested in the role religious institutions performed in the
aftermath of the death of Michael Brown. Political scientists and sociologists have
provided a dualistic literature of diametrically opposed authors on the subject of
religion’s capacity to create positive change for racial minorities in the United States or
racial progress in general. Fredrick Harris refers to these two competing schools of
thought as opiate theory and inspiration theory. Harris describes the former as the
theory that “insists that Afro-Christianity promotes otherworldliness, functioning as an
instrument of political pacification and fatalism” while the latter “makes exactly the
opposite claim arguing that Afro-Christianity has played a central role in Black politics,
catalyzing, for example, the collective involvement of African Americans in the modern
civil rights movement” (Harris 1999; 4-5). In this paper, I will use the same terms,
however, I will not limit their definitions to Black Christianity in America, but I will try to
show how religion has inspired or discouraged Americans from all racial and faith
backgrounds to act in response to the police killings of people of color in America,
specifically the killing of Michael Brown. I expect for religion to inspire or pacify the
reaction of Black Christians in different ways than white Christian traditions, but that is
exactly why I plan on broadening the definition, to help uncover those differences. What
follows in this chapter is a discussion of the origins and current statuses of these schools
of thought.
21

Opiate Theory: How Religion Hinders Black Political Advancement
The term, opiate theory, in the African-American religious context is credited to
Gary Marx (1967), who found that the more frequently a Black respondent attended
church and the higher the importance placed on religion by the respondent, the lower
the level of the respondent’s civil rights militancy (Marx 1967). The creation of several
secular Black interest groups (the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People and the Urban League) throughout the early twentieth century as alternatives to
Black churches coincides with this perception of religion as an opiate to militancy
(Fowler et al. 2010).
However, the idea of religion as a pacifying force has its roots far earlier and its
sentiment was popularized by another Marx. Karl Marx famously said, “Religion is the
sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless
conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 1843). By this Marx meant that religion
is a tool used by those in power to pacify the masses from overthrowing tyrannical
economic and societal systems. In his thinking the abolition of religion, is therefore
essential in the progress of human history and the liberation of the oppressed classes.
According to Marx, questioning religion causes us to question all oppressive institutions
of society. He goes on to say, “It is, therefore, the task of history, once the otherworld of
truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world... Thus criticism of Heaven turns
into the criticism of Earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the
criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.” Marx’s eschatology is therefore a
secular utopia in which the pacifying forces of religion are thrown out.
22

In this section, I will discuss opiate theory, or the theory that religion is a
hindrance to the social advancement of those with less power. More specifically, in the
American context opiate theory describes a worldview that causes Black Americans to
act in ways that are counter to their self-interests and to refrain from participation in
the political sphere even when their human and civil rights are being violated. I choose a
looser definition, defining opiate theory as the phenomena of religion acting as a
pacifying force that stymies anti-racisim and progressivism in general. I will attempt to
discuss the thought behind opiate theory and the empirical evidence from the fields of
sociology and political science that support it.
Marxism and Dialectical Materialism
For Marx, religion justifies the societal evils of this world because, “Religion is
the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form,
its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement,
and its universal basis of consolation and justification” (Marx 1843). Religion provides a
distorted interpretation of the world because religion is the product of humanity like the
many other oppressive systems that mankind has created. In response to Hegel, Marx
develops his worldview of “dialectical materialism” in which he perceives class struggles
as the main way for understanding how history unfolds, as opposed to Hegel’s focus on
conflict of ideas. Marx approaches Hegel through Feuerbach’s conception of materialism
for whom, religion, “poisons, nay destroys, the most divine feeling in man, the sense of
truth” (Thompson 2011). For Marx, ideas, and more specifically, religion, as constructs
of humanity, do not help in the change and progress of human history because they are
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prescribed by those who wish to maintain the status quo; they are untruths, a god
delusion. Rather, global change happens in real-world struggles not in the battlefield of
the heart or mind, because through those struggles of history exposes real truth. This of
course stands in conflict with the saying of Jesus in the Gospel of John, “I am the Way,
the Truth, and the Life.”
Secularization
As Marx predicted that the role of history was to “uncover the truth” and, in the
process of doing so abolish religion, many social scientists began to document the
decline of religion as a prominent force in civic life. Secularization, the view that that the
modernization of society leads to the devaluing of religion, became the scientifically
accepted view of religion in the 1960’s. Prominent pioneer scholars of secularization
include Bryan Wilson, David Martin, and Peter L. Berger among others. The theory
gained such wide acceptance in the academic community that, until recently, it was
mostly unchallenged. Katznelson and Jones (2010) sum up the theory, saying,
[It] purported to describe a universal transition from a traditional religious
picture of the world to a rational conception. Every society was thought to be
caught up in this global trajectory, even if each progressed along it at different
speeds. In this approach, the division and differentiation of church and state
into separate spheres was identified with a progressive separation of politics
from religion, an overall shift from a religious to a rational and scientific
mentality, and a waning acceptance of religious authority (Katznelson and Jones
2010).
Secularization can encompass several different phenomena but usually comes in
at least one of three varieties: the decline of religious practice, the decline in power of
religious institutions, and the change in religious thinking (Wilson 1966). Whatever
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form, secularization always means change. Wilson finds the latter of the three varieties,
the change in religious thinking, to be the most dramatic for society; he says, “Religious
thinking is perhaps the area which evidence most conspicuous change. Men act less and
less in response to religious motivation: they assess the world in empirical and rational
terms, and find themselves involved in rational organizations and rationally determined
roles which allow small scope for such religious predilections as they might privately
entertain” (Wilson 1966; 10). If religious institutions are declining in power and
religious thoughts are not effective in swaying minds how then can religion be a force of
any power in political advancement or in anything in the temporal world? Therefore,
secularization is a denial of the ability of religion to have influence outside of its own
sphere.
Wallis and Bruce (1992) describe the process of secularization as having three
features, which seem to reflect the varieties of secularization discussed by Wilson.
These include: social differentiation, societalization, and rationalization. The first of the
three, social differentiation refers to the “process by which specialized roles and
institutions are developed or arise to handle specific features or functions previously
embodied in, or carried out by, one role or institution” (Wallis and Bruce 1992; 12). For
example, in the United States, religious institutions used to perform much of the public
health and welfare roles now provided by the state. While the church in the United
States still works to provide for these functions at some capacity, the responsibility has
been mostly relegated to the government. Societalization, the social change that has
occurred over time causing individuals to view their lives as connected with society at
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large rather than simply their own village or small community, fuels the privatization of
religious institutions. Religion is now less likely to address broad popular concerns, but
rather to mostly impact individuals. Finally, rationalization refers to the ever increasing
reliance on rational thought rather than moral or sacred influences in the decision
making processes of individuals. If true, all three forces would continually sap the ability
of the church to be a force for equity in society.
However, the evidence for secularization is mixed. According to Chaves (2011),
using evidence from the General Social Survey as well as the National Congregations
Study, it is clear that many religious beliefs have remained fairly consistent among
Americans since the 1970s, with the only real changes in beliefs being a decline in the
belief in biblical inerrancy and a development of “diffuse spirituality” (Chaves 2011; 33).
Additionally, Chaves finds that while religious service attendance may have been in
decline during the 1970’s and 80’s, it has remained fairly stable since the 1990s (Chaves
2011; 47).
While religiosity in America may now be in a period of stability, that does not
mean that modernity has not shifted how Americans practice their faith. According to
Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014), “Religion has certainly been touched and influenced
by the modern world, but it is more accurate to speak of secularization as adjustment
and adaptation than to employ the image of decline and fall” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown
2014; 17). While the roles of religious institutions have changed in their relationship to
society, in the political realm it is still easy to see the role that religion plays in American
elections through religious gaps at the voting booth. This paper seeks to address how
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this relationship has adapted to the modern context of post-Ferguson America. Is the
relationship between the church and society nothing more than a hodgepodge of
congregations that discourage active participation in combating societal evils, or is the
Christian faith a more powerful contiguous institution that encourages societal change?
Structural Functionalism
Following secularization, the sociological theory of structural functionalism also
precludes a prominent role for the church within the culture at large. According to Smith
“This school of thought viewed religion as serving society’s macro-functional need for
cultural consensus and social integration…to the extent that religion survived the forces
of secularization, it did so because it provided the shared values and norms necessary to
promote social harmony and equilibrium” (Smith 1996; 2). Structural Functionalism can
be thought of as an extension of the privatization of religious life from the secularist
school of thought. Religion helps serve a purpose for individuals but is unlikely to
overstep its bounds and go into the political sphere. People receive spiritual
nourishment from religious activities and belonging to religious communities, but that
does not affect their political attitudes or actions and certainly cannot influence policy
change.
Elements of the American Christian Opiate
The Marxist theory of dialectical materialism provides no avenue for religion to
influence social change because of its distance from material wealth and temporal
struggle, while secularization simply precludes religion from being the seat of power as
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modernity moves forward. The question then must be asked: are there aspects
inherent to religion that preclude it from playing a role in social and political
advancement even if we reject the notion of dialectical materialism and the impact of
secularization?
H. Richard Niebuhr, in his classic book, Christ and Culture, discusses the interplay
of Christianity and the cultural sphere through the development of a typology. Niebuhr
defines culture as the “language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization,
inherited artifacts, technical processes and values” that human beings hold to (Niebuhr
1951). The types which describe how culture and the Christian faith interact are as
follows: Christ against Culture, Christ of Culture, and Christ above Culture. The last of
these types has three subtypes: Christ and Culture in synthesis, Christ and Culture in
Paradox, and Christ as Transformer of Culture. Each of these types are positions that can
and have been adopted by various institutions and individuals over the history of the
Christian church. Of these, the first two types as well as the Christ and Culture in
Paradox subtype fit in well with opiate theory, while the Christ as Transformer of
Culture is an example of inspiration theory and Christ and Culture in synthesis is neutral.
Niebuhr’s conception of the Christ against Culture is the theological perspective
that Christians and the world are in conflict. This worldview is well in line with opiate
theory because it calls Christians into reclusion. In this theology, Christians are the “new
creation” and the people of God that will soon be brought into the “new Jerusalem”.
They therefore should be separated from the world which is corrupted while Christians
are restored, or in the process of being restored. This theological worldview is largely
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rooted in the Book of Revelation and the First Letter of John and Niebuhr claims that it
was espoused by Christian leaders throughout history from Tertullian to Tolstoy.
Notably, Niebuhr describes the former as taking the “positive and warm” ethics of love
from the New Testament and replacing it with negative morality and a focus on fearful
avoidance of sin—a trait that has been found to be related to individualistic Christianity
and conservative political behavior (Mockabee et al. 2009) . Niebuhr describes Tolstoy’s
position as one in which “good government” is a nonsensical concept. Niebuhr describes
this position by saying, “Against [Government’s] evil there is no defense except
complete nonparticipation, and nonviolent striving for the conversion of all men to
peaceful, anarchic Christianity” (Niebuhr 1951; 61). Therefore, Christians of this type
will avoid political action and, indeed, refuse to give politics much thought beyond a
general disdain.
According to Niebuhr, in this position, “The counterpart of loyalty to Christ and
the brothers is the rejection of cultural society; A clear line is drawn between the
brotherhood of the children of God and the world” (Niebuhr 1951; 47). Christians are
viewed as a new people, or a new race and are called to separation. A Christian with this
theological conviction is likely to withdraw from society altogether (Niebuhr provides
famed author Leo Tolstoy as an example), rather than try to actually transform the
cultural sphere. Christians and the world are at war against each other.
In addition to the Christ against Culture theology, Niebuhr describes a theology
of Christ of Culture, this position does not see a tension between Christianity and
Culture. According to Niebuhr, those who hold this faith-based worldview, “[I]nterpret
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culture through Christ, regarding those elements in it as most important which are most
accordant with his work and person; on the other hand they understand Christ through
culture, selecting from his teaching and action as well as from the Christian doctrine
about him such points as seem to agree with what is best in civilization” (Niebuhr 1951;
83) This position does not allow for the Christian religion to bring about much change in
culture because it works to harmonize the two. While they see the culture through a
Christian perspective, their Christian perspective is also seen through a cultural lens.
Ancient Gnostics and more modern liberal protestants of the early twentieth century fit
well into this type. Niebuhr criticizes this group as both not being very effective in
proselytizing or in meeting cultural goals, and acknowledges that they face criticism
from both the religious and the secular. Niebuhr says, “Christian liberalism is rejected by
John Dewey as well as by a Barth. Marxists dislike Christian socialism as much as
orthodox Calvinists and Lutherans do” (Niebuhr 1951; 108). Essentially, in an attempt to
harmonize both concepts, they created a watered down Christianity alongside a
powerless position in culture.
Niebuhr’s third type is “Christ Above Culture”. In this worldview, Christians rely
on both Christ and Culture to live their lives. Niebuhr divides this into three sub-types.
Of these Christ and Culture in Paradox aligns well with opiate theory while Christ
Transforming Culture aligns with faith supporting and inspiring social action and Christ
and Culture in synthesis is more neutral. I will discuss the paradox and synthesis
worldviews here, saving the transformative position for later on in this work when I
discuss the theological bases for Inspiration theory. Christ above Culture is distinctive
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because it views the question as one of God and humanity rather than God and the
world. Christ and Culture in Paradox is based on the idea that God is holy and man is
sinful. God is able to redeem and provide Grace while humankind is prone to
destruction. Christians must therefore uphold both merciful grace and divine
judgement. Christians are called to be all-graceful (forgiving) and all-truthful
(condemning). This might not seem as perplexing to the Christian as paradoxical
concepts are present in many of the core theological concepts of Christianity including
the incarnation (Jesus is both fully God and fully man) and the trinity (there is one God
in three persons). Niebuhr traces this stance to the writings of the apostle Paul and
tracks it through Luther and Kierkegaard. This perspective naturally supports political
conservatism because it offers grace to those within the Christian community but
condemns lifestyles and behavior that are not congruent with the moral codes of the
community. Therefore, outsiders are often seen as wicked rather than deserving of
grace.
The synthesis position tries to harmonize the Christian Church and Culture.
Christians are to rely on both Christ and Culture in order to live fulfilling, God-fearing
lives. This is seen clearly in the Christian tradition of providing proofs for God using both
reason and faith. While reason is from the culture, it is seen as a gift from God.
Proponents would contend both are needed in order to fully understand the Christian
religion. This worldview is neutral in whether it supports or suppresses political action
on social issues within the church. However, it seems like it leans more towards
suppressing political action. This is because rather than taking the step to allow the
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Church to transform the culture, this position can lead to the Church becoming simply
another institution within the culture. The most notable proponent of this position
from church history is Thomas Aquinas.
Another typology developed by a sociologist rather than a theologian comes
from Christian Smith who describes religion’s relationship to culture as two faces that
roughly align with the conception of opiate and inspiration theory. To Smith, religion in
its pacifying role is the first face of religion (later he discusses how religion’s second face
is one that inspires political activism). According to Smith,
Religion typically is in the business of supplying meaningful worldviews and moral
systems that help to integrate and harmonize societies; of providing comforting
theodicies to those distressed and suffering; of rendering ideologies that legitimate the
oftentimes unjust status quo (Smith 1996; 1).

In this view, religious institutions inspire little more than church attendance, and
while they can have a harmonizing effect on communities, they often lead to the stifling
of social progress. This is due to the fact that religious cultural systems all feature what
Smith calls, “sacred transcendence”. This is, essentially, a focus on the otherworldly
which fundamentally shifts how one perceives reality. Religion, therefore, encourages
conservatism because it “helps to justify and sustain the world and life just as it is
experienced” (Smith 1996; 6). Religion can, therefore, cause those in lower social strata
to not strive for social advancement in this world but to pacify themselves so as to
achieve some form of heavenly prize. According to Emmerson and Smith, “By providing
significance and purpose to life as it is, religion provides legitimation for the world as it
is (Emmerson and Smith 2000; 17). This legitimation leads believers to passive
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acceptance of the world, as well as its political and social systems, while diverting their
attention heavenward.
Another theological feature of American Christianity that hinders social progress
is premillennialism (Emmerson and Smith 2000). Premillennialism, generally, is the
Christian theological concept rooted in the Book of Revelation that claims that Christ
will return before establishing his heavenly kingdom that will reign for a thousand years
on Earth. While sacred transcendence is a focus on the otherworldly which justifies the
world as it is, premillennialism justifies the idea that the temporal world is unholy and in
a constant state of decline until the return of Christ (i.e. it is beyond saving). Souls are
to be saved, while the world is condemned, prompting believers to avoid political action
and spend their time proselytizing. The Great Commission to spread the gospel is
prioritized over the second of the great commandments to love others. Michael Gerson
in a column in The Atlantic describing the relationship between evangelical Christians
and the Trump presidency described premillennial theology and its effect on American
politics. According to Gerson,
In this view, the current age is tending not toward progress, but rather toward
decadence and chaos under the influence of Satan. A new and better age will not be
inaugurated until the Second Coming of Christ, who is the only one capable of cleaning
up the mess. No amount of human effort can hasten that day, or ultimately save a
doomed world. For this reason, social activism was deemed irrelevant to the most
essential task: the work of preparing oneself and helping others prepare for final
judgment (Gerson 2018).

Premillennial theology is widespread throughout American evangelicalism and
plays into individualistic and exclusionary attitudes. One theological offshoot of
premillennialism that is common among more charismatic sects of Christianity is
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dispensationalism. This theological argument holds that throughout history God has
made several revelations or dispensations to mankind, establishing new responsibilities
to humanity which man will ultimately fail to live up to. This ultimately leads to divine
judgement. Dispensationalists argue that the “end times” are imminent, therefore,
there is not much of a need for social activism, but rather proselytism. For example,
studies have found that premillennialist and dispensationalist eschatology are negatively
related to support for progressive environmental policy (Guth et al. 1995). The
impending judgment compels believers to work less towards lasting social change and
focus more on enforcing Christian moralism. Consequently, it should be expected that
conservative eschatology leads to conservative politics across policy arenas. For
premillennialists, the world is in a state of decay that can only be stopped through the
Parousia, the second coming of Christ.
Additionally, American Christians are able to draw on a wealth of scriptural
support for opiate worldviews including passages that describe the sovereignty of
political powers as well as passages that command peaceful living. Through these
passages, Christians may see new ideas as creating division and not as living at peace
with others. Within the American Christian tradition, “common sense” readings of
scripture where historical/social context of the writings are largely ignored for how a
particular passage can apply to the reader are common. Therefore, individual verses can
be as important as developed theological frameworks, because they are influential in
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the development of attitudes among individuals and their leaders. Here are a few
examples of passages from the Christian scriptures that justify an opiate position3:
● “For the kingdom is the LORD’S And He rules over the nations.” Psalm 22:28
● “And he said, “O LORD, the God of our fathers, are You not God in the heavens?
And are You not ruler over all the kingdoms of the nations? Power and might are
in Your hand so that no one can stand against you” 2 Chronicles 20:6
● “He rules by His might forever; His eyes keep watch on the nations; Let not the
rebellious exalt themselves. Selah.” Psalm 66:7
● “Every person is to be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no
authority expect from God, and those which exist are established by God.
Therefore, whoever resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and they
who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves. For rulers are not
a cause of fear for good behavior, but of evil. Do you want to have no fear of
Authority? Do what is good and you will have praise from the same” Romans
13:1-4
● “But I say to you, do not resist an evil person; but whoever slaps you on your
right cheek, turn the other to him also.” Matthew 5:39
Finally, beyond key biblical passages that may be used as justification for opiate
attitudes, how one values scripture may be related to attitudes on racial justice.
Biblicism, the view that the Bible should be read literally and is the ultimate source of
divine authority has been shown to be related to attitudes on criminal justice.
Specifically, Perry and Whitehead (2020) find evidence that race alongside Biblicist
readings of scripture interact to influence one’s evaluation of which is preferential:
wrongful conviction or erroneous acquittal. Essentially, when it comes to the question
of which is better to let the innocent be imprisoned or to let the guilty go free being
white and biblicist views of scripture are positively related to the former. Perry and
Whitehead find that these variables interact in that whiteness moderates the effect of

3

All passages listed here are from the New American Standard Bible.
35

biblical literalism. Being a white biblical literalist is the strongest predictor of preferring
wrongful conviction over erroneous acquittal, while being a non-white biblical literalist
or a white non-biblical literalist are less likely to prefer wrongful conviction. At the same
time, being Black makes one unlikely to prefer wrongful conviction regardless of views
on the Bible. These preferences are tied to racialized attitudes because of the high
disparity in arrests, convictions, and sentencing between Black people and white people
(The Sentencing Project). If views toward the Bible can influence attitudes toward a
racialized criminal justice issue, they are likely to influence racist or anti-racist attitudes
more broadly.
Real World Evidence of Opiate Theory
Practically, we can see opiate theory at work throughout history and around the
world. Numerous religious groups seek to remain entirely separate from the political
sphere. These include the Amish, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and who formally separate their
religious groups from the political sphere, but also many of the faithful avoid political
culture because they perceive it as creating disunity and not important to their mission.
Today despite Republican control of the legislative and executive branches of
government, and the Christian right being in a comparatively influential position in
American politics, Rod Dreher argued for a Christian retreat from American civil life in
his 2017 New York Times bestselling and widely discussed book, The Benedict Option
(Dreher 2017). For Dreher, Christians are opposed to culture and instead of entering
the Culture War, they should build their own secluded culture. Dreher’s book responds
to the politics of the day with pessimism. He predicts the obliteration of Christian
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America if Christians do not retreat into their own counter cultural communities. For
Dreher this is the way to preserve the Christian faith rather than political action.
However, the opiate theory in practice looks less like a separation of the church from
culture and more like religious values, language, and institutions promoting the status quo and
moralizing oppression. In The Color of Compromise, Jemar Tisby describes the history of the
Christian Church’s complicity in racism in the United States. This history can be traced from the
the pre-revolutionary period, through religious defenses of slavery in the antebellum period, as
well as inaction during the Civil Rights Movement (Tisby 2019). Indeed, the religious alliance
with conservative politics has done much to quell racial progressive social action in the United
States.

Up to this point, I have discussed opiate theory as a phenomenon that
suppresses political progressivism through a focus on otherworldly reward and a denial
of the temporal world or of the role of the church as an active force in changing the
temporal world. While this can lead to seclusion and isolation from the political sphere,
there is, of course, another way that religion stymies political progressivism: through the
facilitation of and alignment with right-wing politics.
The American Culture War
A widely discussed and divisive theory on how religion helps to form a divide in
American civic life is the culture wars theory. James Davison Hunter is attributed by the
literature as the first to coin the term in his book “Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America” and since then many have affirmed or countered his main claim that there is a
division between the orthodox and progressive and that this division will lead to
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increasing conflict inside and outside of the American political sphere (Hunter 1991).
The idea that, in America, religiosity is associated with the political right while
secularism is associated with the political left is often viewed through this lens.
However, Putnam and Campbell describe the development of religious polarization in
America as a series of “seismic societal shocks”, the first being the sexual revolution of
the 1960s (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 3). This led to a growth of conservatism and
religious evangelicalism as a response. According to Putnam and Campbell, “as
theological and political conservatism began to converge, religiously inflected issues
emerged on the national political agenda, and ‘religion’ became increasingly associated
with the Republican Party” (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 3). This led to another “seismic
shock” in which many, especially the young, have begun to disavow religion.
This narrative provides evidence that there is a divide between the conservative
religious and the more liberal non-religious, but does not account for the divide
between the theologically conservative and progressive within the American religious
community. Hunter dates the roots of the Culture War as much older than Putnam and
Campbell’s societal shocks, over a hundred years and claims that theological progressive
initiatives within churches, synagogues and other religious organizations have been
countered by orthodox reactions for over a century. Some examples cited are:
protestant intellectuals who pushed for an interpretation of the Bible that was
reconciled with the findings of modern science and the orthodox groups who countered
in defending the scripture through the creation of dozens of Bible colleges and other
organizations, American Catholics who desired to make their religion more palatable to
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protestant Americans of the time, and the papal condemnation of this Catholic
Americanism, as well as the formation of the reform movement in Judaism and the
struggle of the Orthodox to maintain their religious identities (Hunter 1991, 78-85).
The theory is not accepted across the board by the political science literature.
One of its biggest detractors is Morris Fiorina. Fiorina et al. argue that the American
electorate is not polarized along moral lines, rather that the political figures from whom
the electorate must choose are more polarized (Fiorina et al. 2010). Wolfe argues that
the perceived culture war is a product of journalistic sensationalism and that while there
has been a growth of religious conservatives, that does not necessarily mean that the
various denominations are split between orthodox and the theologically progressive
(Wolf et al. 2007). While there is evidence for both competing schools of thought, the
culture wars framework is useful in explaining the alliance between religious institutions
and the American political right and tracks with the current racialized division within
American life.
The Religious Right
The Religious Right is a conservative political movement in the United States
mostly made up of Christian evangelicals which can be traced back to evangelical
leaders such as Jerry Falwell and others within the Moral Majority organization in the
1970s. The Religious Right tends to embrace the culture war narrative and believe that
they are “culture warriors” fighting for moral positions on family, education, and
sexuality (Lambert 2008). Among others, both Putnam and Campbell as well as Lambert
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argue that this movement rose as a response to the counter-culture movement and
sexual revolution of the 1960’s (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Lambert 2008). While
Jimmy Carter was able to get elected with the support of southern evangelicals, having
said throughout his campaign that he is a born again Christian, his liberal policies on
education and his views on family were a contrast to those of evangelicals at the time
and allowed for the Christian Right to better motivate evangelicals to vote Republican
(Lambert 2008, pages 196-205). According to Martin (2005), despite Ronald Reagan
being less religious in his personal life than President Carter, Falwell and the rest of the
Moral Majority supported him because he championed the family values agenda that
they argued for (Martin 2005). Since this time, the Religious Right has played an active,
and often a successful, role in the Republican Party nomination process, the formation
of Republican Party Platforms at the state and national levels, lobbying Congress, and
litigation (Wilcox and Robinson 2011).
According to Wilcox and Robinson, Americans join the religious right for one of
two reasons. Either there is an aspect of one’s personality that is linked to membership
in the Christian Right, for example many argue that those who are more authoritarian or
dogmatic are more likely to join up (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). Alternatively,
Americans may join the Christian Right because the movement represents their political
views and religious beliefs and allows them to have influence within Republican party
politics (Wilsox and Robinson 2011).
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The Authoritarian Christian
Adorno et al. introduced the concept of authoritarianism as a type of personality
trait, or a set of traits, that centers around the concept of obedience to authority,
adherence to norms and procedures, and frustration towards out-groups (Adorno
1950).4 According to Adorno, this concept is one that most often presents itself to those
who have had a harsh upbringing.
Altemeyer (1988) has a more specific definition than Adorno. He defines
authoritarianism as the combination of three attitudinal clusters: 1. Authoritarian
submission, which is defined as “a high degree of submission to the authorities who are
perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;” 2.
Authoritarian aggression, which is defined as “ a general aggressiveness, directed
against various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities;”
3. Conventionalism, or “ a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are
perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities” (Altemeyer 1988;
page 2).
Authoritarianism is also an attribute that tends to be positively related to
conservatism. In fact, in many studies it is not known simply as authoritarianism, but
right-wing authoritarianism. There has been some debate over whether or not there is
such a thing as left-wing authoritarianism, as many have claimed that some fascist forms
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While both are attitudes that deal with frustration towards out-groups,
authoritarianism should not be misconstrued with ethnocentrism.
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of government were more left-wing in their ideals; Altemeyer presents the idea that in
modern western societies it is hard to measure authoritarianism among those in the left
because their political ideology is very far removed from that of the established
government. (Altemeyer 1988, 258-264). Altemeyer (1988) says, “Communists in
countries such as Canada and the United States will be very unsubmissive to the
established authorities; they will favor free speech, the right to dissent, and so on, and
thus they will be ‘democrats.’ In places such as the Soviet Union and Poland, however,
Communists will be opposed to these things and so be highly authoritarian” (Altemeyer
1988, page 260).
Later, Altemeyer did develop a definition of left-wing authoritarianism which has
the same components as his definition of right-wing authoritarianism only with a
different direction (Altemeyer1996). Left-wing authoritarians have a high degree of
submission to authorities who are dedicated towards overthrowing established
authorities, a high degree of aggression towards those established authorities and those
who support them, and a high level of conventionalism in regards to the norms and
conventions of the revolutionary authorities (Altemeyer 1996, 219). Still it is a concept
that is, if not more present in those of the political right, hard to measure among those
of the left.
Stenner (2005) has proposed a different view of the concept. For Stenner,
authoritarianism is simply a psychological predisposition to intolerance. It is a
predisposition where one values group authority and uniformity over individual
freedom and diversity (Stenner 2005). On the other hand, Hetherington and Weiler
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(2009) believe that the concept’s root is in the need of many to impose order on
ambiguous situations (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, page 34). Furthermore, while
they agree with scholars such as Fiorina that the public is not as polarized as the media
makes it out to be, they present evidence that the public does have polarized levels of
authoritarianism and that it is possible that “those scoring at opposite ends of the
authoritarianism tend to engage in different, and often incompatible, forms of moral
reasoning” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, page 187). Perhaps, therefore, the culture
war is not against liberals and conservatives, or modernists and orthodox, but nonauthoritarians and authoritarians.
In regards to religion, the literature conventionally points to the idea that those
who are more religious are more authoritarian and vice versa. Altemeyer (1996) finds
specific evidence that authoritarianism is correlated with religious orthodoxy and
fundamentalism.
However, using various scales of religious maturity, Leak and Randall (1995)
found that there is a negative relationship between authoritarianism and religious
maturity (i.e. those who are more mature in their religious faith are less authoritarian
than those who are immature in their religious practice) (Leak and Randall 1995).
Religious maturity as examined by Leak and Randall includes, among other items, critical
thought about one’s faith, openness to doubt, and the ability to examine religious issues
without reducing their complexity. As authoritarianism tends to be linked to
conservatism, this is in direct contrast to the Religion Gap hypothesis that those who
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attend church more often are more likely to be conservative than those who do not; it is
also in contrast to Altemeyer’s findings.
Inspiration Theory: How Religion Encourages Black Political Advancement
In this section, I will walk through the various theological concepts and historical
movements that support the idea that faith inspires social action. Specifically, I will
discuss Niebuhr’s conception of Christ as the Transformer of Culture and postmillennial
eschatology as worldviews that are associated with Christian political action. I will then
take some time to discuss Christianity as a social force in U.S history by discussing the
Social Gospel movement, Christianity as an inspiring force in the U.S. Civil rights
movement, and finally evidence of religious faith as an inspiration to social action today.
I will conclude this section with a brief review of Christian scriptural justification for the
pursuance of social justice.
Christ Transforming Culture
As described previously, Niebuhr describes several types of Christian approaches
to culture. One of which is “Christ Transforming Culture”. In this view, while mankind is
fallen and in sin, Christ is still sovereign over culture. Therefore, Christians are
encouraged to participate in culture and to be Christ’s agents in transforming the
culture to look like the Kingdom of God. Relying on the Johannine writings in the New
Testament, Christians of this perspective see themselves as “Kingdom Workers” in more
than just the sense of proselytizing. Rather, they see working for societal good as part of
God’s redemptive work on earth. While there is sin on earth, the goodness of the earth
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is emphasized while believers are meant to fix the deficits that come from the fall. Many
who hold to this view of their role as Christians would see racism and other social
injustices as a consequence of the fall of man and therefore seek to eliminate racial
injustice in the world.
Postmillennialism
Postmillennialism is the Christian theological school of thought which interprets
chapter twenty of the book of revelation as describing the second coming of Christ as
occurring after the final millennium in human history, a time when Christian ethics and
peace cover the globe. This school of thought runs counter to premillennialism
described earlier in this chapter. While premillennialists believe that the world will fall
further and further into decay until the second coming of Christ, postmillennialists often
believe that it is their responsibility to help bring about the peace of the final
millennium. According to Gerson, postmillennialism was widespread among American
evangelicals during the Antebellum period and “As such, they were an optimistic lot
who thought that human effort could help hasten the arrival of this promised era—a
belief that encouraged both social activism and global missionary activity” (Gerson
2018).
Gerson describes how the Civil War, followed by advances in science led
American Christianity to schism, with theological progressives seeking common ground
with science, theological conservatives embracing fundamentalism, and both groups
becoming generally less optimistic about the coming millennium. While this caused
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postmillennialism to wane in popularity, during the evangelical era of postmillennialism
we see both evangelical and mainline Christians push for moral reform including the
Christian influence on abolitionism.
Social Gospel
Christian progressivism today has its roots in the Social Gospel movement of the
early 20th century and the American Civil Rights movement later on (Fowler et al. 2010).
According to Lambert (2008) the Social Gospel movement developed as a counterforce
against the Gospel of Wealth. Lambert calls the movement, “a radical expression of
Christianity, imagining the United States as a redeemed nation dedicated to a just
society for all its citizens rather than a land of opportunity for a few rich individuals”
(Lambert 2008). In this movement a focus on, as one leader of the movement, Walter
Rauschenbusch, puts it, “crossing the racial boundary lines and outgrowing nationalistic
religion” (Lambert 2008; Rauschenbusch 1918). Rauschenbush accepted socialist
principles as practical answers to problems of the day, and his focus on Christ’s
teachings on the Kingdom of God lead him to both optimistically believe that society
was progressing towards that ideal, while also deeming the concept of sin as applicable
to society itself in addition to individuals (Rauschenbusch 1907). Under the theology of
the Social Gospel, which encompassed mostly Christians but also those from other
faiths, religious belief went hand in hand with political action.
Morone describes the moral cause of religious leaders who took part in The
Social Gospel movement as moving from individualist sins to communal troubles.
Indeed, he describes how the sins of puritan America (sloth, drunkenness, violence, and
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lust) were turned on their head. Poverty is no longer the result of the sin of sloth, rather
it was caused by societal sin. Drunkenness, violence, and even lust were viewed now as
public health issues whose causes must be fixed (Morone 2003; 19). Morone says that
while historians relegate the use of the phrase Social Gospel only to a few writers and
thinkers at the end of the 1800’s, Morone says it lived on and influenced American
domestic policy for almost half a century (Ibid.)
To be sure, the spirit of the Social Gospel movement reappeared during the
American struggle for civil rights and several large religious-political movements since
including the religious crusade for temperance, and religion’s campaign on life issues
such as abortion and euthanasia. Martin Luther King Jr. was educated at the Rochester
Theological Seminary, the same institution as Rauschenbush, which had a doctrinal
emphasis on the social purposes of faith (Noll 2008). Findlay (1990) also identifies the
remnants of the Social Gospel in the commitment of churches to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Findlay 1990).
Christianity as a Politically Progressive Force Today
While it is less visible than the “Religious Right”, there are Christian political and
racial progressives working to achieve political goals through party politics. While the
Republican Party relies heavily on Evangelicals and the Religious Right as a loyal voting
bloc, the Democratic Party relies heavily on religious “nones” as well as the growing
Religious Left. While the Religious Left does not make headlines quite as often as the
Religious Right, it is still a well-documented force in American politics that is more
associated with the Democratic party and progressive politics. The reason for it being so
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elusive to the public eye is, according to a Lambert (2008), likely due to the fact that
most religious liberals are members of the Democratic party, which has always been
“reluctant to promote any religious movement that could be defined as exclusive, or
that could be accused of trying to create a religious establishment”(Lambert 2008; 218).
However, Lambert points out that a series of failed elections has inspired leaders of the
Democratic party to organize the Religious Left as a viable alternative to the Religious
Right (Lambert 2008; 218). The success of these efforts is debatable, however, we can
see that the Pew Research Center has begun to include “Faith and Family Left” within
their political typology.
The Religious Left tries to provide a moral alternative to the Religious Right and
is becoming more organized. There is evidence that it is growing but has additional
hurdles that the Religious Right does not face, according to an interview with Robert
Jones, CEO of the Public Religion Research Institution (Merritt 2013). These include
ethnic diversity leading to less natural affinities between members of the Religious left,
geographical dispersion, and the fact that the Religious Left is more religiously diffuse
(i.e. religion is not always the main driver of their political attitudes) (Merrit 2013).
While there is organization within the Religious Left, according to Lambert, there
is some difficulty defining who makes up the Religious Left as it deals with a wealth of
policy issues and topics and it is largely a partisan designation. Therefore, many who
would be considered as part of the Religious Left do not choose to self-identify as such
(Lambert 2008; page 221-222). Many members of the Religious Left choose to selfidentify as “liberal Christians”, “compassionate Christians” or “progressive Christians” or
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simply as Christians (Lambert 2008; 222). While the Religious Left does include
evangelical Protestants, most politically progressive protestants are representatives of
mainline protestant denominations rather than evangelical Christianity.
In regards to white Christians, the literature is optimistic in seeing Christianity as
an inspiring force for civil rights, especially among evangelical protestants. Emerson and
Smith (2000) argue that white evangelicals have become increasingly more involved in
race relations, “calling for nothing less than a complete end to racial strife and division”
(Emerson and Smith 2000; 3). However, despite a shift among white evangelicals to this
goal, Emerson and Smith are less than optimistic about how religion can help achieve it.
According to Emerson and Smith,
The structure of religion in America is conducive to freeing groups from the direct
control of other groups, but not to addressing the fundamental divisions that exist in
our current racialized society. In short, religion in the United States can serve as a moral
force in freeing people, but not in bringing them together as equals across racial lines
(Emerson and Smith 2000; 18).

However, focusing events centering around race including the elections of
President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump, the death of Trayvon Martin, and
the Ferguson moment may have tampered optimism that White Christianity is becoming
more focused on racial justice.
Biblical Justifications for Progressive Political Action
Biblical justifications for political progressivism are rooted in the idea of Christian
charity. Throughout the Old Testament, care for orphans, widows, and the poor is a
common theme. Some example verses include: Hosea 14:3, Isaiah 1:17, Psalm 82:3, and
Deuteronomy 10:18. The ancient texts called for the care of these groups of people who
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were among the most marginalized and powerless in society. Jesus’s teachings doubled
down on the idea of caring for the poor. While this theme is carried out throughout the
gospel narratives it is most notable in the gospel of Luke. Jesus’s message calls for
radical compassion to not just the poor, but to those considered the “least of these” (i.e.
the most marginalized in society). Throughout the Gospel of Matthew we see Jesus’s
push for radical generosity and hospitality in his famous Sermon on the Mount as well as
his speech concerning the “Judgement of the Sheep and the Goats” in Matthew 25. In
this speech, Jesus provides criteria for avoiding God’s judgement based on feeding the
hungry, welcoming the stranger, clothing the naked, and visiting the sick and
imprisoned. Here, Jesus calls his followers to seek out those who are oppressed or
marginalized and provide them with care.
In addition to Christian charity, the New Testament encourages the pursuance of
social and racial justice in many ways. Jesus seemed to defy racial and cultural barriers
(for example, his association with the Samaritan woman at the well) and he often
opposed societal norms and laws that he believed to be unjust. Additionally, the apostle
Paul, often considered the true founder of the Christian religion, speaks for unity
beyond national, gender, and socioeconomic barriers in his effort to create a religious
sect that was multi-cultural.
Unconventional Partners: An Alternative to Opiate and Inspiration
Fowler, in his book, “Unconventional Partners: Religion and Liberal Culture in
the United States” argues that the question is not whether or not religion supports or
criticizes the societal status quo. Rather, Fowler argues that religious institutions are
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escapes from the pressures of liberal society. Fowler defines liberalism as the societal
order that emphasizes rationality and skepticism, social tolerance, and individualism and
individual rights. Liberalism is reinforced by society through various institutions which
he calls, collectively, “the liberal order”. In Fowler’s conception, religion does not
contribute to liberal society and it does not challenge it, but rather makes it bearable.
He calls religion “a refuge from our society and its pervasive values” (Fowler 1989; 4). It
acts as an escape from two aspects of the liberal order: moral skepticism and
individualism. Religion provides this function by providing a set of values for those who
are religious to live by and through providing a sense of community. This concept is
similar to structural functionalism as it provides a role in society for religion. However,
that role is separate from civic life.
The Black Church: Opiate or Inspiration?
The role of the Black church, specifically, in Saint Louis public life has been in
dispute. While Bunch (1940) shows that African-Americans held the balance of power
between the major political parties in the region, and electoral engagement in the Black
church was widespread due to the self-interest of Black clergy, the changing political
landscape has called the role of such churches into question since at least the 1980’s.
Jones (1987) relies on survey data from Black pastors in the Saint Louis area in order to
discuss this debate in a regional context. Eventually, Jones comes to the conclusion that
Black religious institutions in the greater Saint Louis area are willing to facilitate political
participation in the region but often are ineffective due to a lack of (Jones 1987).
However, Jones does not include data for many congregations deemed “too small”;
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these include data from the many storefront churches throughout Saint Louis City and
Saint Louis County (Jones 1987).
Despite the opiate theory’s claims, there is a wealth of research on how the
Black church mobilizes its congregations into political action, specifically electoral
politics. According to Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014), Black churches are able to
stimulate political action in three ways: first, by providing a platform for political
learning, second, by empowering church members through increasing their social
capital, and third, by communicating messages about the relevance of religion to public
life (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). Harris and Smith (2005) describe churches as
“mobilizing agents” in Black communities, and claim that they mobilize individuals both
directly through such activities as having voter registration drives, and indirectly by
providing information on community and political events and linking inactive church
members with those who are already mobilized (Harris and Smith 2005).
However, Wald and Calhoun-Brown also explain the limitations that Black
churches have in participating in politics which include, first, dissatisfaction from
progress in electoral politics despite continuing support for electoral activity within
Black churches, second, a class of secular leaders that have developed since the civil
rights movement, and finally, difficulty in engaging politics outside of electoral politics
(Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). That being said, Wald and Calhoun-Brown show that
religious organizations have often turned to civil disobedience when “motivated by
intense and deeply felt commitments but lacking in other resources” or in order to “add
moral weight to their position” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014).
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Fowler et al. (2010) place an emphasis on the role of the clergy within Black
Protestant churches as the main link between African-American religion and politics.
According to them, “African American pastors and churches are convinced that political
activity is a legitimate and necessary means of improving the African American lot on
Earth” (Fowler et al. 2010). They then cite Lincoln and Mamiya (1990) who provide
evidence that 90 percent of African American clergy approve of political action (Lincoln
and Mamiya 1990). According to Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014), “Because members
of the clergy have more coherent worldviews, they can be particularly effective opinion
leaders, framing grievances in a way that makes them politically relevant to
parishioners”, and by linking theological positions to political policies clergy are able to
mobilize their parishioners on these “questions of morality” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown,
2014). Interestingly, survey data from national polls shows that Black people tend to be
more favorable of churches and clergy speaking out on social and political issues than
White or Latinx people (Pew Research Center 2003).
If opiate theory is to be believed we can expect little political action from clergy
in our study. This can be for one of two different reasons. The first potential reason
would be that members of the clergy have strong politically conservative worldviews in
which they see their faith as promoting political action to maintain the status quo. They
will be unlikely to identify racial justice as a significant policy issue. The second is that
clergy see their role as apolitical. In this case, clergy will be unlikely to say that they
encourage political action among their congregations or engage in it themselves. Among
citizens we can expect very little connection between religious attitudes and support for
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racially progressive policy change or using contentious politics to achieve those ends.
They are likely to see their congregation as being disengaged in politics. On the other
hand, if we accept inspiration theory, we should expect to see faith leaders who link
their doctrinal beliefs with racialized problems and policy solutions. We would likely see
mission statements that include items beyond worship and proselytizing. We can also
expect to see religious citizens connect racial progress with their faith community.

2.3 Clergy and Racial Crises: Two Studies
Having provided a short summary on the relationship between religion and
politics in the United States, we must now turn to two important questions: how do
clergy respond to racialized crises and how do clergy engage in politics more generally?
Section 2.3 will answer the former, while 2.4 will explore the latter. How these
questions were answered in the Ferguson Moment will be explored in chapters three
and four.
Two studies in particular describe the reaction of clergy in instances of racialized
tension or violence. These are Campbell and Pettigrew’s 1957 study of clergy and
school integration in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Sokhey’s 2001 study of clergy reaction to
protesting and violence following the police killing of a young Black man in Cincinnati,
Ohio. These two studies are separated by several decades, and also the direction of the
racial tension.
Ernest Campbell and Thomas Pettigrew were the first to systematically study
clergy response to racial unrest in their study of ministers in Little Rock, Arkansas in
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1957. The Little Rock case was a controversy surrounding an early instance of
mandated school integration in which nine African American students were enrolled in
Little Rock Central High School, which had previously been a whites-only school. The
controversy led to both Arkansas National Guard and Federal troops being deployed to
escort the students to school.
Neither Little Rock nor St. Louis are part of the “Deep South” yet both are states
where slavery and segregation have left a major scar. The clear difference between
Little Rock and Ferguson was the direction of the outrage. In Little Rock rioting broke
out over a policy to integrate schools. The outrage was centered around an anti-racist
policy, whereas in Ferguson, and the St. Louis region at large, racial tensions center
around ongoing perceived racist policies and behavior by public officials. In Little Rock it
was white people protesting to preserve a racist policy, while in Ferguson it was a
diverse group that protested the actions of the Ferguson police.
In Campbell and Pettigrew’s work we see Christian appeals to peace and law and
order in Little Rock, rather than a Christian defense of desegregation. Campbell and
Pettigrew describe a prayer meeting held some weeks after the rioting as a “ritualistic
termination of any attempts by the clergy to direct the course of events in the racial
crisis” as the clear goal of the service was to emphasize compromise and peace rather
than moving forward toward racial justice. In this way the clergy were able to appease
national pressure for church action, while not actually having to take steps that may
have been deemed controversial by congregants.
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The authors discover that certain institutional factors influence clergy to act in
pacifying ways rather than to work for social reform. In particular, they find that
institutional structures within religious congregations help clergy with anti-racist
convictions to avoid developing guilt while maintaining their inaction.
Campbell and Pettigrew discuss three systems that help to determine whether a
minister will be active in their integrationist views or remain inactive. These systems are:
the self-reference system (SRS) or how one sees oneself and their own motivational
factors, the professional reference system (PRS), occupational carrots and sticks outside
of their own congregation, and the membership reference system (MRS), influence from
one’s congregation. While a member of the clergy’s self-reference system and
professional reference system tend to motivate action on racial justice, they are not as
powerful as the membership reference system.
According to Campbell and Pettigrew, congregations expect ministers to act as a
“cohesive force” and maintain harmony within the congregation, to show steady
increases in church membership, and to encourage maximum annual giving for
improvement and expansion of the congregation’s resources. These goals are difficult to
achieve by going public and taking action on divisive issues, including racial justice.
Additionally, one’s SRS is able to pacify any guilt for inaction by allowing
ministers to focus on their “role” as leaders of their congregation and through
communication techniques such as talking about “deeper issues” or vague values rather
than the temporal issues at hand. They are able to feel that they are doing their Godsanctioned duty by keeping peace rather than pursuing progress.
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Campbell and Pettigrew note that all major Protestant denominations had made
statements declaring support for school desegregation, yet they find that
congregational pressures constrained the behavior of clergy in Little Rock. We can,
therefore, expect similar behavior in St. Louis. While Christian leaders on a national
scale may preach racial reconciliation and healing and call for systematic reform of
criminal justice in response to the death of Michael Brown, local clergy may not for a
variety of reasons, notably congregational pressure. Additionally, protestant
denominations have become more independent of national denominational
organizations. Campbell and Pettigrew look specifically at ministers from established
denominations. Their scope does not include church leaders of independent
congregations or faiths beyond or on the fringes of Christian orthodoxy.
However, the Little Rock study has several shortcomings. Campbell and
Pettigrew conducted 29 interviews with minsters: 27 protestant and 2 Jewish. They
attempted to interview Roman Catholic priests, but were unable to due to lack of
cooperation. Therefore, Campbell and Pettigrew can only speak to two of the major
religious traditions in the United States but do not tell us anything about how Black
Protestant or Roman Catholic clergy react to instances of racial crisis. Additionally,
Campbell and Pettigrew look specifically at ministers from established denominations.
Therefore, their scope does not include church leaders of independent congregations or
faiths beyond or on the fringes of Christian orthodoxy. This is possibly due to Campbell
and Pettigrew’s use of the “snowball technique” rather than random selection in
choosing who to interview. Indeed, it may be likely that they find similar behaviors and
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pressures across their sample due to the fact that they chose to forego random
selection. They acknowledge these shortcomings, explaining that their sample is
weighted towards large, prestigious congregations or those who were reputed to have
played active roles in the conflict.
Following Campbell and Pettigrew, Sokhey examines clergy behavior decades
later in Cincinnati. In the year 2001, Cincinnati was a city rife with racial unrest following
the shooting of Timothy Thomas, one of many young unarmed African-American men
who have been killed by police in the United States. Outrage following the shooting led
to passionate protesting. Using mail surveys and phone interviews to Cincinnati clergy,
Sokhey (2007) studied the response of religious leaders to the racial unrest in the city
following the death of Thomas.
Sokhey’s study is unique because it focuses specifically on the role of proximity
in determining how clergy respond to racial tension and protest. His main research
question was whether or not being farther removed from the protests geographically
leads to being farther removed from the issues that the protests address. Following
Djupe and others, Sokhey is interested in what mobilizes clergy to political action and
how clergy then mobilize their congregants.
The abuse and killing of young unarmed Black men by police in American cities
followed by protest and intermittent violence has become a common event. While each
city has their own histories and cultures, the scenario in Cincinnati bears considerable
resemblance with the unrest that surrounded the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson.

58

Protesting, vandalism, looting, and rioting occurred in Cincinnati’s Over-The-Rhine area
for three days following the shooting of Timothy Thomas, although unlike in Ferguson, a
mayor-ordered curfew helped to end the tumult just a few days after the shooting
(Garretson 2001). Both uprisings led to national media attention, the influx of highprofile figures into the city including Revs. Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson. While in
Ferguson, the police officer who killed Michael Brown was not indicted, Cincinnati
officer Stephen Roach was tried for the killing of Timothy Thomas but was found not
guilty (Horn 2001).
Sokhey found fairly high amounts of engagement from Cincinnati clergy,
although engagement breaks down differently across race and religious tradition and
attention was self-reported (Sokhey 2007). According to Sokhey’s study, Black
protestant churches were the most likely to report clergy and congregational interest in
race-related issues, followed by Roman Catholics. While 60 percent of Sokhey’s survey
responded that they believe that the Cincinnati government had not done enough to
deal with the city’s racial tensions, nearly 70 percent of the survey said that rioting was
an unjustified response to Thomas’ death. Additionally, 90 percent of the survey agreed
that the church should be more active in handing racial reconciliation in the city.
Additionally, Sokhey found that race was a key determinant in how clergy
responded to the racial unrest in their city; while only 10 percent of clergy in white
churches reported that they believed the rioting was justified, 45 percent of clergy in
churches with predominantly Black churches disagreed. There was also a racial
distinction between who clergy believed was to blame for the riots. Half of the clergy
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from Black churches blaming the police and only 12 percent of clergy from white
churches saying the same. Clergy viewed the performance of churches in pursuing racial
reconciliation differently along racial lines as well, with a larger percentage of the survey
believing that Black churches had been successful in promoting racial reconciliation (40
percent) compared to white churches (15 percent), with an overwhelming majority of
Black clergy (70 percent) saying that white churches were ineffectual.
How then did clergy behave in Cincinnati in the early 2000’s? Sokhey found that
clergy mostly responded to the racial unrest through public speech. Sokhey found a
small increase in various activities across the board including hosting special worship
services dedicated to racial reconciliation and hosting a community leader to discuss
race relations. However, he finds that most of the change comes from congregations
who were already engaged with these issues. Interestingly, however, Sokhey’s survey
reports a comparatively large percentage of Cincinnati clergy as participating in marches
or rallies for racial justice (about 30 percent); African-American clergy were much more
likely to participate in these less conventional forms of clergy participation than were
clergy of predominantly white churches. Ultimately, Sokhey finds that in addition to
congregational and community resources, race plays a large role in whether clergy
actively participate in justice work.
Similar to Campbell and Pettigrew, Sokhey examines resources and motivations
for clergy action. Sokhey found some differences in resources; clergy from Black
congregations were more likely to report that their congregation was lower income than
other nearby congregations. However, despite the lack of resources a much larger racial
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gap exists in motivation to participate, where Sokhey finds clergy of Black churches were
more likely to say that their congregations, their community organizations, and attitudes
of other clergy were encouraging in reconciliation efforts.
One aspect that sets Sokhey’s study apart from the previous works on clergy
activism is his focus on distance as a predicting factor in clergy behavior. Sokhey looks at
physical distance between congregations and the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood where
most of the rioting took place. He finds that clergy whose churches are located farther
from the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood were much less likely to pay attention to
racialized political issues, and were also less likely to participate in reconciliation efforts
in response to the riot by public speech or more active means. Sokhey’s study ultimate
concludes that clergy working nearer to racial crisis took on the role of community
leaders and provided for a social network that encouraged prolonged and pronounced
clergy participation in reconciliation efforts.
Sokhey’s study is also unique because he attempts to explain what factors are
predictive of different types of political action among clergy. He estimates three
models, one in which all forms of reconciliatory actions are considered, one in which
community-oriented action is considered and a third which focuses on individualistic
activity. Within the model based around community-oriented action such as attending
meetings or active protesting, he finds that personal interest and religious beliefs as well
as whether or not the clergy were compelled by media or congregational pressures to
participate in reconciliatory efforts as significant predicting variables. He also finds
length of tenure in congregation and geographic distance from the uprisings to be
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significant factors. However, in the model which examines individualized and personal
activities that are more within-church, personal beliefs still play a predictive role, but
distance is not a predictive factor, and congregational encouragement and racial
makeup are more likely to play a role in discouraging this type of political behavior.
While Campbell and Pettigrew examined personal beliefs, the congregation, and
denominational restraint, and as we shall see Djupe and Glibert added community
restraints as a predictive factor in clergy behavior in situations of racial unrest, Sokhey’s
work is important because it confirms the effect of these influences. However, he also
adds distance from the incident of police violence and protesting as a significant factor
that needs to be considered in the sociological examination of religious response to
racial unrest. He also contributes significantly to our understanding of what factors
mobilize participation among clergy by his conclusion that the type of reconciliatory
activity that is being considered may be influenced more or less strongly by different
types of factors. By separating community and individualistic factors of reconciliatory
action, Sokhey wisely shows us that different factors influence different types of
behaviors. Sokhey’s work shows how a clergy’s personal beliefs, denominational
structure, congregational beliefs, and community pressure can press upon clergy the
role of community leader, causing them to take part in more outward facing actions
(Olson 2000). Whereas more individualistic activities such as public speech were
influenced more by congregational factors such as racial demographics and the political/
theological attitudes of the congregation regardless of distance from riots and protests.
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While social networks and community ties do more to encourage outward prophetic
behaviors, White congregational homogeneity can encourage silence from the pulpit.
While the scenarios in Cincinnati and Ferguson are easily comparable, over a
decade separates the two tragic moments of racial unrest. Can Sokhey’s study speak to
Ferguson? This author believes so, however, it would be unwise to assume that clergy
behavior in Ferguson would act exactly the same as that in Cincinnati. Additionally,
Sokhey tells us a lot about clergy mobilization but not much about the effectiveness of
clergy in mobilizing congregants or in helping the community beyond clergy’s selfreporting of overall church effectiveness. Sokhey also does not try to get to the bottom
of what factors of personal belief must be present to activate clergy activism. Is it
theological, political, or eschatological? While personal belief is a motivational a
predictor of both of Sokhey’s factors of participation, what aspects of one’s beliefs are
important? Are they socialized more from the seminary or from Main Street? Which is
more important, beliefs about God or beliefs about the importance of Community?
These are questions that Sokhey’s study does not address.

2.4 The Political Behavior of Clergy
Scholars of religion and politics have published several studies examining how
faith elites behave politically as well as when and why they might be motivated to do so.
In “The Political Voice of Clergy” Djupe and Gilbert (2002) go farther than Campbell and
Pettigrew in answering this question. The authors ask whether or not clergy are
addressing important public issues in their public speech and what factors encourage
them to do so. They find that clergy speak out on issues when they are mobilized to do
63

so, but also as a way to represent their congregation to the public. They divide the
issues that clergy might speak out on into two categories: moral issues, and importantly
for this paper, social justice issues. Adding to Campbell and Pettigrew (1959), they
suggest that there are several systems at work that act as determinants for clergy
speech: political and ideological, personal, denominational, congregational, and secular
community influences.
Using a survey of Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and Episcopal Church
clergy, the authors find that there is not an especially clear pattern as to how ideological
and political orientations translate to clergy going public on moral issues. However,
ideological and political orientations are clear predictors to whether or not clergy go
public on social justice issues such as gay rights and the environment, with political
conservatives being less likely to address social justice issues publicly than political
liberals. Unfortunately, Djupe and Gilbert use these two issues as their examples of
social justice issues rather than policy issues more closely related to racial justice.
In regards to congregational resources, Djupe and Gilbert say, “The role of the
congregation in shaping clergy’s political behavior lies at the intersection of
congregational approval of clergy public speech and ideological agreement with the
clergy” (Djupe and Gilbert 2002; 605). Congregational support provides job security for
clergy and it is unlikely that they will behave in ways that will damage that support.
Across both moral and social justice issues congregational support drives public speech.
Djupe and Gilbert also checked several other congregational factors including tenure
length, church size, and member loyalty but found no effects on public speech. They did,
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however, find that the percentage of members involved in small groups within the
church is a likely predictor of public speech on abortion and school prayer.
This emphasis on congregation seems fairly intuitive but it also seems to detract
from the clergy’s role as opinion leaders when they are only likely to speak out when
their congregation is already like-minded on a particular policy issue. According to them,
“Clergy become active participants in a policy debate when they sense an opportunity
for change and when they are encouraged to participate by their secular ties and
agreeable congregations” (Djupe and Gilbert 2002). So, contrariwise, clergy are less
likely to speak out on an issue when they feel their congregation would react negatively,
and are less likely to act if the status quo is hard to overcome. This seems to downplay
their role as opinion leaders, since congregational opinion plays into whether or not
they choose to go public on a social issue. However, this should prove valuable in our
understanding of the political speech of clergy within Ferguson. Was Ferguson viewed as
an opportunity for change, or as a precarious situation that needed to be navigated
cautiously?
While one might expect to have found a relationship between denominational
resources and the ability to pursue community development, Djupe and Gilbert find no
relationship between denominational resources and whether or not clergy go public on
either moral or social justice issues.
One of the biggest shortcomings of “The Political Voice of Clergy” is Djupe and
Gilbert’s inability to examine personal traits such as race, socioeconomic status, gender,
or location due to low variance in their sample. They do, however, find that older clergy
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are more likely to speak out on public issues due to their “socialization during more
politically active periods, their deeper community roots, and their more secure position”
(Djupe and Gilbert 2002; 606). It is likely that other demographic factors influence
whether or not members of the clergy go public on issues, but this important study fails
to answer exactly which ones.
According to Djupe and Gilbert (2002) as well as Djupe and Calfano (2013), clergy
have a strong political voice through public speech, usually in the form of sermons or
public prayer, and are able to use this tool to prime political attitudes. From these two
works we find that clergy often go public by communicating publicly on an issue, but
that this communication is typically done through priming certain values rather than
directly discussing an issue.
Djupe and Calfano (2013) assess the effectiveness of clergy speech on political
tolerance. They argue that faith elites are able to communicate religious values that
affect political tolerance by affecting threat judgments. The priming of exclusive
religious values influences the level of threat and thus decreases political tolerance.
Similarly, exposure to inclusive values reduces the sense of threat that individuals feel
for out-groups and indirectly encourages tolerance. Traditionally, studies on political
tolerance are not able to perceive differences between individual cognitive structures
and collective experiences; what is unique about this study is its ability to expose
subjects to a value and therefore provide a collective experience. The authors suggest
that exposure to different values is what is important because religious groups respond
similarly to inclusive and exclusive value priming. Applying the work of Djupe and
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Calfano (2013) to our understanding of Ferguson requires us to evaluate what types of
values faith elites expose citizens to in the wake of this racialized tragedy.
The power of clergy as opinion leaders seems to be heightened among racial
minorities. Fowler et al. (2010) place an emphasis on the role of the clergy within Black
Protestant churches as the main link between African-American religion and politics.
According to them, “African American pastors and churches are convinced that political
activity is a legitimate and necessary means of improving the African American lot on
Earth” (Fowler et al. 2010). They then cite Lincoln and Mamiya (1990) who provide
evidence that 90 percent of African American clergy approve of political action (Lincoln
and Mamiya 1990). This is higher than among other groups; survey data from national
polls shows that Black people tend to be more favorable of churches and clergy
speaking out on social and political issues than Whites or Hispanic people (Pew Research
Center 2003).
However, clergy are likely to be more effective as opinion leaders when they
prime religious values rather than discuss specific political issues. Djupe and Gilbert
point out that systematic misperceptions about the amount of political cues that clergy
provide are based on whether or not a congregant has positive or negative attitudes
towards the issue that the cue is intended to prime and the importance of that issue
(Djupe and Gilbert 2009). Therefore, a focus on values is useful for clergy, because
church members are likely to “erect defenses” against the political speech of clergy,
however, by focusing on religious values, clergy are able to sidestep these defenses
(Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Djupe and Calfano 2014). In fact, Djupe and Calfano among
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others have shown that clergy often lose credibility when they discuss political rather
than religious issues, although as mentioned above this may be more of a problem for
white clergy (Djupe and Calfano 2009; Djupe and Calfano 2014; Kohut et al. 2000). The
problem is also compounded by congregants projecting their own political views onto
clergy, especially when an issue is salient (Krosnick 1989; Krosnick et al. 1993). However,
Djupe and Gilbert find that church goers are almost always able to correctly identify
issues that are most frequently addressed by their clergy (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; 61).
By trying to influence individual political preferences through priming religious
values, clergy are able to maintain credibility and indirectly influence political change.
The religious values that Djupe and Calfano focus on in their study are exclusivity and
inclusivity. Different institutions and faith elites emphasize different values. Emphasizing
exclusivity may prime congregants to be less warm to out-groups, while emphasizing
inclusivity would do the opposite. Djupe and Calfano find that members of clergy are
more likely to promote inclusive values which makes them appear less effective because
they are already engrained into congregants political attitudes, while the priming of
exclusive attitudes are more rare and are more clearly visible in Djupe and Calfano’s
results (Djupe and Calfano 2014; 183).
Djupe and Calfano go on to argue that once this value priming occurs, it limits
the options of policy elites who must either frame their message within the context of
those values or have their policy cues shaped by the values environment (Djupe and
Calfano 2014; 184). Djupe and Calfano go as far to say that the religious values priming
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of clergy and religious insitutions “contributes to the diversity of the nation in such a
way as to make it difficult for factious politics to survive” (Djupe and Calfano 2014; 184).
Djupe and Calfano find that primed values that are seemingly disconnected from
politics can influence both foreign and domestic policy preferences (Djupe and Calfano
2014; 202). Their focus is on immigration issues. While we might assume that the effect
of the religious priming of values would also be prominent on racialized issues, it does
not tell us whether or not religious value priming is able to shape someone’s attitudes
on contentious politics or to motivate them to participate in contentious politics.
Another important voice in the conversation on the political influence of clergy is
Laura Olson. Laura Olson seeks to answer what causes some members of the clergy to
become active in politics while others avoid politics entirely. As in this study, Olson is
interested in the political participation of clergy in so far as the political involvement is a
part of the clergy’s institutional role rather than as part of their personal lives. Olson
says, “Clergy may have clear personal political beliefs, or they may even be active in
interest groups or political parties, but if they do not bring their politics directly to bear
on their congregations, they do not act as political leaders on behalf of, or even in
reference to, those whom they lead (Olson 2000, 14). However, while this study is more
concerned with the political participation of clergy, Olson is concerned with the political
involvement of clergy. Following V. O. Key, this means that Olson is more interested
with clergy’s “orientations to the political realm” than she is with the specific actions
that clergy take to influence the political realm (Olson 2000, 14; Key 1961). Olson’s
study is restricted to protestant clergy in urban Milwaukee, where she finds that both
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religious tradition as well as community factors influence the mobilization of clergy on a
wide span of issues.
Olson categorizes political involvement among clergy into three different types:
disengaged, agenda setters, and political leaders. Disengaged clergy view their role as
faith leaders as inherently apolitical. They focus on proselytizing and the spiritual needs
of their congregants while avoiding direct involvement in politics within their
institutional role. Agenda setters engage in public speech in order to prime their
congregants for political action, but do not see their role as clergy as going beyond
public speech. Political leaders are members of the clergy who are actively involved in
politics as either activists or public officials. This group views the role of clergy and
political involvement as intertwined and inseparable. Olson’s sample is fairly evenly
divided among the three groups with 16 clergy being categorized as disengaged, 17
being categorized as agenda setters, and 13 being categorized as political leaders.
Olson finds that politically disengaged clergy are mostly disengaged because of
personal preference. However, some were constrained by congregational concerns,
denominational norms and the lack of resources such as time. Disengaged clergy and
their congregations are sometimes involved with acts of service in the community but
they do not consider it political action.
Agenda setters use public speech to mobilize their congregations to political
action yet do not go beyond public speech to overt political action. Olson’s sample
shows agenda setters as ranging from those who identify important political issues from

70

the pulpit but do not encourage members to respond through political behavior to
those who identify political problems and clear strategies that the congregants should
take to address them.
Olson argues that both religious tradition and socioeconomic factors within the
local community influence whether or not and in what ways clergy go public on political
and social issues. Olson’s study includes 16 Mainline Protestant clergy, 16 Evangelical
Protestant clergy, and 14 Black Protestant clergy, accounting for three of the four major
American religious traditions.
While Olson believes that religious tradition is important, it is not as strong as a
predictor of political involvement as is the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood
which the clergy represent. She finds that neighborhood socioeconomic resources are
negatively related with political activism among clergy. At first glance this seems
counterintuitive. Verba and Nie (1972) have made the case that in order to participate
in politics individuals must have the time and economic resources to do so (Verba and
Nie 1972). However, the lack of resources within the neighborhood is actually what
motivates the clergy to become a political actor. This is because congregants from
wealthier neighborhoods and suburbs are more likely to already be socially or politically
mobilized than congregants in less affluent neighborhoods. Clergy within these affluent
neighborhoods, whose congregants are already involved within the neighborhood, have
less incentives to work as opinion leaders or mobilizers than do clergy within less
affluent neighborhoods, whose congregants are more focused on providing for their
basic means of survival. Olson says, “Political leadership is in fact imperative for some
71

pastors regardless of their denomination, their theology, or even their race, as politically
active pastors tend to be those whose congregants face the most trying economic
circumstances” (Olson 2000; 11). So while a congregation may lack economic resources,
clergy of such congregations are more motivated to use their social capital to work for
political change and to mobilize their congregants to stand for their own interests and
community revitalization.
According to Olson, how clergy rank the importance of various political issues is
also predictive of how involved clergy will be in politics. She highlights that moral,
family, and reproductive issues tend to be more important among clergy who are less
involved with politics, while crime, racialized issues, and economic disparity are issues
taken up by those who are more active in the politics of Milwaukee.
Olson points out four personal resources that influence where a clergy might fit
in her typology of political interest. These include attitudes toward political involvement
among clergy, feelings of political efficacy, gender, and career stage. Notably, the
personal resources that Olson identifies are mostly strongly connected to contextual
factors. Gender and stage in career are largely related to congregational and
institutional power which tends to be restricted to women and novices. Olson assumes
that to some extent all members of the clergy have sufficient money, time, and civic
skills to have an active political orientation (Olson 2000, 44; Verba and Nie 1972). Olson
therefore chooses not to focus on these personal resources.
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Clergy within Olson’s survey took different stances on how involved clergy
should be in politics. Subjects provided scriptural examples both for and against being
politically interested. Those who believed that clergy should not be involved with
politics also stated a lack of qualifications as a reason. On the other hand, several
respondents who believed that clergy should be politically active believed that societal
issues can only be addressed by the moral leadership of the church (Olson 2000, 35).
Clergy classified as political leaders were unanimous in responding that clergy should be
involved in politics, while agenda setters were almost evenly divided and the politically
disengaged leaned towards answering that political activity is not acceptable. It stands
to reason that political leaders believe that involvement in the wider world is an
essential function of the clergy. While views on the institutional role of clergy are
important, what factors influence where clergy acquire these views is outside the
purview of Olson’s study. Both those who oppose and support clergy involvement cite
the Bible, but different passages using different hermeneutics. They also both cite the
qualifications of clergy to address such issues. Olson leaves us with the question of
what, if any, theological dispositions and political worldviews are predictive of these
attitudes.
Olson finds that her sample was split as to the level of political efficacy that they
feel. Perhaps to be expected, almost all of those classified as political leaders felt that
clergy had a lot of influence when it comes to politics, whereas agenda setters and the
politically disengaged mostly felt that clergy did not have much efficacy in politics (Olson
2000, 37).
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Olson cites Carroll et al.’s 1981 study which finds that women of the clergy are
more likely than their male counterparts to believe that their church ought to be
involved in community politics, yet finds that women in the clergy are more likely to be
politically disengaged. None of the political leaders in her sample are women. That
being said, Olson’s sample only includes four women. Women are much less likely to
achieve ministerial status in protestant churches, especially in Evangelical and Black
Protestant churches where women are major power players within their congregations
but prohibited from official leadership and preaching roles. Three of the women in
Olson’s sample serve in Mainline Protestant churches while one serves in a traditionally
African American church (Olson 2000, 39). Olson finds that the major barriers that
prevent women from higher levels of political involvement are mostly congregational
constraints rather than a personal indifference to political action.
The last personal factor that Olson examines is career stage. Olson finds that
clergy are most politically involved at mid-career. This makes intuitive sense as younger
clergy who have yet to establish themselves may feel less confident in expanding their
institutional role to include political issues, whereas clergy nearing retirement are likely
to surrender institutional power to younger members of the pastoral staff. Ten of the
thirteen political leaders in Olson’s sample were in the middle of their career (those who
had been in the ministry for over five years but who do not plan to retire within the next
five years), while ten of the sixteen politically disengaged respondents were in the first
five years of their ministerial career.

74

After breaking down personal resources in her sample, Olson turns to an
examination of the various contextual resources that may help or hinder clergy from
moving to higher levels of political involvement. These include both denominational
traditions and socioeconomic factors. Once again, Olson is not so much concerned with
personal time, money, and civic skills. A pastor’s individual social capital is taken for
granted, what is more important for Olson are denominational and neighborhood
constraints on political involvement. While perhaps she is neglecting some personal
factors, her work is a leap forward in viewing how context influences the political
involvement and activism of clergy.
Following Guth et al., Olson’s first contextual factor is the influence of
denominational tradition. As her study focuses exclusively on clergy from protestant
traditions, the constraints or opportunities for political involvement offered by the
Catholic tradition are not discussed. Olson’s study does represent the remaining three
major religious traditions in the United States: Evangelical Protestantism, Black
Protestantism, and Mainline Protestantism.
While Evangelicals at the time of Olson’s writing and even more so today are
major players in national elections and conservative political movements, Olson finds
that the political involvement of evangelical public figures on the national stage, and
evangelical individuals as a voting bloc does not translate to politically active clergy at
the local level in Milwaukee at the time of her study. Half of the Evangelicals in her
study were disengaged while all but one of the rest were agenda setters. Olson finds
that within Evangelicalism, Pentecostals tend to be more involved than Evangelicals and
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Fundamentalists in her survey. While the individualism associated with Evangelicalism
may have lead us to expect that Evangelicals would be more involved with politics
because of a lack of denominational constraints from doing so. However, Olson refers to
Jelen (1993) who discusses the strict separation between spiritual and political spheres
that has traditionally been prominent within the Evangelical tradition. As Evangelicals
have grown in political power within the United States would Olson’s findings still hold
true? It would seem that for this study Evangelicals are likely not to play a strong role
within racialized politics as they have strongly been aligned with political conservatism,
the Trump presidency, and traditional social norms.
In her analysis by religious tradition, Olson finds no real consensus on political
interest among Mainline Protestant clergy. In fact, Mainline Protestant clergy are almost
equally divided into Olson’s three types (Olson 2000, 49-50). Olson attributes this
division to Mainline Protestantism’s history of social gospel theology at odds with the
encouragement of alternative readings of the Bible as well as real world pressures such
as declining congregational membership. Olson does find that more Mainline Protestant
clergy can be described as politically engaged than the Evangelicals in her survey.
However, Olson points out that the lack of consensus shows that studies by traditions
are not sufficient in identifying political differences among clergy.
Olson found that among the clergy she interviewed from Black Protestant
religious tradition three were disengaged, five were agenda setters, and six were
political leaders (Olson 2000; 51). So while African American clergy are known for being
more politically active than white clergy, still most of her sample were not full political
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leaders. However, Olson points out that the disengaged clergy from this tradition all
held secular jobs in addition to their role as clergy which might limit the amount of time
they could devote to performing a political function within their church. Unlike this
study, however, Olson is not looking exclusively at racialized political issues. It is very
likely that in the wake of a tragedy like Ferguson, there will be a more pronounced gap
between the political interest and activism of clergy of color compared to white clergy
or clergy of churches that are not traditionally African American.
Overall, Olson does not find religious tradition to be a significant indicator of
political interest in Milwaukee. Rather, she finds the socioeconomic status of
neighborhoods to be a much more compelling predictor of political interest, although
not necessarily in the direction that might be intuited. The conventional wisdom on
political interest and activism is that individuals with better access to resources are
more likely to participate in politics. Voters are wealthier and more likely to work white
collar jobs than the average citizen; they are also more likely to be white than to be
within a minority racial group. However, Olson finds that neighborhoods with the
fewest resources are actually the ripest for clergy to act as political mobilizers (Olson
2000; 53).
Olson examines census data of the neighborhoods surrounding the churches in
which the clergy in her sample work and finds a negative relationship between per
capita personal income and the likelihood of a preacher being categorized as a political
leader; she also finds a positive relationship between unemployment rates and percent
living below poverty level with the likelihood of being categorized as a political leader.
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While at first glance, this data seems counterintuitive, Olson provides strong theoretical
support for the data. She argues that churches in neighborhoods with higher
socioeconomic status have members that are more likely to be civically active already.
Therefore, clergy can focus on the spiritual needs of their congregation and community
rather than their physical and political needs. Additionally, Olson also makes the case
that low-income citizens may be easier for clergy to mobilize into political action by the
provision of civic skills through the church, skills which higher socioeconomic
congregants already are more likely to have.
Olson considers race as a socioeconomic factor as well. Milwaukee, like St. Louis,
is a highly segregated city where minority racial populations are likely to live in
communities with fewer resources. Olson finds that clergy in neighborhoods with higher
minority racial populations are more likely to be political leaders (Olson 2000, 57). The
theoretical support that Olson provides for this finding is that all-Black neighborhoods
tend to have high levels of racial solidarity and have been shown that, when mobilized
by an opinion leader, are more likely to become politically active. Compellingly, Olson
finds no significance in the race of the clergy themselves as an indicator of political
interest.
Taken together, Olson finds that contextual factors influence clergy to become
politically interested not because they have the means, but more so because of
necessity and responsibility. Clergy in neighborhoods that have more access to
resources do not see politics as part of their institutional role, because their congregants
are already well-positioned to be active in pursuing their needs through politics, while
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clergy in lower resource neighborhoods pastor congregations who have more needs and
less means of pursuing their own interests.
The final indicator of political interest that Olson examines is the political agenda
of clergy. Which political issue clergy find most important can indicate what level of
political interest she or he has. Olson asked clergy in her sample, “What political issue or
set of issues concerns you most as a clergy member in this day and age?” (Olson 2000,
61). Olson typifies responses to this question across four categories: immediate life
circumstances of those in their neighborhood, morality and family issues, discrimination
against Christians and minorities, and nonlocal topics.
The first topic includes a wide variety of responses from gambling to welfare
reform to education to crime to health care. Olson finds that half of those who
mentioned these issues in her sample were political leaders, with political leaders being
about three times as likely to mention economic issues and twice as likely to mention
safety issues than were disengaged clergy or agenda setters (Olson 2000; 65). This
provides additional support for Olson’s findings on contextual sources that clergy in
lower resource neighborhoods are more likely to be politically interested. Here, she
finds that clergy who are political leaders have issues concerning the less well off on
their mind. According to Olson, “This is yet another reason to believe that clergy in poor
neighborhoods may be compelled into the political realm out of necessity. The problems
they discussed clearly affect poor people more than the middle class, and it is poor
people with whom central city clergy interact on a daily basis” (Olson 2000; 70).
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Olson’s second category, family and sexual morality, are issues often associated
with the Christian Right including abortion and gay rights. These responses were mostly
driven by agenda setters who made up half of these responses. Of those who responded
in this way almost all were of the persuasion that America has wandered too far away
from traditional Judeo-Christian sexual morality. Very few political leaders mentioned
these issues. Many of those who claimed that these issues were of the utmost
important were from an Evangelical tradition and were not very interested in politics.
The third issue category that Olson discusses is discrimination. This is
discrimination both against Christians and against racial minorities. Olson finds that
clergy who claimed that they themselves were discriminated against based on their faith
tended to be Evangelical and not very politically involved. On the other hand, those in
Olson’s sample who believed that racial discrimination was one of the most important
issues tended to be more politically involved.
Olson’s final issue category was less pronounced than the others, that is nonlocal
issues. These include institutions such as the state of Congress, the media or the
presidency, as well as international issues such as war, genocide, and trade. Overall,
nonlocal issues were not very high on the political agendas of clergy in Olson’s sample.
Most of those who identified these issues were agenda setters.
Overall, Olson finds that the issues that tend to lead clergy to higher levels of
political interest tend to be those that affect the well-being of those in their
neighborhood. These issues tend to be more associated with the American political left.
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Clergy are motivated to political interest around these issues often out of necessity due
to poor socioeconomic conditions within their neighborhoods and likely a lack of
civically active congregants. At the same time, clergy who are interested in issues that
tend to be associated with the American political right or the Christian Right ten to be
less interested in politics as a part of their institutional role. These clergy tend to
represent congregations outside of the inner city who are already civically involved and
less likely to need opinion leaders to mobilize them to protect their interests. In this
way, Olson’s study runs counter to traditional common knowledge about the
relationship between faith and politics which seems to many to be much more
pronounced on the political right.
Olson’s work is very thorough, but a case can be made that like other scholars of
political actions of clergy, perhaps Olson is overlooking personal theological, political,
and socioeconomic factors. Additionally, Olson’s study does not discuss clergy and
racialized politics as much as moral issues like abortion, crime, and family morality. As
with Sokhey, Djupe and Gilbert, and others, this paper addresses whether Olson’s study
holds up under the intensely polarized politics that have emerged under the Obama and
Trump presidencies and the birth of the Black Lives Matter movement. Furthermore,
can Olson’s findings hold true when transplanted to Ferguson and the greater St. Louis
region?
The first portion of this study will test the hypotheses and conclusions of the
above works to see if they are applicable to the context of St. Louis in the aftermath of
the death of Michael Brown. Specifically, this study will seek to understand what
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political narratives or frames are likely to be accepted and shared by clergy as well as
the means through which they are shared. Systems of influence will be examined as well
including the SRS, PRS, and MRS. These systems will be examined through the use of
qualitative interview data in the hopes of understanding the factors that contribute not
only to whether clergy speak out but to what clergy believe. If Djupe and company are
correct in accessing that often clergy speak through priming values, the choice of clergy
to “go public” on an issue is less important than what the clergy believes, because
values associated with those beliefs can be presented rather without much thought as
to their political connection. To be sure, clergy do not need to go public on any
particular issue in order to prime values associated with that issue.
Furthermore, the above studies do relatively little to examine how theological
beliefs and religious practices might influence political interest or action. This study will
try attempt to increase our understanding of the association of these factors with clergy
response to racialized state violence. Largely, this study is an attempt to use the
concepts developed by the above works and to evaluate their capability for explaining
clergy action and interest during not just a crisis, but a national focusing event on race
and violence. The ultimate goal is to identify whether clergy are in Morone’s conception
participating in a jeremiad in demand of racial equity and justice or moralizing state
violence.

2.5 Framing Ferguson
One final item that must be addressed before we move to our qualitative study
of clergy and our quantitative study of the rank-and-file faithful of Ferguson: framing.
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Framing is important in this study as it lies at the heart of our question. Responses to
the death of Michael Brown (and virtually all incidents of racialized state violence) are
centered around two frames: one that supports the state as properly exercising law and
order, and one that sees that state action as unjust. The facts or non-facts that one
accepts or rejects are often grounded in which frame one is predisposed to. For that
reason, attention is needed on how the events of Ferguson have been framed.
Issue framing is an important early step in the policy process. How issues are
framed can determine how they are evaluated and implemented. The Frameworks
Institute, a nonprofit organization whose mission is to equip the nonprofit sector with
the ability to frame the public discourse on social problems defines a frame effect as “a
difference in the way people react to a particular choice depending on how it is
presented” (Frameworks Institute). The group goes on to say that “changes in advocacy
communication [i.e. speech in support of or against a policy alternative] lead to changes
in public discourse, public opinion public policy and even outcomes” (Frameworks
Institute). According to Lakoff (2006) “every word evokes a frame” (Lakoff 2006).
Therefore, it is of utmost importance that policy makers and policy entrepreneurs
discuss the policy that they are advocating for in a way that evokes the correct frame
that they are trying to relate to the public. Frames and symbols are utilized universally
throughout policy arenas, but this paper will seek to address how policy activists,
political elites, and the media sought to define the issue surrounding the Ferguson
Moment and the killing of Michael Brown by former Ferguson police officer, Darren
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Wilson, and the subsequent killings of young Black men by police officers throughout
the United States.
Symbols, Language, and Stories within the Policy Process
Defining the issue is a key strategic step in the policy process. According to Stone
(1988) a problem definition is “a statement of a goal and the discrepancy between it
and the status quo…it is the strategic representation of situations” (Stone 1988; 106).
The classic maxim that there are multiple sides to any story holds true when we look at
public problems and public policy. Stone argues that there is “no objective description
of a situation; there can only be portrayals of people’s experiences and interpretations”
(Stone 1988; 106). A policy maker or activist must decide how to present the issue in a
way that most successfully wins the public to their cause.
It can be argued that language rather than force is the basis of politics.
According to Elder and Cobb (1983), “Whatever else may be involved, communication is
central to politics. Certainly, who communicates what to whom, how, and with what
effects go to the crux of the political process” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 9). Edelman (1964)
addresses this point in his classic book, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. He asks, if politics
is the question of who gets what then why is there so much talking rather than force?
The problem with force according to Edelman is the potential for resistance or
counterforce. According to Edelman, “Through language a group can not only achieve
an immediate result but also win the acquiescence of those whose lasting support is
needed” (Edelman 1964; 114). The public responds to the verbal cues of politicians,
media, and policy activists. Edelman argues that it is the “consistency in the contexts in
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which specific groups of individuals use symbols” that is crucial for understanding
politics because “Meaning and response…are not the same for everyone, but a function
of group interest or mutual role taking” (Edelman 1964; 115).
For Edelman one of the most important uses of language within politics is that it
can either mobilize the public or keep them from becoming mobilized through the
creation of sign structures. Sign structures act effectively as an issue frame within this
paper, although they can be more broad conceptions such as “liberty” or “reason” or
the Constitution of the United States; sign structures are essentially any “potent
symbols justifying man’s lot and his acts” (Edelman 1964; 129). So if the issue frame is
prominent enough it would qualify as a sign structure. Edelman argues that these sign
structures are powerful forces in political life and can even cause people to act against
their own self-interests. According to Edelman,
Syntax and the prevailing sign structure thus implicitly express the ideology of the
community, facilitate uncritical acceptance of conventional assumptions, and impede
the expression of critical or heretical ideas. A system of signs that objectively hurts a
group can even be embraced and protected by the group it injures (Edelman 1964; 126).

Symbols are important for policy definition because, according to Stone, “They
are means of influence and control, even though it is often hard to tell with symbols
exactly who is influencing whom” because they are “collectively created” (Stone 1988;
108). Elder and Cobb describe symbols as the “currency” of the communication
process. According to them, symbols “represent the focal objects of political attitudes
and opinions and serve to define the procedural and substantive concerns of
government” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 9). Symbols for Elder and Cobb also provide the
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link between individuals and civic society (Elder and Cobb 1983; 27). These symbols
once adopted by society can have intense effects on the individual. Edelman says, “Man
creates political symbols and they sustain and develop him or warp him” (Edelman
1964; 1).
Stone points out four aspects of symbolic representation that is used in the
policy definition process. These include narrative stories, synecdoche, metaphors, and
ambiguity. First, the use of stories in policy definition is widespread. According to Stone,
“Definitions of policy problems usually have a narrative structure; that is, they are
stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end, involving some change or
transformation…They have good guys and bad guys…and they have a moment of
triumph” (Stone 1988; 109-115). Stone points to two different types of narratives that
are common in the framing of issues. The first is the story of decline. This is an
apocalyptic type narrative which starts with an allusion to “the good old days” and
“ends with a prediction of crisis—there will be some kind of breakdown, collapse, or
doom—and a proposal for some steps to avoid the crisis” (Stone 1988; 109). This is the
narrative adopted by Donald Trump during his campaign for president through the use
of the slogan “Make America Great Again”. The second type of narrative is a story of
control, which according to Stone, looks like this: “The situation is bad. We have always
believed that the situation was out of our control, something we had to accept but
could not influence. Now, however, let me show you that in fact we can control things”
(Stone 1988; 113). Stone points out that both story types have alternate forms and that
the stories of control “offer hope, just as stories of decline foster anxiety and despair”
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(Stone 1988; 115). Policymakers present their alternatives as a way of either providing
that hope or avoiding that despair.
The second symbolic form that policies take on is synecdoche. This is a literary
tool where not so common examples are represented as what is typical. According to
Stone, “It is common in politics that one part of a problem particularly catches the
popular imagination, evokes a sense of horror, and confines the policy response to the
part of the problem” (Stone 1988; 117). One example of this use of symbolic problem
definition is Ronald Reagan’s creation of the welfare queen myth. This leads to policy
that is skewed to accommodate one aspect of the issue but does not address the issue
as a whole. However, it is politically useful because “it can make a problem concrete,
allow people to identify with someone else, and mobilize anger” (Stone 1988; 117).
The third aspect of symbolic representation widely used in public policy is
metaphor. According to Stone, “On the surface, [metaphors] simply draw a comparison
between one thing and another, but in a subtler way they usually imply a whole
narrative and a prescription for action” (Stone 1988; 118). Metaphors are common
place in policy language and usually imply prescription. Stone provides examples of
metaphor in public policy including discussing institutions as living organisms or as
machines, social problems as diseases, and the metaphor of war which can be seen in
the War on Drugs and the War on Poverty.
The fourth aspect described by Stone is ambiguity, what she calls the “most
important feature of all symbols” (Stone 1988; 123). The fact that one symbol can have
multiple meanings depending on who is receiving the symbol “enables the
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transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective results and purposes”
(Stone 1988; 123). It allows for compromise. Stone calls attention to the connection of
this important aspect to Elder and Cobb’s study of symbols when they say, “To approach
the study of politics from a symbolic perspective is to recognize the peculiar problems of
synchronizing diverse motivations, expectations, and values so as to make collective
action possible” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 28). Ambiguity is at once able to appease the
polis while also allowing the policy leaders to “Carve out a sphere of maneuvering
hidden from public view, where they can take decisive action on a problem” (Stone
1988; 124). It allows for both sides in a conflict to claim victory (Stone 1988; 125
Lakoff’s Four Morals of Issue Framing
How then do we evaluate the strength of a frame? In the long run, by what
percentage of the polis the frame is able to win over. However, in the crafting of frames,
we need principles to help us determine what makes a strong frame. Lakoff describes
four “morals” of issue framing. The first, as mentioned above, is that every word evokes
a frame. The example that Lakoff provides is that the word ‘elephant’ prompts us to
recall a specific image and specified knowledge (i.e. we think of an elephant) (Lakoff
2006). According to Lakoff, “ideas are primary—and the language carries those ideas,
evokes those ideas” (Lakoff 2004)
The second “moral” provided by Lakoff is that “words defined within a frame
evoke the frame”. The example that Lakoff uses is the word “trunk” or “peanuts”
evoking the idea of an elephant (Lakoff 2006). One example of this that we can
sometimes deduce which side of an issue someone is on based on their vocabulary
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when discussing the issue. When it comes to policy, it is hard to imagine the politically
far-right using terms such as “social justice” or “reproductive rights” because they are
words defined within a more politically progressive frame. It is disadvantageous for one
to discuss a policy while using language defined within an opposing framework.
Third, Lakoff says that “negating a frame evokes a frame.” His famous example is
that it is impossible to tell someone not to think of elephant without them thinking of an
elephant. Acknowledging the opposition’s definition of a policy problem is not a
successful way to promote one’s cause.
The fourth and final of Lakoff’s morals of framing is that every time a frame is
evoked it is reinforced. According to Lakoff, replacing existing frames takes time
because “reframing requires the rewiring of the brain” (Lakoff 2006). Additionally, it is
difficult to apply new frames to an issue or even to adapt old frames to new issues.
According to Elder and Cobb,

“Discontinuities do, of course, occur as events and changing circumstances give rise to
new demands on the political system. These demands are frequently couched in terms
of familiar symbols in order to legitimate the demands and to solidify support. The new
application of familiar symbols is likely to be unsettling to many and perceived as
threatening to some” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 16).

We must keep these morals of framing in mind when we evaluate how
narratives about the death of Michael Brown are communicated.

Confirmation Bias
Bosso (1994) discusses the increase in focus on problem definition within the
public policy literature. He looks to the increasing fluidity of American politics, the loss
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in power of traditional contextual bases of problem definition (the political party), and
the idea that we may now be entering a period where “definitions of all public problems
are up for grabs, a free-for-all of meaning that will eventually will settle into new
cleavages” as potential causes for the increased focus on issue definition (Bosso 1994;
182). This observation was made during the early days of the internet and one can
assume that this “ideological anarchy” that Bosso describes has only increased with the
exponential increase in information sources from the development of the internet and
social media.
It is well established that the values of symbols are not intrinsic to the symbol
itself, but rather the meaning is “invested in it by the people who use it” (Stone 1988;
108). According to Elder and Cobb, “The same symbols may communicate different
things to different people. What is perceived by some may be substantially at odds with
what is perceived by others” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 10). Problem definition is, therefore,
“affected by culture, societal values, and prevailing norms, but also by the formal
structure of governing institutions and procedures within which politics takes place”
(Bosso 1994; 192).
Here I will take the time to, first, discuss different sources of bias: biases from
culture, biases from political systems, and finally biases from media. Culturally, people
tend to reject information that is conflict with their already preexisting beliefs. This
concept is known as confirmation bias. However, the process is constrained by
reasoning and the amount of evidence provided. According to Kunda (1990), “people
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a
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justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer.
They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to
support it” (Kunda 1990). Taber and Lodge (2006) found that when it comes to political
information people tend to accept without scrutiny arguments that favor their own
political persuasions and a higher tendency to counter-argue information that is against
their politically held beliefs; additionally, people tend to seek out sources of information
that confirm their preexisting beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006). One’s political
socialization is therefore important in how one interprets frames and symbols.
Governmental institutions and norms can be biased from allowing certain policy
issues a place on the agenda. This is described by Schattschneider as the mobilization of
bias. According to him, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because
organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics and
others are organized out” (Schattschneider 1960; 71). This is important to keep in mind
as we consider how the issue of Black political advancement remains off the legislative
agenda.
The news media plays an important role in the policy process by providing
political information to citizens and through its power to set the agenda (Birkland 2001;
88-90). However, Birkland points out that the media tend to dramatize news coverage in
an attempt to seek profits which can result in the distortion of people’s perceptions
(Birkland 2001; 93). Iyengar (1994) finds empirical evidence that television shapes both
how the public understands the causes of political issues and also the needed solutions
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to those issues (Iyengar 1994). Additionally, Iyengar finds that the media tend to discuss
social problems outside of their context. In other words, they tend to discuss issues as
episodic rather than discussing societal systems that may have caused the issue (Iyengar
1994). There is evidence that the media are also biased in favor of the status quo.
According to Bosso (1990) it is difficult to change existing symbols because “Mass
media… are unlikely to challenge the received culture, but will instead publicize
deviations from… or threats to… orthodoxy (Bosso 1990; 199). Alternative media and
social media are also growing in importance. Social media, in particular, has been under
criticism from the mainstream media and the public for its spreading of misinformation
and its potential effect on the 2016 United States Presidential elections (Isaac 2016).
Framing Ferguson
Now this paper turns to a discussion of what frames were employed by groups to
interpret the death of Michael Brown and the formation of the Black Lives Matter
movement and how successful were they. I will address how those frames were relayed
by the media and how they were accepted by the public.
Both the racially conservative and the racially progressive seemed to respond to
the killing of Michael Brown by deploying different variations of a control narrative as
described by Stone. The Black Lives Movement adopted a narrative that closely follows
Stone’s model for control narratives, specifically, they argue that the systematic killing
of young Black men at the hands of police officers is no longer something beyond the
control of the people, and by standing up and speaking out these killings can be
stopped. According to the Black Lives Matter network website, “Black Lives Matter is an
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ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and
intentionally targeted for demise” (Black Lives Matter).
On the other side, racially conservative and pro law enforcement framers use the
victim blaming narrative, which Stone describes as an alternative version of the control
narrative (Ryan 1971; Stone 1988). These groups portray Michael Brown as a thug and
argue that if he would have peacefully followed Darren Wilson’s orders that he would
not have been killed. The Ferguson Police Department’s release of video footage of
Michael Brown pushing a convenience store clerk before leaving with a box of stolen
cigarillos earlier on the day of his death has lead some to believe that the Ferguson
Police Department were trying to reinforce that narrative (Vega et al. 2014). As
discussed in the introduction to this work, controversy ensued when the New York
Times published an article days before Brown’s funeral in which the phrase “Michael
Brown… was no angel” was used (BBC News). This reinforced the conservative narrative
and outraged many on the other side of the issue. The alt-right has developed a
different narrative to discuss racial politics more broadly, a narrative of decline. They
evoke a jeremiad that describes the nation’s acceptance of racial minorities as having
led to the downfall of “American” culture, and argue that this American culture must be
restored through racist and morally conservative policies.
Many other symbols and metaphors were adopted by competing factions
debating the circumstances of Brown’s death. One of the most prominent of those
symbols was the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot.” Regardless of the veracity of the
slogan’s origins, which has been debated, the slogan itself has been adopted into the
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larger cultural zeitgeist. One example of popular public figures evoking this frame is
when five team members of the St. Louis Rams took the field with their hands up in
order to show solidarity with Ferguson protestors; this lead to subsequent criticism from
the racially conservative and acted as a precursor for subsequent controversial displays
by athletes advocating for racial justice (ESPN).
Following the protests in Ferguson, law enforcement representatives took to the
media to speak out against what they perceived as an attack on law enforcement and
the criminal justice system from the Black Lives Matter movement, arguing that police
killings of young Black men was not a systematic problem but simply “a few bad apples”
within the criminal justice system (Sigel and Kumanyika 2016). They argue that Black
Lives Matter uses synecdoche, pointing to these instances of police violence against
young Black men as representative of systematic failure, when perhaps it is episodic in
nature as police groups claim. However, they also continually use synecdoche to argue
that Black Lives Matter protesters are anti-American and violent. Unfortunately, a
system to gather complete data on police use of lethal force is not in place (Klinger
2008). This results in the opposing sides relying on varying data. This is important in
priming as, according to Stone, “There are many possible measures of any phenomenon
and the choice among them depends on the purpose for measuring” (Stone 1988; 127).
Therefore, the data one uses depend on the frame one is presenting. However, the
increase of the appearance of these types of killings in the media, as well as evidence
within the criminal justice literature tend to point to the fact that this is a systematic
issue (Albonetti 1997; Alexander 2011; Bates 2010; Brennan 2008; Sweeney and Haney
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1992). Additionally, experimental studies have even shown a racial bias in police
officers’ decisions to shoot suspects (Correll et al. 2007).
Other sources document racial differences in perceptions of how fair the
criminal justice system is toward Black people (Hurwitz and Peffley 2010; Bobo and
Johnson 2004; Sigelman et al. 1997; Tuch and Weitzer 1997). This is a textbook example
of how individuals and groups interpret political information and symbols differently. In
my own research I have found that within Ferguson steep racial cleavages exist as to
how Ferguson voters interpret the death of Michael Brown (Udani et al. 2014; Udani
2014). Unfortunately for the Black Lives Matter movement, their opponents and
perhaps some within the movement itself have framed the conversation as one of Black
people versus police, when middle white America tend to see police as national heroes.
Elder and Cobb argue that symbolism in politics may heighten racial disparities in
attitudes toward Black political advancement. Elder and Cobb, citing Anton (1967), say
that often actual policy outcomes do not align with the symbols used to justify those
policies (Anton 1967, Elder and Cobb 1983; 22). Additionally, many policy outcomes are
mere symbolic gestures that are
Sufficient to assuage anxieties and to reassure the public that a problem has
been resolved…Implicit in this reaction is a tendency to perceive officially
sanctioned and appropriately processed statements about a problem as a
solution to a problem (Elder and Cobb 1983; 22).
When symbolic gestures toward Black political advancement are made, whites
“see the ‘legitimate’ grievances of Black Americans as largely answered; [for Black
people to] expect more [is considered] unreasonable” (Elder and Cobb 1983; 22).
The Media and Michael Brown
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As discussed above, reporting from news media tends to be episodic rather than
systematic (Iyenger 1994). Additionally, episodic frames tend to cause viewers to see
problems as caused by individual responsibility rather than as caused by society or
institutions (Iyenger 1994). These concepts strongly tie in with debates surrounding the
death of Michael Brown and subsequent killings of young Black men by police and the
ways that the problem is framed. If the media characterize these killings as episodic,
rather than discussing police killings of Black men on as systematic, then we can expect
for media consumers to deny the frame that these killings are pervasive within the
criminal justice system and that steps must be taken at an institutional level rather than
an individual level in order to combat them.
Media tends to add fuel to the fire of racial myths and racism, often through
neglecting to share the views of racial minorities and barring racial minorities from on
camera positions (Campbell 1995). According to Campbell (1995), the news media
ignores “life outside of middle-American/dominant culture parameters, [which]
contributes to an understanding of minority cultures as less significant, as marginal”
(Campbell 1995). Additionally, Mendelberg (2008), Entman (1997), and Huber and
Lapinski (2008) argue that the media tends to prime racial resentment (Entman 1997;
Huber and Lapinski 2008; Mendelberg 2008). Entman’s study shows, “ample support for
a hypothesis that local television’s images of Blacks feed racial anxiety and antagonism
at least among the portion of the white population most predisposed to those feelings”
(Entman 1997). Gilliam et al. (1997) discuss how television news coverage of crime can
distort reality for viewers, causing them to view racial minorities as having a higher
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“propensity to commit different types of crime”. According to Gilliam et al. “This
distortion is likely to impede thoughtful discussion of racial divisions in contemporary
America” (Gilliam et al. 1997)
Specifically, in regard to the Ferguson moment, Suebsaeng (2014) and others
have pointed to unflattering portrayals of Michael Brown by both traditional and
alternative news media (Suebsaeng 2014). Additionally, there is evidence that the news
media in this case have opted to discuss the problem in more episodic terms (Al Jazeera
2014; Deggans 2014). Deggans also finds evidence that cable news tailored its reporting
of Ferguson to cater to how their audience views race, specifically calling out Fox News
for denying racial bias within law enforcement, while acknowledging that MSNBC took a
more personal approach to killings of young Black men by police (Deggans 2014).
Finally, both sides of the issue point to the spread of misinformation surrounding the
death of Michael Brown.
Evaluating the Frames in Ferguson
Taking Lakoff’s four morals into account which frame is more successful? It
seems that the media have tended to promote, perhaps unintentionally, the episodic
frame while failing to discuss killings like Michael Brown’s within a larger systematic
context. Every time a frame is evoked it is reinforced and it appears that the media, one
of the main channels of political information for everyday Americans, reinforces racially
conservative frames. This is what the literature would lead us to hypothesize, and this
hypothesis seems to be confirmed by anecdotal evidence, although a more systematic
study to this question in the tradition of Iyengar is needed.
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Additionally, Black Lives Matter has other hurdles in that the police effectively
act as a symbol evoking overwhelmingly positive images within white America. The
symbol of the heroic policeman is hard to overcome and effectively bars racially
progressive narratives from reaching many Americans. To criticize policing is to criticize
police, and to criticize police is to criticize American heroes. It is likely, therefore, that
some Americans are threatened by these new symbols as would be predicted by Elder
and Cobb.
However, there is hope for the Black Lives Matter movement. Every time their
frame is evoked, it is reinforced, and many have taken up the cause to continue
discussions of police violence towards Blacks and to promoting their narrative.
Additionally, according to Lakoff, every time their frame is negated it is also reinforced.
Therefore, every time a conservative pundit disputes the historicity of “Hands up, Don’t
shoot” they remind information consumers of police brutality. As of now, little effective
progress is being made within our government to advance a more equitable criminal
justice system. Framing is an early step in the policy process. To be sure, the battle is still
over what frames the American people will accept about police violence and race.
These competing frames also track well with different theories on the
relationship between the religious and political spheres. The main biblical story is one of
redemption. Throughout the Old Testament, God continually leads his people out of
captivity and oppression. Within the New Testament, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is
meant to redeem those who believe in him. This would seem to indicate that Christians
should be receptive to jeremiads that call for more liberatory change. However, the
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Bible, as well as many Christian liturgies, is also full of themes that emphasize
obedience, order, and authority. These clearly relate to the pro-police frames that
resulted after the death of Michael Brown. Because of the clear relationship between
biblical themes and racialized frameworks, it is important that we understand what kind
of frames are accepted and passed on by faith elites in the St. Louis region when it
comes to racialized politics.
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Chapter 3: The Response of Clergy to Racialized Violence in Ferguson
So far, we have established the basics of the complex relationship between
religion and politics in the United States from what we currently know in the literature
and discussed theological and philosophical ideas of how that relationship should look.
We have also briefly looked at how religion and politics have interacted in the United
States throughout history and how different narratives about the death of Michael
Brown are shaped. Now we proceed to answer our research question of what the
religious response to racialized police violence looks like in America today. We will be
searching for answers to this question in two levels: faith leaders and the rank-and-file
faithful. This chapter deals with the former.
Much of this research is consistent with the current understanding of the
political action of clergy. For instance, clergy are often constrained from acting
politically by their congregation. However, this paper will also provide evidence that
perceptions of mission are important indicators of political action and interest.
Additionally, communal religiosity such as the sacraments also seem to have bearing on
political interest and activism. Ultimately, this chapter will find that religious leaders
pick from various paths, some pursue peace, others justice, and others the status quo.

3.1 Methods
In order to investigate how clergy responded to the crisis surrounding the death
of Michael Brown, I conducted interviews with various clergy from throughout the St.
Louis region. Interviews were conducted throughout the fall of 2019 into the early part
of 2020. The five-year gap in time allowed for members of clergy to discuss what is
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different about serving in their role since the death of Michael Brown and how their
congregations have changed. However, the gap in time has led to some setbacks. Often,
congregational leaders who had served during the Ferguson Moment are no longer in
their posts. If this was the case, efforts were made to talk with both current leaders and
their predecessors.
An unforeseen problem with the timing of the interview process was the onset
of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent quarantine. At the onset of the crisis I
decided to halt interviews for two reasons. First, safety was of concern and although
phone interviews could be conducted, the quarantine has added a considerable amount
of stress onto churches, especially those with fewer resources. I did not feel that in good
conscience I could add additional burdens to potential respondents at this time. Second,
the findings would likely be skewed by responses gathered post-quarantine. For
example, some questions selected for the interview portion of this study asked about
the most prevalent issues facing the St. Louis region. Responses to these questions
would be radically different post-quarantine as public health, individual liberties,
joblessness, and other issues became radically more important. While responses to
interview questions are often affected by the timing of the interview, this dramatic
scope of the pandemic is likely to radically shift responses. While this limits the amount
of data that was able to be gathered for this portion of the project, the interviews
alongside evidence gathered from news sources provide solid data for how churches in
St. Louis responded to the crisis in Ferguson. As the year went on and more incidents of
racialized violence focused national attention on racism in the criminal justice system, I
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was more satisfied with my decision to stop interviewing. The Black Lives Matter
movement has become embraced by the mainstream American populace, a much
different scenario than what the clergy in St. Louis faced in 2014 when Michael Brown
was slain in the street. Societal and congressional pressures to go public were likely
much different in 2014 than they would be in 2020. For further research, I wish to
compare reactions to justice movements in 2020 with those early days in 2014.
However, that is beyond the scope of this project.
Interviews consisted of fourteen questions representing three main topics:
doctrinal and theological issues, social and political issues, and questions regarding
attitudes and reactions to the Ferguson moment. Interviews usually lasted around an
hour and a half. Interviews were conducted in-person when possible, although some
clergy opted to be interviewed over phone or via Zoom video-conferencing software.
Churches were selected in order to include the four major religious traditions
within the United States: Black Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant,
and Catholic. However, it was very difficult to find Catholic clergy who were willing to
participate in the study. The snowball method was employed in which I asked
respondents who they believe I should talk to and I then made an effort to interview the
contacts that they pointed me toward. Ten interviews were conducted representing
nine different churches covering all four traditions. Of these, one respondent
represented Catholicism, five represented Mainline-Protestantism, two represent Black
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Protestantism, and two represented Evangelical Protestantism.5 Responses included
three Black respondents, one Latinx respondent, and six white respondents.6 Eight male
clergy and two female clergy were interviewed.
As this project seeks to evaluate how frames around the death of Michael Brown
are accepted and transmitted within religious circles, the main dependent variable for
this study focuses on what information the member of clergy believes about the death
of Michael Brown. Clergy are asked directly what they think happened the day that
Michael Brown died. Their responses are then examined by the researcher and
categorized as being a narrative that is police favorable or Black Lives Matter favorable.
For example, one respondent provides information that they believe a bullet hole was
found in Darren Wilson’s car from Michael Brown firing off the police officer’s gun.
There is no actual evidence of this occurring, however, the member of clergy heard this
evidence and internalized it. This would be categorized as a police favorable narrative as
it promotes the idea that Michael Brown’s death was an unfortunate incident of selfdefense. However, if a statement rejects the idea that Darren Wilson acted in selfdefense it would be deemed a Black Lives Matter favorable narrative. In addition,
variables around issue interest, political interest, and political actions also act as
depended variables in this section of the study.

5

Note: When classifying based on tradition, I chose to follow Pew Research Center’s
approach and identify churches that are predominantly Black/African-American but that
are associated with a Mainline Denomination as a Mainline church rather than as part of
the Black Protestant tradition (Masci et al. 2018).
6 Demographics information such as race, age, sex were interviewer-perceived.
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3.2 Hypotheses
The main question that this study seeks to answer is whether or not religion has
an inspiring or opiate effect on political action after moments of racial crisis. I expect to
find that in some cases religion works as an inspiration, but that it will more often act as
an opiate. That is not to say that there is no active response by churches and their
leaders in response to racial crisis, but rather that these responses will be more focused
on community care than social/political change.
Additionally, I hope to find evidence as to whether differences in doctrinal and
theological attitudes are related to difference in political attitudes and responses to
racial crisis among clergy. I expect to find that members of the clergy that believe that
the mission of the Church or that the mission of Jesus Christ to includes a political
component to be more likely to be politically interested in social justice issues and to
have a more change-minded than peace-minded in their response to the death of
Michael Brown. At the same time, I expect to find those who do not emphasize a
political component, but rather focus on sharing the gospel and forgiveness of sins, to
have a more peace-minded response and to be more politically-focused on morality
issues.
Following the studies discussed above, I expect to find that congregational
demographics and location are closely related to responses to the Ferguson Moment
and what types of issues clergy are politically interested in. I expect that clergy from
congregations that are composed of more people of color to be more mindful of social
justice issues than those who lead congregations that are predominantly white or
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located in predominantly white neighborhoods. Additionally, I expect that mainline
protestant clergy and Black protestant clergy will be more likely to be politically
interested in social justice issues rather than morality issues, compared to evangelicals
who I expect will put a greater emphasis on morality issues. Finally, those who preach
more often on end-times may be less likely to be politically interested in social justice
issues over morality issues and also may be less change focused due to the idea that the
world is in a state of decay.
I also expect to find that clergy take a pacifying approach over a change-oriented
approach in how they discuss the death of Michael Brown. Specifically, when asked
about the events surrounding the death of Michael Brown, I do not expect many clergy
to openly endorse one narrative or another. Rather, I think that when asked, clergy will
take qualifying stances or try to answer in a way that is conflict averse. Furthermore, I
expect that clergy will not be likely to believe that the church should be actively involved
in politics.
Finally, I believe that clergy in the sample will be likely to say that the Ferguson
Moment changed their congregation in some way, but I believe that how that change
looks will vary. As a focusing event, it is likely that the death of Michael Brown and
subsequent protests could have activated a new focus on social and racial justice within
churches in our sample. Another possibility is that churches may have split or lost
members due to their proximity to Ferguson, or due to disagreements on how to
respond.
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3.3 Findings
Overall, the sample is mixed on how they responded to the death of Michael
Brown. Two respondents communicate about the Ferguson Moment in a way that
evokes a police narrative, five communicate in a way that is resonant with a Black Lives
Matter narrative, two were unsure about the events of that day and it was difficult to
classify their responses as either supporting a police or a Black Lives Matter narrative
and one chose not to speculate on the events that led to Michael Brown’s death. Half of
the sample’s political interest was devoted to justice issues such as race or economic
inequity, while the other half of the sample were mixed in their responses indicating
issues that can be classified as justice issues or morality issues such as abortion. Notably,
no respondents indicated that their sole political focus was on issues of morality.
All of the clergy in the sample indicated that their church was changed in some
way by the Ferguson Moment, but their responses varied. They responded to the death
of Michael Brown in a variety of ways including: speaking from the pulpit, protesting,
working as de-escalators, providing for needs in the community, creating or joining
small groups focused and racial justice and reconciliation.
I examine political attitudes and responses to the death of Michael Brown as a
dependent variable related to three different types of independent variables: doctrinal,
demographic, and place-based. The first looks at relationships between theological and
doctrinal beliefs and political attitudes. Next, I consider relationships between
demographic variables such as personal characteristics of the clergy themselves as well
as demographic characteristics of the congregations that they shepherd. Finally, I look at
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place-based variables. These include proximity to the location where Michael Brown lost
his life and responses to questions how different or similar a church is from neighboring
churches.

3.3.1 Doctrinal Beliefs and Liturgical Practices
There are a variety of doctrinal differences between the clergy interviewed for
this project. The most basic difference is the Christian tradition to which they subscribe.
Additionally, there are differences in practices such as how the clergy approach baptism
or the practice of communion. There are also differences in how the clergy view the
mission of their congregation, the mission of Christianity more broadly, and the mission
of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, cleavages exist in beliefs around the end times and the
frequency of end times preaching. One of the main research questions for the interview
section of this project is whether these differences are related to political attitudes and
responses to the death of Michael Brown.
Given that the most basic theological differentiator among the clergy in the
sample is religious tradition, we are compelled to ask whether there is a relationship
between religious tradition and racialized attitudes. As stated above, the survey
consisted of five Mainline Protestant clergy, one Catholic priest, two Evangelical
Protestant clergy, and two members of clergy from the Black Protestant tradition. As
can be seen in Figure 3.3.1, Mainline Protestants in the sample were the most likely to
make statements consistent with the Black Lives Matter narrative (80%) although one
Mainline Protestant clergy made statements consistent with the police narrative that
Darren Wilson acted in self-defense. One Black Protestant respondent made statements
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consistent with the Black Lives Matter narrative while the other said that they were
unsure about what happened and did not relay information that can easily be described
as promoting either narrative. Among Evangelicals in the sample one responded in a
way that was consistent with the police narrative while another was unsure. The
Catholic priest in the sample opted not to answer. In the sample, Evangelicals are less
likely than Mainline or Black Protestant clergy to accept the Black Lives Matter
narrative, this does not hold statistical significant using the Pearson Chi-Square test
[Chi2(9)=15.9; Pr=0.069]. Additionally, according to the data gathered, tradition does
not predict what sorts of action clergy might have taken in response to the death of
Michael Brown or whether or not clergy identify race or police brutality as issues of
concern within St. Louis in any way that would allow us to make inferences about clergy
in St. Louis as a whole.
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Figure 3.3. 1

The type of issues that clergy are politically interested in varied by tradition as
well. Mainline Protestants in the sample were the most likely to be solely focused on
justice issues (80%). Fifty percent of Black Protestants were solely focused on justice
issues, and all of the Catholic and Evangelical respondents were interested in both
justice issues and moral issues [Pearson Chi2=4.8; Pr=0.187]. This is consistent with my
hypothesis. It makes sense the those of the Catholic and Evangelical traditions would be
interested in moral issues as well as justice issues.
Clergy varied on how and when they practiced two of the most notable
sacraments of the Christian faith: baptism and communion. Attitudes on baptism and
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communion are important as Mockabee (2009) relates higher views of these sacraments
with more community focused faith rather than individualistic faith. These factors are
then related to progressive politics and conservative politics respectively. Six of the
clergy members believe in the practice of adult-only baptism while three led
congregations that practice infant baptism. While baptism was clearly important to all
respondents in the project, some had a higher view of baptism than others. One
respondent representing an evangelical megachurch spent a considerable amount of
time discussing the importance of adult baptism as an essential aspect of personal
salvation. He said, “It’s immersion not sprinkling or pouring. It’s to dip or to plunge. In
the book of Acts every time we see someone receive Jesus as savior they are baptized.”
Only one interviewee reported representing a church that practices speaking in tongues.
Frequency of communion varied in the congregations led by the clergy interviewed.
Three represented churches that practice communion weekly, three represent churches
that practice communion monthly, two practice communion every other month, and
two failed to answer how frequently they practice communion. It should be noted that
frequency of the practice does not necessarily mean that it is held in higher regard. For
example, a mainline clergy member in our sample said, “When it comes to the Lord’s
Supper, we believe that it is important but I’m fairly into the idea that important does
not necessarily mean often. We don’t practice it every week. We do every fifth Sunday
and thanksgiving, but it is the focus of the service when we do it. We highlight and give
it attention as being important.”
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The data does not point to any discernable relationship between how the
sacrament of baptism is practiced and which narratives around the death of Michael
Brown the member of the clergy is likely to accept. However, all three members of
clergy whose congregation practices infant baptism said that race is one of the most
important issues in the St. Louis area at the time of the interview. Those who said that
they only practice adult baptism were split three on each side [Pearson Chi2(1)=2.2.5;
Pr=0.134]. This tracks with what might be expected because infant baptism is more
community focused because it is about bringing children of church members into the
community. On the other hand, adult baptism is often seen as an individual’s expression
of faith. Therefore, it makes sense that we would see those who practice infant baptism
to put more of an emphasis on racial justice. This is represented graphically in figure
3.3.2. Interestingly, when looking at the traditional moral issue of abortion, we see the
same split among those who hold to adult baptism, while those who practice infant
baptism are unified in not identifying abortion as an important issue. However, there is
no trace of a relationship between the frequency of communion and racialized attitudes
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in the sample.

Figure 3.3. 2

Clergy were asked three questions to help clarify what role they see Christianity
playing in the world. They were asked to explain their church’s mission statement, the
mission of the Church, and the mission of Jesus Christ. Additionally, clergy were asked
which is more important, avoiding sin or helping others, a survey question whose
responses have been linked to individualistic religion and communitarian religion
respectively (Mockabee 2009). Together these responses help give an understanding of
how St. Louis clergy perceive their role and the broader purpose of the Christian faith in
the world today.

112

The table below presents responses to the three mission questions from the
interview. Some clear themes are present. First, proselytizing is almost always
mentioned in discussions of mission. Many clergy in the sample appeal to the “Great
Commission” from scripture when discussing the proselytizing aspect of the Christian
mission. Additionally, love is very prevalent as a theme in responses to these missional
questions. Scriptural references to Jesus’ commands to love God and love others were
often appealed to in discussions of both congregational mission and the mission of the
Church. When it comes to the mission of Jesus, responses centered around two
different themes: salvation and justice. First, many responses were focused on Jesus’s
mission to save the lost. How this was accomplished seems to be in debate among those
in the sample. Specifically, two clergy are opposed in their responses as they discuss
whether or not Jesus came to die. Many responses mention Jesus as a saving or
reconciling figure. Another prominent theme is justice. Two respondents mentioned
that Jesus came to set captives free. Perhaps, this is related to saving the lost and
forgiving sins, but it also seems to be related to ending temporal oppression as well.
Other responses specifically discuss justice or care for the outcast. Below you can see a
breakdown of congregational, ecumenical, and Christological mission statements
provided by the respondents in the sample.
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Table 3.3.1 Respondent Identified Mission Statements
Church
Church
Congregational
Mission of Christianity
ID
Tradition
Mission
A
Mainline
Love God and love “I think the mission statement of the Church should
be the same as Jesus’ response and the prophets’
Protestant
neighbor

response to ‘What are the greatest
commandments?’ Love God and love your neighbor
as yourself.”

A

Mainline
Protestant

“We’re not a real
Same as congregational mission.
doctrinal church,
but if you ask what
the mission is it
would be to love
God and love
neighbor. Jesus’s
two
commandments.
It’s about all we can
agree upon.”

B

Mainline
Protestant

“To make Jesus
famous”

“More broadly I think the mission of the church is in
the commission in the gospel of Matthew, ‘Go you
therefore make disciples, baptizing and preaching,
and sharing what you learned with me with one
another.’ I’ve always believed that’s the message of
every church.”

Mission of Jesus Christ
“Compassion and Justice and also to praise
God to give thanks for God’s love and
mercy.”

“His mission seemed to be summarized by
Luke in chapter four. Certainly healing,
crossing boundaries with the outcasts, the
poor, exorcisms was certainly a big part of
that as well seemingly; to seek and save the
lost.”

“Scripturally, Jesus quotes the prophet Isaiah,
I’m not going to quote it perfectly, but he has
come to set the captives free, to loose the
bonds that bind us, the spirit of the lord was
upon him to preach liberty to preach
freedom to eliminate the bondage of sin and
to provide life. Life is temporal as well as
eternal, and not just life but life abundantly. I
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C

Evangelical
Protestant

“Leading people to
find and follow
Jesus”

“To fulfill the great commission of Jesus, to lead
people to find and follow Jesus, to take Jesus to
the culture where you’re at so people can see
how Jesus loves them by how we live out the
faith. We are to live it out so that people are
drawn to him. We’re not just to do good things
for Jesus but to change people’s lives. We
partner with people all around the world to
take Jesus effectively to the cultures whatever
they are and of course there are several
different cultures here in St. Louis.”

D

Black
Protestant

“Our mission is to
share the hope of
Jesus Christ in a
hopeless world.
Our vision is to take
the city for God”.

“The great commission says, ‘Go into all the
nations baptizing, teaching in the name of the
father son and holy spirit, teaching them to
observe all things.’ We’ve got to go to the parts
of the world that we don’t necessarily want to
go to. We’ve got to get out of the comfort of
the four walls of our church.”

believe Jesus to be the great liberator, the
emancipator.”
“To me it was to come and give us the gift of
salvation and hope, and so we can
understand who God is and God’s purpose
for us. In Philippians chapter 2, it says he left
heaven, he came to earth, took on our debt-our sin paid for-- so that we can be forgiven
of our sin. But I believe it wasn’t just to bring
salvation but that we can understand and see
who God is. He came as messiah to redeem
us so that we would have hope so that we
could have an eternity with Jesus so that we
could be one with Jesus. We could not pay
for our sin ourselves he did it for all of us.”
“He ministered to the poor, to the
brokenhearted… Isaiah 61 says, “The spirit of
the sovereign lord is upon me because he has
anointed me… to set the captives free” And
that’s what Jesus did he came, he preached
to the poor. The rich thought he would come
to them and be their person. They were
looking for this rich royal king and he was
born in a manger. He was born in a barn with
animals all around. He was born to a
carpenter and a young girl. I’d like to say
Jesus is for everybody. He’s relatable for all
mankind.”
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E

Mainline
Protestant

F

Evangelical
Protestant

G

H

“Living the good
news”

“We are not removed from the world, but doing
things for the good of God’s creation.
Reconciliation work, because Jesus came to
reconcile people to God. Hungry people fed,
lonely people comforted.”
“Lead people to
“In general, I would sum up in the great
love god, love
commission that Christ gave which is to go and
others, and become make disciples and he elaborates on that about
devoted followers
baptizing and teaching them to follow his
of Jesus Christ”
commands. It’s about making followers, but
that is not independent of Jesus’s nature which
was not coercion but showing the love of Christ
by meeting people’s needs, in trust that they’d
follow Christ.”

“To reconcile all people to God.”

Catholic

“Proclaiming
acceptance and
hope”

“Well first to proclaim the saving message of
Jesus and second to extend his kingdom of love
and justice on earth.”

“I would say the same thing I said about the
church. Proclaiming that saving message and
extending the kingdom of God.”

Black
Protestant

“Preaching the
gospel, Changing
the world”

“One of the problems with church is people
want to put it in a box. Christianity is designed
for life. If life changes we make change the
method of how to apply the message. We don’t
change our message… Churches have to change
their method to reach out more affectively to
others. Now there are so many social needs as

“The mission of Jesus Christ was to come and
be the payment for our sins. He therefore
came with the mission knowing that he was
going to die but also knowing he had the
power to rise from the grave and from that
give a gospel message to all people Jew and
Gentile that they all could be saved by

“He had his own mission statement he said,
“the son of man came to seek and save the
lost”. In a holistic way Jesus cared about
people, we see his desire to care for
emotional, physical, tangible needs, at the
same time his ultimate goal is to care for
spiritual needs. The church has been divided
over which is more important. I think it’s
both. Jesus came to lost people who are
separated from God, but there’s also people
who need help so it’s both.”
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well. Churches have to take the message of the establishing a fellowship with God. His
gospel and make it much more life-applicable so mission was (Romans 3:23) the propitiation,
people have answers to their life today.”
the payment for our sins. Without him there
would be no faith. He’s the author and
finisher of our faith.”
I

Mainline
Protestant

“Our mission
statement is to be an
open minded, open
hearted, open door
community”

“Christianity in the 21st century is called to be interfaith. We cannot live on an island and imagine that
our message is the only thing that we are concerned
about that we don’t see the other people who are
willing to engage the community. We don’t say that
others’ faith is not valid. Open to the movement of
likeminded people in the world. Likeminded in being
respectful of others’ religious traditions, and
likeminded in the sense of how we practice
compassion, mercy, charity, engagement.
Christianity today no longer conceives of community
as a resource for church growth. For some, the
community is just a vehicle by which you grow your
church. The church must be much more integrated
in the community and the wellbeing of the
community is dependent on the church being
responsive to the needs of the community.”

His mission, historically and theologically,
was to come and be faithful to the God who
sent him. I don’t think he came to die, he
came to live, but he was not afraid to die for
what he believed in and that is God’s coming
Kingdom. When he was forced to make a
decision between violent revolution, or being
faithful to his calling as a healer as a prophet
as a liver of the faith, he decided that he
would choose the path of giving himself.
When I say he didn’t come to die, I think he
truly saw himself as a reformer of Judaism,
not the starter of a new religion. That was
Paul probably. He started a movement.
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Based on the responses above, variables were created indicating whether
Christological mission statements referred to two key justice indicators. The first is
whether the respondent made a clear indication that there was a political component to
Jesus’ ministry. The second variable is whether or not the clergy’s description of Christ’s
mission included care for the poor. Figures 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 display how these beliefs are
distributed across Christian traditions.

Figure 3.3. 3
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Figure 3.3. 4

Although inferential statistics are not promising due to the small sample size,
within the sample there seems to be a relationship between each of these variables and
acceptance of narratives around the death of Michael Brown (See figures 3.3.5 and
3.3.6). One hundred percent of respondents who see aspects of Jesus’ mission as
political make statements that align with the Black Lives Matter narrative, while those
who do not identify a political component to Jesus’ mission are more divided on the
issue [Pearson chi2(3)=2.5; Pr=0.475]. Of those that say Jesus’ mission was not political
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37.5 percent make statements aligned with the Black Lives Matter narrative, 25 percent
make statements aligned with the police narrative, and the remainder provided answers
that showed they were unsure of which narratives to accept or chose not to
answer(37.5 percent). The variable on Jesus’ mission being to the poor shows a weaker
pattern. Here those who believe Jesus’s mission was, at least in part, to care for the
poor was split between the police narrative and the Black Lives Matter narrative fiftyfifty. Whereas those who did not mention Jesus’ mission as being related to the poor
also had fifty percent of the respondents favoring the Black Lives Matter narrative,
however, here 25 percent were unsure, 12.5 percent did not give a response, and 12.5
percent accept the police narrative. Curiously, however, these variables do not seem to
have any directional relationship with identifying race as a major issue of concern in St.
Louis.
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Figure 3.3. 5
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Figure 3.3. 6

As mentioned earlier in this work, Mockabee has shown that asking whether it is
more important for Christians to avoid sin or help others is a useful survey question
related to attitudes of political conservatism or liberalism (Mockabee et al. 2009).
However, this question does not seem to translate well in an interview project
conducted among thoughtful experts of Christianity. Most respondents (70%) failed to
answer or gave a compromising answer such as “It’s not a matter of either/or. They are
connected.” Three respondents said that helping others is most important for
Christians. All three of which were from the Mainline Protestant tradition. However, it
might be notable that no respondents answered that avoiding sin is more important.
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While most respondents gave a compromise answer or no answer, 100 percent of those
who said that helping others is more important to the Christian life identified race as a
major issue of concern in St. Louis compared to fifty percent of those who gave a
compromise answer, and sixty percent of those who refused to answer [Pearson
Chi2=1.9048; Pr=0.386]. Once again, this finding does not have inferential power but still
it is useful in describing our sample. As figure 3.3.8 shows below, those in our sample
who chose helping others over avoiding sin were more likely to communicate Black Lives
Matter adjacent themes than those who gave compromising answers or opted not to
answer [Pearson chi2(6)=3.433; Pr=0.753).

Figure 3.3. 7
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Figure 3.3. 8

Clergy responded in a variety of ways when asked whether and to what extent
churches should be involved with politics. Four respondents (40%) gave answers
indicating that they do not believe that the church should be very involved in politics.
The responses given were very similar regardless of differences in Christian
backgrounds. One minister representing an evangelical megachurch in neighboring St.
Charles County said,
I think we need to help people, but I don’t go political in the church and my primary
reason is because of the example of Jesus. It’s not the threat of losing my 501c3 license;
that’s not what motivates me. I just look at Jesus and what he did and that’s where I’m
going to go. Politics divides people and can sidetrack a church from where its supposed
to be. I will speak out for life and against hatred, against arrogance against pride. That
fits both sides of the fence in a huge way.
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Another respondent representing the Catholic tradition said,
I would say that the catholic church sees its role as informing consciences so we preach
values, but then it is the role of the member of the church as a citizen to live out their
values, but they do have to make their own decisions. The church doesn’t say vote for
this person or not that person. It does at times say that certain proposals are
intrinsically immoral or not but we don’t endorse or prohibit explicitly any one person.

While these respondents represent very different church traditions, they both
subscribe to the notion that their role is more about shaping consciences by preaching
values rather than speaking directly on issues of politics. However, one respondent who
represents the Mainline tradition discussed his hesitancy with getting political due to
congregational pressure:
We’ve been into all kinds of things since then and typically we lose members because
sometimes we’re too involved but sometimes we gain members because people say I
agree with them. There’s no secret that mainline protestants have been diminishing in
size and influence since the 19th century and part of that is the sense that religious
leaders have been too political about things. It’s a dance man; it’s a dance for a pastor
to have to do. You’re almost danged if you do and danged if you don’t kind of thing. If I
don’t get political about some issues coming down the pipe I have colleagues that will
criticize but some of us who are more in the coasts try to say that but it’s hard in the
Midwest. On social media in our groups I’ll put my two cents, I’m as progressive as the
next guy here but until you pastor my church you can’t tell me how to pastor my church.
Because my congregation they don’t want their preacher to be too political. I think
we’re confused about the purpose of the church.

Another respondent, representing a Mainline congregation, provided a
qualifying answer, saying that the church should be somewhat involved in politics. They
describe the church as a place where community members can become engaged with
real issues of the day, but they stress that the church’s involvement in politics should
not go so far as to associate with partisan politics. According to him, “The Church is
where people are animated to engage. However, they are going to engage in their work,
but if the church becomes affiliated with political parties the church loses.” The fear
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here is a loss of power for the American church. The minister bemoans the state of the
church in Europe, blaming the lack of Christian influence on partisan politics. However, it
is also an appeal to peace and to maintaining strong attendance. He says, “When you’re
too involved with politics you are drawing a line down the congregation.”
Within our sample, those who gave answers indicating that the church should be
involved in politics, whether very involved or somewhat involved, were more likely to
advance a Black Lives Matter adjacent narrative than were those who said the Church
should not be involved in politics [Pearson chi2(3)=7.9167; Pr=0.048). This is significant
at the .05 criteria of significance, meaning it has some inferential power for clergy in St.
Louis more broadly. Figure 3.3.9 shows that 83.33 percent of respondents who said the
church should be involved in politics advanced the Black Lives Matter narrative
compared to zero percent of those who said the church should not be involved in
politics at all. Additionally, those who support a politically active church were more
likely to report using public speech from the pulpit in response to the death of Michael
Brown [Pearson Chi2(1)= 2.8571; Pr=0.091]. Respondents who favored a politically active
church were slightly more likely to have participated in protest politics following the
death of Michael Brown as well (33 percent compared to zero percent of those who felt
that the church should not be active in politics; Pearson Chi 2(1)=1.6667; Pr=0.197).
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Figure 3.3. 9

Perhaps a belief that the church should be politically active is related to clergy
who are more likely to promote a racial justice narrative than a status quo narrative
because they feel more empowered to create change in the political sphere. Another
possible explanation is that this question connects to individual and communal
theologies described by Mockabee 2009. Indeed, as can be seen in the figure 3.3.10,
when we look at responses to this question by tradition, the Evangelical respondents,
known for a tradition of individualism, all answer in the negative, while Mainline
Protestants and Black Protestants, traditions known for communal religiosity,
overwhelmingly responded that the church should be politically active.
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Figure 3.3. 10

Overall, the clergy in this sample do not have an end times focus in their
preaching. One respondent said that they preach on the end times somewhat
frequently, one said that they never preach on the end times, and the rest said that they
rarely if ever preach on the end times. Unfortunately, the lack of variance in frequency
of end times preaching makes it impossible to discern a directional relationship between
end times preaching and political attitudes such as the types of issues that clergy are
interested in or narratives around the death of Michael Brown.
Having established variance in theological beliefs and religious practices among
clergy in our sample and how those may relate to political interest, political actions, and
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responses to the Ferguson moment. Another variable must be considered. How similar
are clergy from their congregants both doctrinally and politically? Additionally, where do
clergy feel pressure to remain silent or to take action on political and social issues?
Most respondents in the sample reported that their congregation was
theologically similar to them. In fact, no respondents said that their congregation was
theologically dissimilar. Seven respondents said their congregation is either very or
somewhat similar with themselves and three said that they were unsure. However,
when asked how politically similar their congregation was to them a plurality of the
clergy said they were unsure. Three clergy felt that their congregation was politically
similar, three felt that their congregation was politically different, and four responded
that they were unsure. However, there does not appear to be a relationship between
perceived similarity between clergy and their congregation and political action or
interest in this sample.
The membership reference system clearly does play a role in whether and how
clergy respond to social issues. However, the mechanics and outcomes of that
referential system can vary widely depending on the faith leader and their congregation.
Many clergy in the sample reported pressure to speak out or remain silent on political
issues from their congregations. However, of those who described this pressure, most
said that the pressure came from both sides and often contradicted each other. Indeed,
for some members of the clergy, navigating reactions to social issues is difficult because
one can offend members of their flock on either side. One clergy member gave an
anecdote about how measured a clergy member might have to react to such pressures.
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Pastor F says, “I feel pressured both directions. We have people in my church. I have a
gentleman who made my life miserable with intense pressure to come out against a
president and make my preaching more political. On the other hand, I’ve had people
who are very angry because they think I’m too political.”
This pressure leads some to avoid using public speech to address social issues.
Minister A says, “In my role, I would say from the pulpit I have to be very careful not to
sound political in a partisan way. Which when you bring up the great issues of the day
whatever they might be you’re being political in a sense, but the congregation is not
happy if they smell partisanship.” Minister A goes on to explain that if they ground their
teachings in scripture they can speak to social issues of the day without expecting so
much “flack.” However, the difficulty and complexity of avoiding an appearance of
partisanship keeps him from going into social issues very often who later criticizes
mainline seminaries doing more “to create activists than create pastors.”
Navigating these paths can be very difficult as controversies resulting from
perceived pastoral partisanship can result based on very minute details. For example,
Minister E recounts an anecdote where a member of their church decided to leave
because of his use of the word “slain” rather than “shot” or “killed” in describing the
death of Michael Brown. While in that anecdote the clergy member decides to stand by
his choice of words, his reaction was not without a cost.
Others in the sample acknowledge congregational pressures to speak out or
remain silent but believe that those pressures have no sway on the message that they
present or the actions that they take. Clergy B says,
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I have felt pressure to be silent but I have resisted that on every side. I believe that I’m
called to live faithfully to the gospel. All of my members don’t share my political beliefs
and at this time in society when we have so much dissidence among people, so much
division… I guess I have members in my congregation, a majority would identify
politically as being Democratic, but I do have Republican members in my congregation.
When I preach, most of my sermons include current day political issues. There are
members in my congregation who think that I should not talk about such things or bring
them in the pulpit. There are people in my congregation who were upset when I moved
the flags from my sanctuary. There used to be two flags in my sanctuary. One was a
United States flag and one was a Christian flag. I had both flags removed because Jesus
was neither American nor Christian. Jesus was Jewish. There are those who disagree
with me about those things. It hasn’t been antagonistic because I can hear them and
they can hear me. We don’t always agree. What we do agree on is that we’re called to
love one another even in our disagreements. I have people who disagree with my
politics. I have people who disagree with same gender loving people being the
embodiment of Christ and I’ve had disagreements with people about the willingness to
welcome as well.

3.3.2 Congregational Size, Demographics, and Location
The clergy interviewed in this study represent different congregations in terms of
size, demographics, and location. Size and demographics were reported by clergy
themselves during the interview process rather than being estimated by the interviewer
from service observations. Therefore, it must be noted that what is being examined
here is not necessarily the true demographics of the congregation, but rather the
perceived demographics of the leaders of these congregations. The question of import
here is whether or not these perceived demographics are related to political attitudes
and reactions to racialized crises among the clergy. The clergy members themselves
carry various identities and characteristics that are also important to examine. For
example, are there differences in the political attitudes of male and female clergy
members? Are White leaders as responsive as Black leaders in responding to racial
crisis?
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The sizes of the congregations varied widely among the clergy that were
surveyed. Half represented churches with congregation sizes of two hundred or less. Of
those two clergy members led congregations smaller than one hundred regular
attendees and three led congregations that were made up of one hundred to two
hundred members. The other half of the sample shepherded congregations consisting of
five hundred or more regular attendees; of these four had between five hundred and
eight hundred regular attendees and one, an evangelical megachurch, had over two
thousand regular attendees across multiple Sunday services. These size demographics
seem to make sense in light of recent trends in congregation size in the United States.
According to Chaves, most congregations are small in the United States, the median
church size being less than one hundred regular participants (Chaves 2011; 64).
However, Chaves also points out that the median church goer attends a congregation
with about four hundred regular participants. The bimodal distribution of congregation
size is shown in figure 3.3.11.

132

Figure 3.3. 11

Because of the bimodal distribution of the sample and the small sample size, I
created a binary variable categorizing responses as either from a small church (500 or
less) or a large church (501 or greater). The distribution of responses in this variable is
fifty-fifty. Small churches in our sample are more likely to share views consistent with
the Black Lives Matter narrative (60 percent) compared to forty percent among large
churches [Pearson Chi2(3)=1.2; Pr=.753]. However, it must be noted that this is not a
large substantive difference as it amounts to a difference in only one respondent.
Additionally, almost all of the clergy who represented small churches in the sample
reported race as being a major issue affecting St. Louis, while large churches were less
likely to identify race as an issue of concern (Pearson Chi2(1)=0.47; Pr=0.49). Figure
3.3.12 and 3.3.13 show more details.
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Figure 3.3. 12
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Figure 3.3. 13

Congregational demographics are also varied regarding age, class, and race. Four
out of ten clergy said that they represent congregations that are made up of mostly
older congregants. One responded that they represent a mostly middle-aged
congregation and one responded that they represent a mostly younger congregation,
one said that their congregation was not predominantly made up of any particular age
group, and three failed to discuss the age demographics of their congregation. It would
make sense to find predominantly older congregations as, according to Chaves, older
people tend to be more highly represented in congregations, especially today (Chaves
2011; 63). Given the sporadic responses to age demographics and the small sample size
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it is hard to determine any sort of relationship between congregation age and political
interest or action.
Congregations had little variation in terms of class. Overall, clergy described their
congregations as middle class with some wealthier congregants and some less well off.
Besides one clergy member, leading a predominantly Latinx Catholic parish, who said
that their congregation was mostly lower/working class and one who failed to answer all
other respondents said that they lead churches that are predominantly middle class.
The clergy interviewed for this project represent congregations that are not
diverse racially or ethnically. One interviewee said that their congregation was
somewhat diverse, but mostly white. This member of clergy gave their response
because while their Mainline Sunday services tended to be predominantly white, their
church hosted many community activities throughout the week which were mostly
attended by people of color. He said,
We have about fifty people in our worshipping community, but we also have community
events throughout the week including meals, co-sponsored events with the local Ba’hai
community, music programs and classes, circus classes, and a food pantry that feeds
one hundred families each week. We also have bible studies and home-schooling
groups. So our fifty person worship services are about seventy-five percent white and
twenty-five percent Black, but those figures reverse for our community events. Our
community events are about seventy-five percent Black and twenty-five percent white.

Besides this interviewee, each respondent said that their congregation was not
diverse but predominantly represented one racial or ethnic group. This lack of withincongregation diversity is typical for American churches. According to Chaves,
“Congregations with more than a smattering of minority presence… remains very rare
and difficult to sustain over the long run” (Chaves 2011; 28). However, Chaves does
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point out that there are more predominantly white congregations in the United States
that have at least some people from ethnic or racial minorities in the congregation. This
seems to be the case for most of the white congregations represented in our sample.
Half of the clergy interviewed (five) lead churches that they report as being not diverse
and mostly white. Most mentioned that they have a few Black or Latinx worshipers and
one said that they have a small number of Asian congregants. One respondent
representing a mega-church in St. Charles county, which neighbors northern St. Louis
County said, “We are a mostly white church and we have a growing number of
minorities and I’ve been speaking to that in the last few years. I think we reflect our
community in a good way as far as our part of St. Charles county which is predominantly
white. I’m thankful that we’re not an all-white church.”
Three respondents said that their congregation is not diverse and mostly Black.
These churches were often less racially diverse than the predominantly white
congregations. One respondent said, “We have one white member, which would
constitute all of the racial diversity in our congregation.” Another said, “We are ninetynine percent African-American; we have one Caucasian.”
Finally, one respondent said that their congregation is not diverse and mostly
Latinx. He leads a north St. Louis County Catholic parish that regularly has eight hundred
attendees, of which seven hundred are Latinx.
While clear variation in the racial and ethnic compositions of congregations
represented in this study are present, this compels us to ask how and when these
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congregational compositions are related to political attitudes and actions of their clergy.
The clergy whose congregations are reported as being predominantly white were split in
the narratives that they present about the death of Michael Brown. Of the five
respondents, two made statements congruent with the police narrative, two made
statements that reflected the Black Lives Matter narrative and one was unsure and did
not represent either position. Clergy who represent predominantly Black/African
American congregations mostly shared statements that represented the Black Lives
Matter narrative, although one of the three was unsure. In fact, clergy who represent a
predominantly Black congregation were over twenty percent more likely to make
statements congruent with a Black Lives Matter narrative than other churches
[Chi2(3)=1.9048; Pr=0.592]. Also, of note in this sample is the fact that only churches
who represent predominantly white congregations describe the death of Michael Brown
in a way that reflects a police narrative. Additionally, the only respondent to say that

138

she responds to critical issues facing the community through protest politics represents
a predominantly Black congregation. In research using exit-poll data gathered for this
study (see the next chapter), it was found that individuals in polling places that were
predominantly white were more likely to accept police narratives about the death of
Michael Brown than those who were in precincts that were predominantly Black. It was
also found that in addition to the racial composition of one’s surroundings, that
proximity to Michael Brown’s death was also related to perceptions about Michael
Brown’s death (Udani et al. 2014). In his study of racial unresent in Cincinnati, Sokhey
(2007) concludes that clergy working nearer to racial crisis took on the role of

Figure 3.3 14

community leaders and provided for a social network that encouraged prolonged and
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pronounced clergy participation in reconciliation efforts. In Faith & Ferguson, Francis
(2015) documents the active and racially progressive response of Mainline Christian
leaders from across the St. Louis region. However, out of the 22 faith leaders she
documents, only one is from within the Ferguson municipality, while two others are
within a mile or so of the site where Michael Brown was killed. This prompts us to
question whether the location of a church is predictive of how it responds to racial
crisis. In particular, we can examine two different items related to location. The first of
which is proximity. How does distance from the location where Michael Brown was
killed influence response? Second, following (Djupe and Gilbert 2002) we can examine
the level of perceived similarity or difference between the church and churches that are
nearby.
First, let us address proximity. One pastor of a predominantly white megachurch in St. Charles County, across the Missouri River from Ferguson and about a
twenty seven minute drive (19.2 miles) from Canfield Green Apartments, describes
feeling insulated from what was happening just across the river from his church. He
says,
During that time we just hunkered down. We’re pretty far removed from Ferguson
geographically. We are a whole different community but realizing that we have families
that live in Ferguson we reached out to them. They were fearful and they were sad that
their city was being seen this way. There was so much pain, that the world saw them
this way, so we cared for them, but community-wise we didn’t really do anything at the
time. Like what do we do? Whenever African Americans came up on the platform to talk
about it and help people understand we definitely made it a matter of prayer but as far
as actions we didn’t do a whole lot.

Churches within Ferguson sometimes felt at least somewhat detached from the
death of Michael Brown even though its repercussions were being felt all around their
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community. Multiple preachers said something like this statement from a leader of a
Black Protestant church within Ferguson: “Most people in Ferguson did not even know
that Canfield Green Apartments were even in Ferguson.”
From how the leader of Church E describes it, the clergy response to the death of
Michael Brown tended to be more from churches that were outside the Ferguson
community. He says, “A lot of clergy could roll into town, be in front of the camera for
protests and get in their car and drive back, but that didn’t materially change the state
that the people in the community were living in.” This is corroborated by the map in
Gunning-Francis’ book, Faith and Ferguson, where most of the congregations she
documents as participating in protest politics are from the St. Louis region but are
mostly from outside the Ferguson community (Francis 2014). Indeed, there seems to be
a different dynamic at work in Ferguson than in Sokhey’s study of Cincinnati, where
distance from Ferguson allows for either insulation to what is happening or opportunity
to participate in ways that are less focused on peace and reconciliation and more
focused on policy change.
I calculated distances between the church locations and the Canfield Green
apartment complex where Michael Brown was killed. I then calculated mean distances
across narrative categories. The total mean of the sample is 5.4 miles with distances
ranging from 2.2 miles away to 19.4 miles. Indeed, the data seems to show the
transferability of Sokhey’s findings. The mean distance from the Canfield Green
apartments of those who accept a police-positive narrative is 10.8 miles while the mean
distance for those who accept a Black Lives Matter narrative is only 3.78 miles.
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However, for those who responded to the death of Michael Brown through protest
politics in response to social issues the mean distance is higher than for those who did
not (6.15 miles and 5.2 miles respectively).
The second location-based variable that we must examine is the perceived level
of difference or similarity that leaders of a church have with the churches near them.
Three of the clergy interviewed for this study said that their churches were very similar
to those near them. Four said that their church was somewhat similar to those near
them. Two said somewhat different and one failed to answer. No respondents felt that
their congregation was very different from those nearby. There does not seem to be any
relationship within our data between perceived difference and narrative acceptance or
responses to the death of Michael Brown. The literature focuses on perceived difference
indicating more politically active clergy. However, there is not much perceived
difference in our sample to speak of. Rather, while clergy in the sample might feel that
their church has something unique to offer, they mostly feel like other churches in the
community are a part of the same work.
The personal identities and characteristics of the clergy themselves is likely to be
an indicator of political interest and action, as well as responses to the racial crisis in
Ferguson. When introducing the sample of respondents, I briefly discussed some of their
demographic variables. How predictive are these variables to narrative acceptance,
political interest, action, and response to the Ferguson moment? It is important to note
that demographic information of the clergy was perceived by the researcher.
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First, let us examine whether sex is a predictor of racialized attitudes among the
clergy in our sample. It is notable, although not statistically inferential, that while the
men in our survey are divided in what narratives they share, the women in the sample
all accept a Black Lives Matter narrative (compared to 37.5% of the men in the survey)
[Chi2(3)=2.5; Pr=0.475]. The women both participated in protest in response to the
death of Michael Brown, although one only as a monitor, while only one of the eight
men in the survey said that he participated. Both women described either police
injustice or race as important issues facing St. Louis compared to only 75% of the men.
An age variable was created across three categories: under forty, forty to fiftynine, and sixty and over. Those classified as sixty or over seem to be less likely to
support a Black Lives Matter narrative about the death of Michael Brown than those in
younger age groups [Chi2(2)=0.5333; Pr=0.766]. On the other hand, only those who
were under forty in the sample failed to identify race or police injustice as an issue of
major importance in the St. Louis region, while 100% of respondents over the age of
forty saw race or police injustice as a major issue [Chi2(2)=10; Pr=0.007].
In regards to race, it is not surprising to find that Black respondents were
significantly more likely to accept a Black Lives Matter narrative than white respondents
[Chi2(6)=11.5; Pr=0.074]. One of the Black respondents expressed that they were unsure
about the events that led to the death of Michael Brown while the other two expressed
views that reflect a Black Lives Matter narrative. Two of the six white respondents made
remarks consistent with a police narrative, three made remarks consistent with a Black
Lives Matter narrative, and one was unsure. The one Latinx respondent declined to
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comment on the events surrounding the death of Michael Brown. While all the white
respondents in the sample cited either “race” or injustice in policing as one of the most
important issues facing St. Louis. One Black respondent and one Latino respondent did
not. The former said that gun violence, crime, and education were the most important
issues; while the latter focused on immigration and abortion.

3.4 Discussion
The data presented in this chapter provides support for many conclusions that
have already been drawn about the connection between clergy and politics. First, most
of the clergy in the sample are reluctant to get “too political”. Instead, their response to
crisis is to focus on community needs such as through providing food or cleanup, or to
advocate for peace rather than policy change. Second, most of the clergy in the sample
use public speech to indirectly influence their congregations through preaching values.
Third, clergy feel pressure from their congregations as to whether they should “go
political” on an issue. Finally, like most churches throughout the United States, the
churches represented in our sample were not racially diverse.
However, some of the data and narratives presented might make us second
guess what we know about the political nature of clergy. First, when it comes to
instances of racialized crisis (and perhaps politically charged crisis in general) distance
might work in more than one way. Sokhey (2007) argues that those closer to the crisis
are more likely to respond. The interviews conducted in this chapter paint a picture of
more localized clergy advocating for peace over policy change, while clergy with more
distance are able to either completely ignore the issue or to become politically active. It
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does so by at once insulating congregations from the unrest while also freeing them to
take action without as much risk of congregational or community backlash.
It might be intuitive, but the evidence drawn from this admittedly small sample
provides evidence that religious factors and other variables within the SRS (Self
Reference System) might be more influential than what is usually considered. While the
sample for this interview project was small, it provided variety in location, race, sex, and
importantly religious ideas and practices. Within the sample, there did seem to be a
relationship between religious tradition and acceptance of narratives around the
Ferguson Moment. Specifically, Evangelicals were less likely than Black Protestants and
Mainline Protestants to discuss the death of Michael Brown in a way that is consistent
with a Black Lives Matter narrative. However, tradition does not seem to be predictive
of what actions a member of the clergy performed to respond to Michael Brown’s
death. Religious practices may also be related to political interest. Take, for instance,
baptism. Within the sample, there was a gap in identifying race as an important issue in
St. Louis based on whether one practices infant or adult baptism, with the former being
more likely to do so. This tracks theoretically as infant baptism tends to be viewed as a
more communal practice compared to adult decision baptism which tends to be viewed
as more individualistic. Perhaps this supports Green et al.’s conclusion that communal
and individualistic forms of religion are related to different political attitudes.
Additionally, clergy represented in this sample had different attitudes on the
mission of Jesus which reflected differences in political attitudes. Those who believed
that Jesus’ mission was political were more likely to discuss the death of Michael Brown
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in a way that reflected a Black Lives Matter narrative rather than a more pro-police
narrative. As Jesus is the center of the Christian faith, it would make sense that beliefs
about his mission, work, and character would be reflective of attitudes and actions of
Christians today. Indeed, one of the strongest takeaways from this study is that how one
perceives Jesus and his mission is indicative of how one interacts with the cultural
sphere.
While the question of which is more important for the Christian life: helping
others or avoiding sin, works as a great question on surveys of rank-and-file Christians,
in an interview setting with faith leaders, most opted for a non-answer or compromising
answer. However, still the few who chose to say helping others are more likely to frame
the death of Michael Brown using a Black Lives Matter narrative. Additionally, attitudes
about whether the church should be political are related within the sample to attitudes
on the death of Michael Brown. Those who are more supportive of a political church are
more likely to accept a Black Lives Matter narrative.
Congregational factors also seem to be related to how clergy discuss the death
of Michael Brown as large churches were much less likely to accept a Black Lives Matter
narrative than small churches or to identify race as one of the most important issues
facing St. Louis. Additionally, as might be expected, the racial demographics of a church
are related to attitudes and responses to the death of Michael Brown and the protests
which followed.
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The individual characteristics of the clergy in the sample also seem to be related
to attitudes and actions around racial crisis. Specifically, women in the sample were
more likely to have politically progressive attitudes and actions. Still, in the United
States, relatively few Christian denominations allow for women to take on ministerial
positions, especially in lead pastoring roles. However, as the women in this survey are a
part of the same denomination as a male member of the clergy who presented much
more conservative views, this is likely not due to the religious environment from which
the women are drawn.
Ultimately, the data produced by this study is not as conclusive as the researcher
would have liked due to the small sample size. However, the most valuable contribution
that it makes is that it provides clear evidence for the importance of qualitative research
as a method of understanding the relationship between race and faith in the United
States. Especially in instances of racial crisis, interviews and observation should be
utilized in order to better understand the pressures, attitudes, and resulting actions of
clergy in their communities. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that
understanding how clergy perceive the mission of Christ can be important in how they
process and perform their role. The evidence presented in this chapter will be
supported by the vignettes presented in the next.
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Chapter 4: Vignettes
Having used the data gathered from my interviews to discuss the relationship
between various variables with political interest, political action, and responses to the
Ferguson Moment. I now present a few narratives that seem pertinent in helping us to
understand how the clergy in my study navigated the crisis in Ferguson. These are
meant to supplement the data in order to give the reader a more complete picture of
the responses that faith leaders took in response to the death of Michael Brown.

4.1 A Tale of Two Churches
One story that is drawn from this study that relates the influence of the racial
composition and the location of a congregation on the ability of clergy to behave
politically is that of two churches representing the same mainline denomination. Three
clergy representing two different churches within the same mainline denomination
were interviewed for this study. The denomination is one of the largest within the
tradition. While this denomination allows for a large degree of doctrinal freedom
amongst its member churches as well as the individuals who attend them, the main
differences between the two churches are their location, the racial composition of the
congregation, and the racial identity of the clergy who lead them.
One of these churches, Church A, located in the center of Ferguson off of South
Florissant Road, has a predominantly white and aging population, and due to
congregational in-fighting has resorted to at least three leaders or interim leaders over
the last decade or so, and these leaders have all been white. I interviewed two of these
leaders, the current one and an interim leader who was in charge of the church during
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the Ferguson Moment. This church’s response to the death of Michael Brown is one that
can be characterized by fear. When asked about how the church has changed since the
tragedy, the current minister said,
It scared the bejesus out of people who were here. It started a miniature wave of people
moving away. I’m going to say that because of the information that got out that a lot of
our people were getting which seemed to suggest that it wasn’t simply a matter of a
white police officer gunning down a Black man in the street but there might have been
an altercation. A lot of people here who lived here when there was rioting in the streets
it made them angry that people reacted in that way. And I daresay that it created a little
more racial animosity in their hearts because they felt like it was an overreaction.

His predecessor, a woman who was the interim minister at the time, described
the response similarly, noting the fear and racial animosity of the congregation. She
said,
The congregation mostly responded in fear. They wanted to lock the doors. People
would say, they knew I was involved in demonstrating a little bit so they’d say “pastor
when is it going to stop? Can you make it stop?” and I said “what would change if it
stopped? Don’t you think racism, the inequity in the school systems…”-Most of them
were retired teachers and they saw what happened in Normandy and other schools“what part of that is okay for Black kids?” I’d say if people stopped protesting then
nothing is going to change about policing, about schools, about Black wealth. So mostly
they just wanted to lock the doors, stick their fingers in their ears and go “lalalala”. I
heard horrific anti-Obama stuff. That had already been a rumbling. So, I don’t know how
it changed them.

It is clear that the two ministers feel constrained in how they are able to address
racism in their roles as members of clergy. The current minister describes the situation
as if his hands are tied and so he often avoids “getting political”. He describes
congregational pressure outweighing social pressure from his social justice minded
peers and colleagues. He says that he will occasionally speak broadly about racism and
might mention the Ferguson Moment when he does, but he describes his role as one
that is not overtly prophetic, rather subtly communicating values. He says,
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It makes my job more difficult, there’s not overt racism in my church, but it is a white
congregation you’re going to get what you get. People are going to respond to
something like the Michael Brown thing, what one person feels it’s going to spread and
trickle out. I have to be very careful when I mention it but I will say, “You know five
years ago this happened and it helped spur the Black Lives Matter movement…”. I talk
about it but I don’t say you’re white and you’re bad, but I can talk about all the issues
where it just creates more awareness. That’s the way I’ve been trained to approach
these things: not overtly. Everybody is on a journey, I can’t force things down people’s
throats but I can plant seeds.

Unlike the current leader of the church, his predecessor calls out the
denomination as being overtly racist. Although, she admits that she was slow to start,
she tried to take an active role in responding to the tragedy. Her congregation was
aware that she was involved in some sort of demonstration and this created more
tension. She says, “I do this because Jesus called me to, but they’re writing my check. So
I had to evaluate what does Jesus want me to be spending my time doing and what does
the church want me to be spending my time doing because those aren’t the same
thing.”
In one anecdote she gives about her time at Church A following the death of
Michael Brown, she describes a request that a community member who was involved in
nursing ministries made to the church. The community member had secured a team of
crisis-response EMTs who were specially trained to handle protest activities to come to
Ferguson to provide their services. She had a family member who attended Church A
and so requested that Church A would house the team during their stay. The interim
minister says that the church would not allow the team to stay on their premises, but
added that the community member, “was gracious enough to let the church find a way

150

to say they did something, so they allowed the EMTs to store some of their equipment
there;” the clergy member sarcastically adds, “WooHoo”.
In addition to pressure from her congregation, she described other hinderances
to her participation including a constant barrage of emails, texts, and other
communications, many events that were not communicated widely, and racial
segregation among clergy. She describes the latter of these by saying, “A lot of Black
clergy are bi-vocational and work during the day and white clergy scheduled meetings
during the day and very often Black clergy aren’t able to go to those meetings, so there
wasn’t a time where we were able to connect.” However, she began attending events
organized by Metropolitan Congregations United and was also trained to become a
deescalator, and she sometimes went out into the street wearing her orange vest that
said “CLERGY” and talked to members of the community. Her denomination began
providing resources which she shared with her flock. She encouraged members of her
congregation to go to an anti-racism training with her and managed to bring along six
people. She also invited speakers to her church. While she played a much more active
role than her congregation was comfortable with, she talks about the time as a time
where she could have done more but was unable. The current pastor described the
reaction to her work by saying, “The interim pastor here, a female pastor… she took to
the streets and there was some negative feedback about that, but most understood that
she was really a part of a larger group of clergy that was trying to mitigate what was
happening and quell what was happening.” In his understanding of her work, she was
working less for radical political change than for peace and reconciliation.
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Despite being in the same mainline denomination, Church B responded very
differently to the crisis. Church B is just a twelve-minute drive away from Church A in
unincorporated space just north of Highway 270. The congregations are similar in size.
They are also similar in their doctrines and practices. However, while Church A is made
up of an almost entirely white congregation and is led by white pastors, Church B’s
congregation is made up almost entirely of Black people and is pastored by a Black
woman. Their response to the Ferguson moment was drastically different as well. The
pastor of Church B became one of the most prominent religious figures in the modern
fight for racial justice in America.
When the current pastor of Church A was asked how he responds to social and
political issues he says that he hosts a bible study dedicated to examining justice issues
and he also occasionally speaks from the pulpit, although he says it is more values based
and he is hesitant of being too pushy. The pastor of Church B’s response is quite
different. She said, “I preach. I protest. I bear witness. I give my resources. I galvanize
my church to give resources. I confront politicians of my time.” She also took a much
more active role in her response to the death of Michael Brown than the interim pastor
of Church A, and her focus seemed to be much more on creating tangible political
change rather than providing for community needs and de-escalation work.
Here is how the pastor of Church B recounts her work after the death of Michael
Brown and how it changed her and her congregation:
The killing of Michael Brown is where I became more known in political circles and
public circles through showing up in those spaces and doing that work within the
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community. Led largely by the young people who were out in the street and doing this
work, but also being called to do that work myself. My church was transformed by that
because we became a meeting place for lots of the gatherings that happened… I became
a spiritual companion for many of the young people who were involved in that and it
catapulted me to the work I do now. Before Michael Brown was murdered I was not
involved in the church in the way that I am now… We continue to serve as a resource for
community. We continue to hold events to care for the community. We are right now
collecting money because we want to begin 2020 with a year of jubilee and we want to
abolish about a million dollars of medical debt in our community, all of those things
happened in the aftermath of what happened to Michael Brown. It transformed us as a
church and hopefully we will continue to help transform others as we go on.

Above, the pastor of Church B describes the death of Michael Brown as a
transformative experience for her congregation that made them more involved in the
community, while the pastors of Church A described it as a fearful experience that led to
many wanting to lock the doors of the church or leaving altogether. Indeed the pastors
of Church A indicated that some of their flock were highly skeptical of the response
made by Church B and their leaders. While pastors of both churches speak to the fact
that they have congregants who do not always agree with their politics, the
congregation of Church B seems much more willing to allow for political speech and
action from their leader. She says, “It hasn’t been antagonistic because I can hear them,
and they can hear me. We don’t always agree. What we do agree on is that we’re called
to love another even in our disagreements.” However, it is unclear why this is the case.
What makes one church respond in a way that is community responsive and one
that is closed off from community? We see clear differences in both congregational
demographics and congregational willingness to accept political action by their leader.
Perhaps leader personality is also at play. The pastor of Church B describes herself by
saying, “I am rarely silent. It’s just not my nature.” While she also speaks of listening and
love, it is clear that she is one that will value taking a stand when she perceives injustice
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over keeping the peace. From the evidence gathered in this study it is difficult to
determine which of these three factors is the most powerful in predicting the response
of clergy and their congregations to racial crises. Perhaps, they all play a role. However,
all three pastors do describe a level of push back from their congregations when it
comes to political actions and yet the two churches have very different outcomes.

4.2 The Slow Start
One church in this study felt especially insulated from the events of Ferguson.
While only being twenty minutes away, Church C is located on the other side of the
Missouri River in the much whiter and wealthier St. Charles County. Church C is an
evangelical megachurch with about 2400 attendees across multiple Sunday services on a
large campus whose main building has a large worship center, a smaller chapel, a coffee
shop and bookstore and a large area for children’s care. Two additional buildings house
offices for the large staff and the middle school and high school ministry. Church C is
comprised of mostly white congregants. The church is predominantly middle aged, but
its largest area of growth is with twenty-somethings.
The pastor of Church C, an older white man, described their church’s mission by
saying, “Our mission is to fulfill the great commission of Jesus to lead people to find and
follow Jesus to take Jesus to the culture where you are at so people can see how Jesus
loves them by how we live out the faith. We are to live it out so people are drawn to
him.” He goes on to say, “We’re not just to do good things for Jesus but to change
people’s lives.” When asked to describe the mission of Jesus he responded that it was
not only to bring salvation but also to reveal to the world who God is. The church’s
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evangelical doctrine is made distinct from similar churches around it by a heavy
emphasis on baptism and communion. These are practiced by all Christian sects, but
unlike many Evangelical churches, communion is practiced on a weekly basis and
baptism is a more central aspect of the process of salvation. Rather than just a public
declaration of faith and a symbol of a renewed life, Church C holds baptism to be critical
because it is the occasion of regeneration or rebirth. Rather than talking about “getting
saved” the leaders of Church C are more likely to talk about being baptized or immersed
which their movement sees as a better translation of the original Greek word and also
emphasizes the difference between other sects’ practice of “sprinkling” baptism
performed on infants.
Political and social issues of interests to the pastor of Church C includes racism,
crime, and abortion. The main form of action that he takes to address these social issues
is public speech from the pulpit. On racism he says,
Racism makes me crazy. To me that is just wrong. its sinful. It bothers me a great deal
that people who are followers of Jesus can be racist and justify it. There’s a lot of pain
where that comes from in the past, but it is just wrong…. Racism, antisemitism, Christian
attitudes towards Muslims, even how people treat those of a different sexual
preference. Jesus never degraded or put someone else down at all ever.

While the pastor may have had personal convictions about racism and shared
them from the pulpit, from how he describes it, the Ferguson Moment catalyzed a new
focus on the sin of racism for Church C. However, this was a slow process. The pastor
described initial reactions to what was happening in Ferguson as “a time of chaos and
emotion. It was not a time of understanding.” He also uses the words pain and
confusion to describe that time. He says, “We definitely made it a matter of prayer, but
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as far as actions, we didn’t do a whole lot.” He talked about that time with a sense of
regret at not doing more. Like other white ministers in this project, his initial action was
to continue educating himself through joining groups, inviting speakers, etc. More
recently, throughout the 2019 summer a special focus on the sin of racism was the
center of a sermon series. In the early part of 2020, the church hosted a movie night to
watch a documentary about the Emmanuel AME Church shooting in Charleston, South
Carolina.
However, the church has decided to take more direct action in ministering to the
community of Ferguson. They acquired a church building from an evangelical church in
the same movement within Ferguson that had been hemorrhaging members since the
Ferguson Moment and eventually voted to close its doors. Church C plans to open a
satellite campus there. According to the pastor of Church C, “We don’t want to be the
white church coming in. We are praying for an African American campus pastor. Now,
we are trying to react. This our city, how do we help them to understand who Jesus is?
We live out faith with them. I don’t think that means we need to be on the riot line, but
we can’t be hunkered down and say ‘what’s the problem over there?”
When asked about the actual events that occurred on the day that Michael
Brown died, the pastor of Church C tends to speak in line with the police narrative. He
says,
Well, I believe Michael and his friend caused a disruption at a gas station or a place and
then he was spotted on the road the policeman gave him some commands there seems
to have been some sort of struggle in the car and the young man went off and the police
man killed him because he felt threatened. I do not know the specifics. But the police
officer, the charges were dropped against him.
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However, he also says that he has tried to understand the impact that it had on
others who see the events of that day differently than he has. Immediately after saying
how he perceived what happens he tells of an interaction he had with someone who
interpreted what happened in Ferguson in a totally different way and described the
need for empathy:
There’s a believer I know from north city, his dad is in jail, he had a single mom, he grew
up in a very poor part of town and when he was a teenager he said ‘I can’t tell you how
many times the car I was in was pulled over… and every time he was arrested and put in
jail because he was a Black man from a bad part of town and he assumed they knew his
dad. Just because his skin color and where he was at they thought he was bad. He
struggled with that emotionally. When Michael Brown died he knew that it was time to
stand up, he did not know the details with Michael Brown, but he knew the emotion. He
will say he knows there’s crime and he knows officers do what they do, but he also
knows there’s a lot of pain and society says we know you’re bad and you’re going to be
bad so some people act that out. So I believe telling young people that god has put a call
on their life you’re here for a reason. That’s not what they’ve been told many times by
their family or by society.

The pastor of Church C is dedicated to the idea that positive change in the world
comes about through the sharing of the gospel rather than through political action. He
does not see Jesus as a political figure and sees politics as a force of division. It makes
sense then that his focus is on changing hearts within his congregation to be more
accepting of people of different identities, while also planting a new church in Ferguson.
However, it is unlikely that the first measure would have been such a primary focus or
that the second measure would have happened at all if it was not for the Ferguson
Moment.

4.3 The Next Generation
Church D has two campuses in different parts of St. Louis. One is located in St.
Louis’ historic Black neighborhood, The Ville, and the other located in Florissant, a St.
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Louis suburb located on the northern border of Ferguson. The church has about seven
hundred regular attendees across the two campuses each week, almost all of them are
African American. Church D is currently pastored by a young African American minister
who has recently taken over for his father who pastored the church for forty years.
The interview was conducted in the church. The young reverend’s office carried
a sense of history, but also felt youthful as jerseys for the L.A. Lakers were prominently
displayed on the walls. The vision of Church D is to “take the city for God” by “sharing
the hope of Jesus Christ in a hopeless world”. The reverend says, “We’ve got to go to
the parts of the world that we don’t necessarily want to go to. We got to get out of the
comfort of the four walls of our church. They’ve asked why you are still down here in
the city, not moved to the county. This is where we’re needed, we can’t abandon our
community.” Indeed, Church D’s leader points out some problems within the
community surrounding the church in the city, specifically education, crime, and gun
violence:
The issues that concern me are our schooling for our children, making sure that they
have accredited schools to go to. Also, to the safety in the city. So, I have members that
are afraid to come down here because there is not enough police presence there have
been too many crimes, too many shootings, too many murders. So that concerns me.
Down the street in the Central West End they have two hundred cameras in a small are,
in the central west end where right outside of that you may have fifteen or twenty and
maybe two blocks away.

When asked about the end times, the reverend said that his congregation
recently went through a series on the Book of Revelation. He says, “In the end, we win
but there is going to be a time of tribulation and a time of suffering before the Lord
comes back and I believe we are actually in those times.” For him, the state of the world
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is one of decay. Things are getting worse. He describes a “great falling away from the
church” that has already occurred. Next, perhaps reflecting on the ministry of his father,
he says, “To the world today God can be anything, church is not of importance, church
leaders don’t have the same respect as they once did. Therefore, many people are
pushed away from the church and don’t see the point to church, to God, to having a
church community or Christianity.”
When asked about the mission of Jesus, before mentioning salvation, Church D’s
pastor says that Jesus came to the poor and the brokenhearted. He says, “That’s what
Jesus did he came, he preached to the poor. He didn’t just, the rich thought he would
come to them and be their person. They were looking for this rich royal king and he was
born in a manger; he was born in a barn with animals all around. He was born to a
carpenter and a young girl. I’d like to say Jesus is for everybody. He’s relatable for all
mankind.”
The reverend feels that it is his duty to speak out against injustice in his
community. Public speech inside and outside the church building is his preferred way of
bringing about change. He says he does not really feel pressure around speaking out one
way or another from those around him. Rather, he is compelled to do so out of a sense
of duty. He said that he is getting more opportunities to do so the longer he has been in
his father’s position and it was clear that he viewed the interview process as an
opportunity to speak out about the issues that concern him.
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He describes one incident where he spoke out about gun violence, saying, “We
had a young boy who was killed literally across the street, ten years old. We went out to
his mother’s house prayed with her, gave her a gift basket, ministered with her,
attended the funeral, and I stood up at the vigil and said this has to stop. I talked about
gun safety and protecting our children, and this has to stop.”
Political involvement of the congregation, especially voting, is of import to Pastor
D as well. When asked how involved the church ought to be with politics, he said that it
is very important for him and his church to be involved. He notes that political
involvement is especially important for the Black church. He says:
It’s extremely important because of the issues that are out there and to making sure we
get our people out to vote that we’re registered to vote. I guess down in the city many
people depend on public transportation, so we have collaborated for people to get
rides. We’re a polling place as well, here and our north county campus. It’s very
important that we are involved. We have days where we register people right after
church, so we try to make sure we do our part.

Talking about how he and his father responded to the death of Michael Brown,
he said that he was at another church in the city and their main response was to start a
social justice ministry. At the same time, his father and leaders from Church D were
active in Ferguson demonstrations and marches. He says, “They tried to be as peaceful
as possible and show a clergy presence.” When asked about what he thinks happened
on the day Michael Brown was killed, the young reverend who had just taken over for
his father thought mostly about the next generation:
Do I think the death could have been prevented? Yes. The reason why, this is the same
narrative that we hear and see over and over again and then there are this is the main
one that we’ve heard about, this is one of the biggest one’s we’ve heard about. It’s still
going on. I have three boys and a daughter. My son is now sixteen, he drives. I fear
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every single time he leaves the house. It’s hard and I have two more boys coming up
after him so its tough trying to grapple with that and knowing that this city seemingly if
your son is murdered there is no justice. That’s just how it is. That’s how our community
feels. So I don’t know how that happened. We all speculate, but there are people who
know what happened. Darren Wilson knows what happened. Will we ever know? I don’t
know.

4.4 For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Something to Eat
Church E is a mainline church that seems to focus more of its efforts on
community events than actual Sunday services. Their mission is “living the good news.”
The minister of the church defined the phrase as bringing people into right relationship
with God through Jesus, but also as a focus on loving others. The list of social and
community programs that the church provides is expansive: art programs, music classes,
community meals, youth events, circus classes, a food pantry and more. They also
partner with other community groups, some of which are not the most expected in
order to make these events happen including the local Baha’i Community and the 4-H
Club. This communal attitude is present in another aspect of Pastor E’s religious
practice. Citing biblical passages such as the beatitudes and the judgement of the sheep
and the goats, the pastor of the church said, “We do reconciliation work because Jesus
came to reconcile people to God. Hungry people are fed. Lonely people are comforted.”
For Pastor E, an older white man who wears the uniform of a Black shirt with a clerical
collar, the work of the Christian is primarily that of helping others rather than avoiding
sin.
Pastor E indicated that repeated communal liturgies that are shared throughout
his denomination are at the center of the work that he does on Sunday mornings. These
practices are done communally as a church but since they are done with others in
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connecting bodies within the denomination they create a sense of community that is
outside of the congregation as well. Faith is not an individual practice for Pastor E or for
his flock.
For Pastor E the church is called to be political in the sense that it is engaged
with the community, but not to the point where it is aligned with political factions. For
him, racial equity and economic justice are the social issues that must be addressed in
St. Louis today. The physical needs of the community are related to the spiritual needs
of the community. Therefore, Pastor E works for change through public speech and
community support. He describes instances of preaching about what Jesus would say
about gun violence as well as calling landlords to make sure conditions are livable for
community members who have asked for his help.
His response to the Ferguson Moment was similar to his responses to other
issues that he believes are social injustices. Here he describes hearing about Michael
Brown’s death: “I heard on twitter. Nobody knew a lot at first. I got a phone call from
an African American woman in my parish. She had gone to the prayer meeting at the
police department which was disrupted by protesters who said, ‘We don’t want your
prayers, we want your help”. So rather than participating in protest, Pastor E tried to
focus on community needs. He says,
What early on became clear is that people were having a hard time getting food. The
streets around Canfield Green were crowded with protesters, police, and press. It was
hard trying to distribute food when stores were closed. So, we started collecting and
distributing food. We were able to get through police lines with a van of food and with a
clerical collar.
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4.5 The Police Chaplain
Church F is a small Southern Baptist church in Florissant, a small community that
shares a border with Ferguson. The church has an average attendance of 50-60
congregants who are mostly white. Around ten of the regular attendees are people of
color including African Americans, Japanese Americans, and Korean Americans. The
pastor of Church F, a middle-aged white man with a grey and white beard who wore a
polo shirt met with me in his office where posters for faith-based movies hung
prominently on the small amount of wall space that had not been taken over by
bookshelves. He said, “There are not many wealthy people in our congregation, but I
wouldn’t call ourselves a poor church. There are a lot of retirees.”
The church is notably different from many of the surrounding churches. Church F
is a part of the Southern Baptist denomination and therefore evangelical while
Florissant is a predominantly Catholic area. Pastor F points this distinction out without
being prompted at the start of the interview. He says, “Actually, our church was
originally not allowed almost 80 years ago when we were first planted; we weren’t
allowed to build the church inside Florissant. However, the relationship with the
community has strengthened.” He goes on to describe the difference between his
church and those around him by saying:
One of the great things about being in Florissant is walls of separation between
denominations a lot have come down. Our minister of music leads a community choir
that includes Presbyterians and Catholics, on some issues there’s a lot of unity: the birth
of Christ, the resurrection, the crucifixion, but when you move out to things like
baptism, the lords supper, are we justified by grace and faith alone or do we need to
add works to that.
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The mission of Church F is to “lead people to love god, love others, and become
devoted followers of Jesus Christ”. Pastor F explains that the church’s mission is
grounded in the Great Commission. The focus is on making disciples. He connects the
mission of Jesus to the church’s mission, explaining that Jesus came to give salvation,
but that he also loved those around him and provided for their needs. He says, “In a
holistic way Jesus cared about people, we see his desire to care for emotional, physical,
tangible needs, at the same time his ultimate goal is to care for spiritual needs. The
church has been divided over which is more important. [Between avoiding sin or helping
others,]I think it’s both.”
Pastor F says that he is pressured to go political in both directions. He says, “I
have a gentleman who made my life miserable with intense pressure to come out
against a president and make my preaching more political. On the other hand, I’ve had
people who are very angry because they think I’m too political.” Pastor F says that he
does not endorse political candidates or encourage his congregants to align with one
party or the other. Rather, he says that he prefers to use his personal relationships with
people to influence values rather than his influence as a pastor to directly try to
influence his flock politically. Pastor F makes a distinction between political issues and
moral issues. He defines moral issues as those in which he is compelled to act and to
Pastor F the most important issue is abortion. However, he says that he is pro-life “for
the whole life”. He cites the film, Just Mercy, before discussing his thoughts on the
death penalty:
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I believe that while, I’m not a pacifist per se, but while the Bible doesn’t oppose
the death penalty, it only approves it under very strict circumstances. Our
judicial system is so fraught with injustice that, while I’m not opposed to capital
punishment in principal, I’m opposed to it in practice if one of every nine people
on death row we later discover is innocent. That’s terrifying to me.
When asked how he responds to the social and political issues that he finds
important, he says the main way he responds is through volunteerism. Specifically, he
volunteers as a chaplain for a local police department. He says, “My role in that is to try
to be a healing and helping presence both for the police --but I’m not doing it in a
political role-- is to be out there to help the police officers but also to be out there with
the public.” He also became involved in a small group of ministers from different racial
backgrounds that meet regularly to talk about issues of racial justice. He says, “I don’t
feel I’m called to politics; I’m called to be a pastor of people. But I think we can move
the ball forward from small things that people don’t have to be defensive. You’re a
human being, I’m a human being. I want to treat you with dignity. Can we listen to each
other and not just find out what we believe but also why?”
Pastor F describes the Ferguson Moment as a tense time but also as one that has
led to increased understanding for him and for those in his church. Here Pastor F
describes his congregation’s reaction to the death of Michael Brown:
Some of my mostly white congregation get very defensive because sometimes there is
an appearance that racism is about whiteness and of course it is not, not anymore than
criminality is about Blackness. At the beginning it was negative, people taking sides, but
there have been some really wonderful attempts in our community to try to bridge
those gaps. We do, for example, as horrible as the death of Michael Brown and the
rioting after were, a positive thing about that is we pastors in our group once a year do a
unity service together and we swap pulpits with each other. I have an African American
in my pulpit, he invites me to speak at his church. These aren’t huge steps but they’re
exciting. There’s an intentional group of north county African Americans and Anglo-
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American preachers that address these issues in groups, much like my little group that
we are going to be doing as well [within our church].

Reactions were spiritual, service-oriented, and relational but the political was
avoided. In addition to new ministerial study groups and the tradition of the unity
service, Pastor F says that he responded through individual and communal prayer. He
also says that they tried to be of assistance to a church that was pastored by a friend of
Pastor F in community cleaning efforts following nights of protest. He says, “They asked
if we could clean up the streets and organize to pray and that’s what we did. On the
political end we did virtually nothing, but on the personal end we tried to listen and not
just have an opinion and spout it.” However, Pastor F says that there were pressures to
not respond even in a relational or service capacity. He says, “It was so hard because at
the beginning it seemed like whatever you did people thought you were taking a side.”
Pastor F, attributing his perspective to his time working as a police chaplain, is
skeptical of the Black Lives Matter narrative. He expresses his frustrations with how the
world might perceive his community and the people around him. At the same time he
says that he is listening to voices that see injustice in Ferguson. He says,
I think one of my great frustrations of the whole thing was… like that there was a
narrative that people were trying to advance and just trying to find facts to make it. I’d
see something on the national news and think ‘Wait a minute I was on that street that’s
not true.’ I’d get frustrated. When people would say how horrible people here are and
say that we are racially intolerant and I’d think that’s not true. But even people who
would disagree with that would show me there really is injustice.

Later he says his thoughts about the events that led to the death of Michael
Brown. He describes an effort to empathize with Black voices while at the same time
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discussing why he believes police narratives are often undervalued. He discusses
Brown’s death in episodic rather than systematic terms:
So, for my friends in the African American community, it highlighted a very real issue
and I’d never want to minimalize that, but as a police chaplain I think people do not
understand how hard it is to make a decision in the moment. So, I don’t know what
happened. What was tragic is his body’s lying in the ground and no one is there to come
to get him, so the whole thing became a community and cultural phenomenon that
existed way beyond the facts between those two people. It’s hard for me to say. I think
they’ve taken on a view beyond what actually happened between those two men and I
don’t know how you could ever peel that away. Obviously, it exposed a nerve within the
African American community, but I think that saying that police are predominantly racist
is so unfair too. I’m with police officers every week and they’re people too. I had one
officer say to me, ‘You know chaplain, in my experience as a police officer, a percentage
of my time is spent with a lot of people who break the law and some are pretty bad
people, and it tends to color my view of the world so that I think worse of the world. I’m
spending 90% of my time with 10% of the people who want to break the law and cause
trouble. I can understand that some parts of minority communities, they’re dealing with
a percentage of police officers that are terrible, but I would argue that my view of the
population in general is askew with my experience with more of the bad people than
the average person is, but I think there are people who are minorities whose views on
police officers are skewed for the same reason.’ It’s just a reminder that all of us have to
be careful, whether you’re growing up in the south from a long line of racists, that is
totally off base, but it’s just as off base to say that a person who has been sworn as a
police officer to uphold the law, to step away and say that all police officers is not fair
either. One of my missions in life is to try to strip stereotypes on both sides and say we
gotta see people.

4.6 The Priest
The priest of Church G, a Catholic parish and school located in north county,
answered my call for a phone interview in Spanish. Switching to English, he says that a
lot of the work that he does is conducted in Spanish. Regular attendance at Church G
features about eight hundred attendees. Of these, about seven hundred are Latinx.
While there is diversity in age, most members are blue collar, working as day laborers or
in construction.
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From images posted on his church’s website, he is a younger man who
sometimes chooses to sport a beard over his friendly smile. He keeps a busy schedule. It
took several attempts to find a time when we could meet and we eventually settled on
talking over the phone. His answers are often brief and to the point. However, one
reason for this may be the questionnaire that I used. For many interviewees, theology
and doctrine is something to be defended and carved out. Those in the protestant
tradition enjoy taking the time to discuss the peculiarities of their belief and practice
because it is what makes them unique. Whereas, when I would ask the priest of Church
G questions on topics like the importance of baptism, he would simply answer with a
“very important” and be ready to move on. Of course, the Catholic practice of baptism
does not look very similar to many protestant forms of the practice. However, it seems
like the priest of church G did not feel the need to go into the details on the tradition
when a copy of the Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church would be readily available
to me. When asked how similar or different his theology is from other churches nearby,
he responds that he would not be able to say.
He does say that he believes that understanding the end times is of little
importance, whereas the sacraments are of a great deal of importance. He views the
mission of Jesus as proclaiming a message of salvation and “extending the Kingdom of
God”. He sees his church as working toward that mission as well. He relays that the
motto of his church is proclaiming acceptance and hope. Reciting a story about a Marian
apparition, he provides part of the reasoning for this emphasis. He says,
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We believe that in 1531, shortly after the Spaniards showed up and were conquering
the indigenous groups, that Mary appeared to an indigenous man named Juan Diego
and encouraged him to have a church built in [the location where she appeared] outside
of Mexico City. But really she was inviting Spaniards and indigenous Mexican people to
come together around her son in faith and so we see ourselves in continuing that
mission and that message of calling people together around Jesus and his mother Mary.

The priest of Church G is protective of his flock. When asked what pressures he
feels to either speak out or be silent on political issues, he says that his congregation is
his motivation. He explains, “I would say that I feel moved to preach on social issues for
the sake of my flock so that if they are being victims in some way they know that they
are cared about and also to instruct and encourage them to live out our call from Christ
to fulfill the demands of justice in society.” When asked to identify which social issues
he believes are most important in St. Louis today he responds, “I do not think I can point
to something in particular in St. Louis that has me concerned,” but he goes on to say, “I
am concerned about racial profiling of my parishioners, as well as abortion and
immigration.” According to him:
We as Catholics believe that all life is precious including life in the womb and so it is an
offense against God and against the dignity of the human person that the unborn can be
killed legally. So that would be a very big issue. On the other hand, I would say that a
very big issue is the fact that this country that was founded by immigrants and for
immigrants is seemingly rejecting and persecuting certain classes of people who are not
deemed desirable immigrants.

He indicates that the response of Catholic priests should be to use public speech
in order to indirectly influence change. He says,
I would say that the catholic church sees its role as informing consciousness, so we
preach values but then it is the role of the member of the church as a citizen to live out
their values, but they do have to make their own decisions. The church doesn’t say vote
for this person or not that person. It does at times say that certain proposals are
intrinsically immoral or not, but we don’t endorse or prohibit explicitly any one person…
In preaching, I try to recall to everyone’s minds both the value of the unborn child and
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the immigrant. Both are deserving of respect. In their daily life and their political life,
they are called to bring these values to bear and respect human life created by God.

The priest was not assigned to Church G at the time of Michael Brown’s death
and chose not to give any comment on what he believes may have happened or how it
might have affected his church. However, he does say that he is aware that the church
participated in some community events and that more work was done on the level of
the archdiocese.

4.7 The Bishop
Church H is a Black Pentecostal church led by an older African American bishop
who takes pride in being a lifelong resident of St. Louis. During the interview, he often
communicates using scripture or various statistics that he has gleaned. The church that
he pastors has a mission of “preaching the gospel; saving the world” and is housed in a
large 36,000 square foot building off of Highway 270.
Church H has about seven hundred regular attendees, almost all of which are
Black and middle-class although there are some wealthier and less well-off members as
well. The bishop of Church H says that he wishes there was more diversity. They are not
members of an official denomination, but rather they are a part of an apostolic
assembly, which he describes as a “brotherhood”. The bishop says that his church is
mostly similar with other churches in his neighborhood except for two distinctions. First,
the church is distinct in how it practices baptism. The bishop says, “We baptize by
submerging in water and we baptize in the name of Jesus. Not in the name of the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Because the reality is what is the name of the
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father the son and the holy ghost? It’s Jesus.” This is a somewhat idiosyncratic practice
that might indicate a closer doctrine of trinity than what is held by most of mainstream
Christianity which often evoke all the names of the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Second, the church also practices speaking in tongues. They consider it a spiritual gift
that they expect will manifest in the life of a believer as evidence of his or her salvation.
Bishop H downplays the difference saying that other churches “still believe in the Holy
Spirit, but not that it will manifest in that way.”
When it comes to politics, the bishop says that he does a lot to encourage his
congregation to vote. He says, “I encourage the congregation to do one thing: to vote.
Not only vote but be knowledgeable when you vote. It’s the ballot box that changes the
course of things.” He says he also allows political candidates to speak at the church, but
he refrains from endorsing candidates, saying that he instead encourages the
congregation to think of what is best for the community.
While discussing the situations in which the church must be involved Bishop H
invokes words like social justice and fairness and he mostly sees political injustice
through the lens of economics. He says, “Slavery wasn’t a racist thing it was an
economic thing, but racism came to justify it. It was about having cheap labor and
making a huge profit. That’s what Hispanics are going through now.” In passing, he
refers to President Trump as “courting the dictators of the world.” He discusses
historically racist housing practices in St. Louis including restrictive housing covenants
and the resulting depreciation in value of Black-owned homes. He bemoans the loss of
jobs to the exportation of American industry to other parts of the world but at the same
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time points out the injustice of taking advantage of cheap labor. He says, “How many
manufacturing companies do we have in other parts of the world paying much less?
That’s another injustice in our nation instead of trying to see my brother do well and me
do well. I want to do well off your back.” He also expresses regret that Amazon, the
large online retailer, did not locate operations in St. Louis.
In addition to economic injustice, Bishop H discusses how he believes education
in America needs to change. First, he discusses disparities in resources within schools
across St. Louis, but he also discusses the lack of faith in public education as central to
America’s moral degradation:
When the Supreme Court took prayer out of school…like why should it be done? How is
faith negatively impacting education? Now you have a problem kids being killed in
school. If prayer was still there maybe there would be less shootings, kids wouldn’t be
so depressed. I’m amazed to find out how many kids you talk about higher education
they’re not even interested. I do believe that Christianity can help by people having a
mindset to develop for excellence in their lives.

Finally, recounting two times when he was pulled over by a local police officer,
Bishop H discusses problems with policing in St. Louis. In one story, he describes coming
home from church and getting pulled over on his street. He says the officer who pulled
him over asked if he was drunk and would not believe him when he said otherwise.
Finally, once he told the officer where he lived, he was let go. In another story he says, “I
didn’t have my tags renewed. That’s my fault. A Ferguson police officer followed me to
the church parking lot. I get out of the car, he shouts at me to get back in it.” He says in
both instances he told the officers involved that he was a member of the clergy and of
the second incident he says, “The chief of police took care of that for me.” However, he
says, “I hear horror stories” about interactions with police in St. Louis.
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Bishop H does not believe that America is a Christian nation. He quotes religious
demographics and says that while many Americans attend church, many of those do not
practice Christianity. He says, “We profess Christianity, but we don’t live the Christian
principles. If we lived the Christian principles, there would be more love, much more
forgiveness.” America for Bishop H is a flawed but not entirely bad place. He says,
“America has always been about social justice and fairness for all people even though
historically our history doesn’t show that.”
When discussing how the killing of Michael Brown affected his church, Bishop H
mentions a history of racism in his community alongside a willingness of his church to
serve that same community. He describes the Ferguson Moment as an opportunity for
his church to become more involved in Ferguson. He says,
I was very moved by what I heard, but also wanted to leave an open ear. People were
very emotional. A man laying down on the ground. Most people in Ferguson did not
even know that Canfield Green Apartments were even in Ferguson. Our congregation
wants to serve people, they were more than willing to get involved and help and they’re
still willing to do that. The community was something that we were very much, we were
always taught to be involved. What happened when we were building this church, we
were told that “the boys didn’t want a ‘coon’ church built over here.” Ferguson did
everything it could to stop this church from being built. I didn’t hold it against anybody. I
tried to get involved in the city way before but there was never a door open. Michael
Brown’s death opened the door for us to get involved in this city. Which is tragic, but
what we’re trying to do now is expand what we do but do it within our means. What can
we do? If people need food, if we can only do 10 bags of groceries a week, we do it. If
we can do a thousand. If everyone does a little bit of something it makes a big
difference.

In describing his reaction to what he calls “a sad Saturday” Bishop H says that he
had just gotten off an airplane when he heard of Brown’s passing. He says, “As soon as I
got off the plane I came right here to the church. I called the mayor. I did not get a
return phone call all week. I called the police chief. Nobody called back. What was so
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unique about it, is I see all the clergy up in arms on tv about what needs to be done and
the mayor does not turn to his own natural resources: the clergy in the community of
Ferguson.”
Bishop H allowed for community events to take place at the church including
rallies and official city meetings. He says that in one media appearance at that time a
news anchor, “jumped down my throat, ‘why would I allow a rally to be at my church
with a guy like Al Sharpton?’ Because he’s considered more of an agitator by some folks.
It’s real simple. I called the mayor and police because I want to help, and they didn’t call
back. Then I got a call asking if we’d do it, so I did. The family needs comfort, the
community needs comfort.” On allowing the city to have a town hall meeting at the
church he says, “To continue to be fair, when the city council wanted their meeting here
we did it to be fair. Jesus, he was always trying to be fair. With the Sadducees and the
Pharisees, he was always trying to talk to them, the people who would listen to him,
those folks. We just wanted to be a help.”
From the pulpit, Bishop H says that he mostly asked his congregation to pray for
Michael Brown’s family in the weeks following Brown’s death. He also says he spent
time teaching people “how to conduct themselves”. He says, “My son he got stopped
once and he called me and told me to pray. He was so polite the officer just told him to
go. Don’t put yourself in harm’s way. There’s some people I don’t care what you do it’s
not going to help. Make sure you don’t contribute to giving a police officer a right to do
any harm to you.” However, he says that he did not spend time denouncing the police
from the pulpit. He says, “Here comes one of the dangerous things. Unless you have all
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the facts, you cannot tell folks these are racist police. You can’t do that.” When asked
what he thinks happened between Darren Wilson and Michael Brown, Bishop H said
that he cannot say. However, it seems that Bishop H has internalized some of the police
narrative as he does refer to a deceptive viral photograph that claimed to be of Darren
Wilson with major bruising on his face. That photograph has been proven to be a fraud
as it is not of Darren Wilson. Bishop H says, “We know something happened. But what
actually happened we don’t know. One scenario said, I drove to Canfield Greens just to
kind of see, supposedly he told him to get out of the street and get on the sidewalk.
Supposedly, Michael Brown charged the police officer and he shot him. I have not seen
enough evidence. There was a picture where supposedly the police officer’s face was
beaten. If you punched a police officer, they’re going to lose their cool. The shooting
might not have been justified, but the aggravation...” Ultimately, he says that the death
of Michael Brown is shrouded in ambiguity. He says,
But then you have a guy, Eric Garner in New York who you could see visibly on TV, I’m a
fat guy and when you’re on your stomach you cannot breathe, and you see him saying
he can’t breath and they’re choking him. That for me was truly a social justice problem.
The thing with Michael Brown, you don’t hear about it much this year. It really has died
down because there are a lot of different stories with what happened to Michael Brown.
The police need to keep their cool and citizens need to keep their cool.

4.8 The White Church
The Pastor of Church I tells me that his church is the oldest protestant church
still standing in Ferguson as we eat sandwiches at Marley’s Bar and Grill, a Ferguson
establishment on Florissant road that is near empty on an early Sunday afternoon right
after church. He is white and older middle aged. “It’s over one hundred and forty years
old,” he says, “and at this point it has about one hundred and forty members.” The
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church is predominantly white, although there are a few older African American
members. Pastor I says, “Even in Ferguson it is known as ‘the white church’ which most
of the white churches here are very white.” The church is predominantly middle class,
although it used to be more affluent. Pastor I says, “Many of the more affluent folks
have died or moved out.” The pastor seems concerned about the demographics of his
congregation and says,
I’m pretty convinced that there is no programmatic way that you become a multi-racial
inclusive congregation. Leadership is the key, but there are ways of preventing people
from coming and feeling comfortable. If you’re going to invite people into the life of the
church, you have to give them a seat at the table. You invite people to come to the
table.

The church, which is an affiliate of a large mainline protestant denomination, has
a core value of openness. Pastor I says, “Our mission is to be an open-minded, openhearted, open door community.” He explains that they are open minded in that they
would not characterize themselves as either liberal or conservative when it comes to
theology. Pastor I says that serving the community is at the center of their work as well
as being welcoming to whoever might walk through the doors: “Christianity today no
longer conceives of community as a resource for church growth… The church has to be
much more integrated in the community and the well-being of the community is
dependent on the church being responsive to the needs of the community. The
emphasis on community is central.” Later on, in the interview he would say, “You can’t
have a healthy church without a healthy community. That’s something I used to know
but couldn’t articulate. People have seen the church as independent of the community
for too long. Without a healthy community you can’t have a healthy church.”
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Despite, or possibly because of the rejection of being on either end of the
theological spectrum, Pastor I places an emphasis on ecumenicalism in the Christian life.
“Christianity in the 21st century is called to be inter-faith,” he says, “We don’t say that
other’s faith is not valid. We are open to the movement of likeminded people in the
world, likeminded in being respectful of others religious traditions and likeminded in the
sense of how we practice compassion, mercy, charity, engagement.”
For Pastor I, the world is in a state of redemption rather than a state of decay.
He does not focus much on the study or preaching of the end times. He says, “I don’t
spend much time talking about the end times even during the season of advent when
we are called to expect Christ. My perspective is that we are called to be faithful in the
here and now and let the end times take care of the end times.”
Pastor I’s view on the mission of Jesus is unique among the clergy interviewed
for this project. There is no mention of forgiveness of sins, rather Jesus was a faithful,
and pacifistic, follower of God who started a movement:
His mission, historically and theologically, was to come and be faithful to the God who
sent him. I don’t think he came to die, he came to live, but he was not afraid to die for
what he believed in and that is God’s coming Kingdom. When he was forced to make a
decision between violent revolution or being faithful to his calling as a healer as a
prophet as a liver of the faith, he decided that he would choose the path of giving
himself. When I say he didn’t come to die, I think he truly saw himself as a reformer of
Judaism, not the starter of a new religion. That was Paul probably. He started a
movement.

Jesus plays an important role in the church still today as “lord of the conscious.”
This is a concept that Pastor I says is important for his denomination as a whole that “we
don’t castigate people because they hold different views on issues” and “just because a
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majority wins doesn’t mean it’s right.” Pastor I believes that the church is often wrong
on social and political issues. He lists LGBTQ+ rights, as well as women’s rights, and
slavery as a few examples. In fact, Pastor I talks a lot about how his church welcomes
LGBTQ+ people and how this might make his church distinct from other local
congregations. He says that he does not want his church to be “bedroom police.” By this
he means that his church does not want to overemphasize sexual morality because it
would be intrusive.
He grounds this perspective on how exegesis is performed at his church.
Specifically, he says, “We interpret scripture by other scripture, so we tend not to lift up
texts that condemn homosexuality to say that ‘that’s what the bible is about’. I also
treat the scripture as authoritative in faith and practice, but not necessarily in science
and history.” This second point is important because at the root of what makes the
church unique is not their attitudes towards social issues or people groups, but rather
how they read scripture and where they believe scripture to be authoritative. However,
this different approach to scripture leads to different social outcomes. Pastor I also
holds a less demanding definition of biblical inspiration than would his evangelical
counterparts. When talking about the historiography of the Book of Job he says, “Is it
inspired? Yes, but not in the sense that every word has been thrown down by God.
What we call scriptures are reflections of real communities of faith trying to understand
what their commitment to God is in the world.” Pastor I says that he likes to teach a
historical critical method of reading scripture. “One of the great tragedies is sometimes
we haven’t helped people to learn what we learn in seminary and what we believe
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about the scriptures and we allow a somewhat elementary school education approach
to scripture…” he says, “People don’t understand that because they haven’t been
taught. People are capable of learning and discerning what the Bible is saying.”
America, for Pastor I, is not a Christian nation, and he does not hold the title
“American” as having much value for the Christian either. He says, “I am Christian who
happens to be an American. I’m not an American who happens to be Christian. The
defining thing for me is my faith and how I view God in the world not just in America.
That’s my stance on American exceptionalism too.” He does describe America as an
“experiment” in religious freedom and acceptance but says that today America is not
exceptional in this.
When it comes to politics, he believes that the church must be involved but he
feels more pressure to be silent. According to Pastor I, “I don’t think you can get around
being in politics. I think if you talk about partisan politics, no. But if you’re talking about
what is happening in communities and the world. We can’t stay silent when moral
issues come up, but to imbed ourselves in political ideology is against who we are as
[members of our denomination] and antithetical to being Christian.” However, he says,
“You have to pay attention to social issues, you can’t avoid them. But you can’t be on a
soapbox either; Sunday morning is the worst time for that. I don’t see the pulpit as
being used that way.” He attributes this position to the value of openness. He knows
that members of his congregation have different political beliefs, he notes that many in
his congregation voted for Donald Trump and many did not, but says, “I find Trump
abhorrent but I don’t feel the need to preach against him.” He says that he does
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sometimes preach about issues, citing children being detained at the border and the
death of Michael Brown. He says, “I’m more about dialogues than monologues and
Sunday morning is a monologue.”
Pastor I describes his own political views as progressive saying, “I don’t like
liberal and conservative. They are meaningless terms nowadays. By progressive I mean
more community centered and community led. Issues of poverty and race and
important to me.” The issues that he sees as most important in St. Louis today are
poverty and race. He says, “Theologically, I think God calls us to be about God’s coming
reign in equality, and justice, and mercy. Look in Micah chapter six and other verses. On
the whole scripture leads towards greater inclusiveness, greater justice, compassion and
equality.” He says that he does not often use his role to speak out for change on these
issues, but rather does so just as “a person of faith.” He says, “I try to keep the
relationships I’ve built over the fifteen years that I’ve been in that church. I tell people
you’re responsible for how you use your faith and how your faith informs your
priorities.”
“What are the ramifications of Michael Brown’s death?” said Pastor I, “At the
very least it was the loss of a young man that I think the people who felt like Darren
Wilson did the right thing did not have much compassion for. I think it’s a tragedy that
any young person dies at the barrel of a gun no matter who he is or what he’s done.”
Pastor I goes on to explain that different community members saw what happened
through different lenses. He says, “It became apparent that the African American
community had seen it in such personal terms, in a way that most white folks couldn’t
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understand. They saw it as an issue of law and order instead of an issue of tragedy that’s
been in the Black communities for years.” Later he adds:
There are people who felt that Michael Brown’s case should be reopened and those
who believe that it was a farce and clear cut. It made us much more aware of the
difference that exist powerfully in our community. It has forced us to reassess given the
fact that we are 99% white. People from both camps are in the church.”

Pastor I says that Ferguson is not unique in its racialized struggles despite his
assertion that Ferguson might have been wrestling with them for longer. Ultimately,
though, he says that the death of Michael Brown revealed how the progress that the
city of Ferguson thought they were making was not effective. He says:
Ferguson is no different than most communities in St. Louis. You can ask why this
experience happened here and not in a lot of other communities... Ferguson has been
working on race longer than a lot of communities in St. louis. Several Ferguson ministers
went to Selma to march. There was a group in the 70s called pride that engaged in racial
issues. We are probably the most multiracial community in the St. Louis area. The
tragedy in Ferguson was successful in revealing that some things we thought we were
moving toward were not successful at all.

Pastor I took a few different approaches to responding to racialized unrest in the
community. First, he gathered his colleagues together with the intention of speaking out
against what happened and networking with African American clergy. He argues that
this was important because of racial segregation within churches in the community. He
says, “That’s a tragedy in the American church today the church is organized on the
basis of the color line and economics.”
Pastor I also designated his church as a “sanctuary space” for protestors to take
refuge if needed. He says, “We told the police that we would not allow them to come in
if they were chasing some of the protesters to the best of our ability, we created
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sanctuary space for anyone to come. For the community people who did not feel safe,
for protesters, for police. We stayed open 24 hours a day for 3 days.” However, he goes
on to say that the space “was not utilized by many folks,” adding, “Our space was
mainly utilized by other clergy from the African American community who came and
parked in our parking lot and they were more involved with monitoring and being a
presence in the protests.”
Pastor I participated in some clergy events but seems to be jaded by some of the
experience, especially when it comes to nationally recognized leaders who came to
Ferguson as well as the uprisings that caused property damage. He says:
There was a Cornell West and Jim Wallace prayer meeting at Wellsprings and then we
marched to the police office. That was a turning point for me. The dual nature of what
was happening… it was a dog and pony show. Wallace and West wanted to get arrested.
It was mainly clergy there. Young protesters there had a somewhat abused look on their
face that this was not authentic. I’m not saying that the motives were wrong. What was
supposed to happen was the religious community would go before the police and say
that we are all in need of repentance for what has happened, as religious leaders and
law enforcement leaders. There would be a dual commitment to repentance and new
action. What happened was it was just the police who were characterized as needing
repentance. I found that to be disingenuous. After three hours, I left… We went to
several meetings; groups were working with protesters and trying to make it as safe as
possible while still getting the message across. We monitored police violence and things
like that. They said to us, ‘Either you are for the police or for us.’ And I said, ‘I can’t do
that.’ In my own mind I thought saying either you’re for us or against us was not healthy
or hopeful. It’s not that you can’t hold the police accountable for their actions, its either
do you validate what we’re doing or what the police are doing. I’m not validating either
one. I’m not validating the violence on both sides. For those people who felt the need to
loot… a very small percentage of those who were really invested. There’s stories of
protesters going to Kathy’s Kitchen and vandalizing and the main group of protesters
who were meeting with clergy and trying to work with police to understand what we
will or will not be able to do surrounded the building saying we will not allow this to
happen. Those who did commit acts of vandalism and violence did not have the
conviction to stand up for what is right.

While he cannot recall specifically what he said from the pulpit during that time,
he does note that the church hosted race workshops and the he later spoke at five year
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anniversary events. He also discusses a coalition that met in the aftermath of the
Ferguson moment. He says:
We work with a group called One Ferguson. Dwayne James, former city councilman, got
people together and said we have to talk about this. Each person who was part of the
initial group invited someone they knew. One of my church members invited me. We
got together and met for about a year trying to find ways to bring about reconciliation,
healing, and justice. One of the members served on the Ferguson commission. It was a
diverse group racially and economically. It was our attempt to say that we need to
model a different way of dealing with the situation. I was in that group for a year to a
year and a half. I think we did some good work in the midst of that time, creating new
kind of networks. One Ferguson lasted for about 2 years and its created lasting
relationships that still have life.

When it comes to what happened between Michael Brown and Darren Wilson,
Pastor I is agnostic, although he places more responsibility on Wilson than on Brown. “It
was a 26 year old and an 18 year old got in a pissing match,” he says. “I used that
euphemistically. It was a competition between a 26 year old and an 18 year old that got
out of control. In terms of what happened I don’t know, but the person who had the gun
had the most responsibility in the midst of the escalation of what happened.”

4.9 Summary
The vignettes presented above supplement the data in the previous chapter.
Together they show evidence that perhaps the leadership style, ambitions, theology,
and outlook of clergy should be considered more deeply in our discussions of clergy and
politics. While all documented receiving pressure from their congregations to speak or
act on political issues from a variety of directions, all responded in different ways based
on their own experience, characteristics, and the narratives that they chose to accept.
Interviews allow the researcher to understand these nuances in a way that survey data
cannot. Take, for instance, the pastor who acts as clergy to a local police force in their
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spare times and the influence that his work has on their political voice. Or, on the other
hand, take the example of Church D where the pastor is working to follow in the
footsteps of his father in a way that helps the community as well as proclaims the
gospel.
While there are glimmers of inspiration theory throughout the vignettes above,
the overall bent of the church is in line with opiate theory. Even among some of the
more politically progressive voices in the sample, peace is more often the objective
rather than long-term policy change. Reconciliation is the goal rather than reparation.
Out of those interviewed only one respondent makes political change central to their
work. Others did work towards providing for the tangible needs of the community
during the crisis by providing food, refuge, meeting space, and cleanup, often to both
parties. Many people in the sample spoke to both the problem of racial inequity and
violent uprisings side by side. While many respondents accepted a Black Lives Matter
narrative in discussing the Ferguson Moment, most did not actively go political.
However, many did pursue peace seriously as well as diversity through joining or
creating various inter-racial ministerial groups or study groups within their churches.
Some spoke out from the pulpit as well, but mostly through value priming rather than a
direct jeremiad.

184

Chapter 5: The Response of Citizens to Racialized Violence in Ferguson
Having examined how faith leaders in the St. Louis area have responded to the
death of Michael Brown, we now turn to the question of how the religious faith of
individuals influence their views on Michael Brown’s death. In order to try to satisfy the
question, I have conducted, with the help of fellow graduate students and professors
within the University of Missouri—St. Louis political science department, two exit poll
surveys of Ferguson voters. The first survey was conducted in November 2014, before
the decision of a grand jury not to indict Darren Wilson, followed by a second survey
during the Missouri Presidential Primary in the Spring of 2016.
In this study, I find evidence that Ferguson is a fairly religious community and
that religion in Ferguson has a role to play in response to the death of Michael Brown.
Congregations within and around Ferguson fight for social justice in different ways and
to different extents. The political ideology of congregants is related to perceived
congregational behavior, specifically Democrats are significantly more likely than
Republicans to attend a congregation that they believe encourages civil disobedience or
protest. Additionally, there are racial differences in whether or not one sees their church
as encourages civil disobedience or fighting for social justice. I also find evidence that
religious traditions may influence the narratives that one rejects or accepts during
racialized tragedies. Finally, I find evidence that in Ferguson, being Catholic is associated
with support for police and pro-police narratives about the death of Michael Brown,
helping to maintain the white dominant power structure in the community.
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5.1 Research Questions
One of our main questions that stems from this literature is whether or not
congregants believe that their congregations are fighting for social and racial justice in
the community. While an exit-poll does not allow us to empirically test religion’s
success in the fight for justice, or even whether or not a congregation’s priority is social
justice as respondents may reflect their own political views onto their church, we are
able to see if voters perceive their church as working toward such goals. While this does
not provide direct evidence for either the opiate or the inspiration theories in the
modern context of the Black Lives Matter movement, it does show us how the citizens
of Ferguson view the work of the church toward justice.
I also wonder whether more voters in Ferguson belong to churches that have
responded to Brown’s death through encouraging protest and civil disobedience or if
they turn to community needs or attempt to insulate themselves from the protests. Are
there racial, political, or economic differences between respondents who say they
attend one type over the other?
Finally, do religious beliefs or behaviors relate to any pressing policy concerns
that stem from the death of Michael Brown? Does religiosity affect one’s concern with
racial justice or police brutality? Does it even go so far as to predict perceptions of the
events leading up to Brown’s death?
I hypothesize that there will be evidence of congregational action in the field of
social justice but that it will not be universal due to religion’s bend toward conservatism.
It is difficult to anticipate to what degree religion is working in Ferguson without data.
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While we have some anecdotal evidence of religion fighting racialized society in
response to the death of Michael Brown, there is also evidence of congregations tending
to the spiritual rather than political needs of the community. I also expect that there
will be a statistically significant rift between Black and White respondents as to whether
or not they feel that their congregation is fighting for social justice, and that this rift will
carry on to whether or not one’s congregation is encouraging civil disobedience or
protest.

5.2 Methods
In order to interpret the data on religion and response to the death of Michael
Brown among individuals, I rely heavily on descriptive statistics as well as some basic
inferential techniques such as chi-squared tests for statistical significance. This test
determines whether the observed data is significantly different from the null
hypothesis, the assumption that the independent and dependent variables are not
related. The chi-squared test is one of the most common and reliable tests used in
cross-tabulation analysis according to Pollock (2012). I also run a binary logit model to
test whether or not religion is a significant indicator of whether or not respondents
believe Darren Wilson was injured while controlling for other variables such as
education and income.

5.3 The Pilot Survey
The preliminary exit poll conducted in November 2014 was administered in four
Ferguson precincts: two in predominantly white neighborhoods and two in
predominantly Black neighborhoods, compared to eleven total precincts in the 2016
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poll. In total, 129 voters participated in the survey. A majority of respondents identified
as Black (58 percent); over a third identified as white (35.5 percent); and, a handful of
respondents identified as Asian, Latinx or other.
The survey consisted of 28 questions. About a third of the questions were
devoted toward political attitudes or policy preferences (ex: What are the most
important issues facing your community?), about a third regarded the respondents’
religious attitudes or asked about their church (ex: How frequently do you pray?), and
about a third were demographic variables (What year were you born?).
Obviously, the small sample size of this data has its limitations, which is one
reason we decided to follow up by conducting the 2016 survey. Additionally, exit-polls
have their own limitations in reliability and validity due to their non-random nature due
to issues with non-response bias and respondent self-selection. Fully acknowledging
these limitations, this survey is one of few, if not the only scientific poll to focus
specifically on Ferguson residents’ attitudes during the time between Michael Brown’s
death and the grand jury decision not to indict, and provides us a snapshot of voter
attitudes during a historic moment for the community and for the nation.
When drafting our poll our team was interested in identifying any racial
cleavages on policy and police favorability, any similar cleavages based on religion
rather than race, and lastly, voter perceptions on whether community churches are
mobilizing to meet the problem of racial injustice in Ferguson and the greater St. Louis
area. While our findings on the racial gaps in racialized political attitudes can be found
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in other places (Udani 2014; Udani et al. 2014), I will now take some time to summarize
the results of the pilot poll before discussing the 2016 Ferguson survey.

5.4 The Pilot Study Results
In our sample, 24.4 percent of respondents identify as Catholic 17.3 percent
identify as Protestant, 11.8 percent identify as Spiritual, 6.3 percent identify as Atheist
or Agnostic, with 29.1 percent identifying as other and 10.2 percent do not identify with
any particular faith. Here are some additional demographics: the median response for
party identification was Democrat; the median ideology was moderate; the median
birth year was 1961; the median sex was female; finally, the median race was Black.
To answer our first research question, whether Ferguson voters feel that social
and racial justice are being pursued by communities of faith, I asked, “If you practice a
religion, how active is your congregation in fighting for social justice in regards to race?”.
Respondents were provided with three options to answer: Very Active, Somewhat
Active, and Not Active. I found that a plurality (44.3 percent) of respondents said that
their congregation was “very active” in fighting for social justice in regards to race, with
slightly fewer (43.4 percent) saying that their congregation is “somewhat active” and
only a handful of respondents (12.3 percent) indicating that their congregation was “not
active” in fighting for social justice. While there is a gap in the sample (see the figure
below), I found no statistically significant difference between Black and White
respondents that they perceive that their congregation is very active in fighting for
social and racial justice (Chi2(2)=3.8552; Pr=0.145). However, the direction suggests that
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Black respondents tend to report belonging to congregations that are more active in
fighting for social justice than White respondents.

Figure 5.4 1

I also asked respondents to identify how diverse they believe their church to be. I
asked respondents, “If you practice a religion, how racially diverse is your religious
congregation;” respondents were provided with five options: “Very Diverse,”
“Somewhat Diverse,” “Not Diverse, Mostly Black/African American,” “Not Diverse,
Mostly Asian-American/Pacific Islander,” “Not Diverse Mostly White,” and “Not Diverse,
Other.” Overall, 28.2 percent of the sample said that their congregation is very diverse;
40 percent answered somewhat diverse, 19.1 percent answered not diverse, mostly
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Black/African American; 4.6 percent answered not diverse, mostly white; lastly, 8.2
percent answered not diverse, other. No respondents responded that their
congregation was not diverse, mostly Asian-American. At 26.9 percent, Black
respondents were more likely than white respondents (12.9 percent) to say that they
attend a congregation that is not-diverse and mostly their own racial group.
Additionally, 29.9 percent of Black respondents said that they attend a congregation
that is very diverse compared to 19.4 percent of White respondents 34.3 percent of
Black respondents said that they attend a congregation that is somewhat diverse
compared to 58.1 percent of White respondents.
While this information can be helpful for identifying political cleavages along
congregational diversity lines, I acknowledge that asking for individual responses is less
than ideal. The literature shows that members of the majority group tend to
overestimate the proportion of minorities around them (Nadeau et al. 1993; Sigelman
and Niemi 2001). However, understanding how Ferguson citizens perceive their own
congregational diversities is also of importance for understanding how race is perceived
in the community.
When I broke down the question on whether or not the respondent believes
that their congregation fights for social and racial justice along these lines we found that
those who said that they attend a very diverse church were the most likely to say that
their church fights for social and racial justice (60 percent), while 38.1 percent of those
who claimed that their church was somewhat diverse said the same. As for those who
said their congregation was not diverse and predominantly Black, 42.9 percent said that
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their church was very active in fighting for social justice. Those who said that their
congregation was predominantly white and not very diverse had only 20 percent claim
that their church was active in fighting for social justice in regards to race [chi2(8)=16.44;
Pr=0.04]. This finding is statistically significant. This indicates that in Ferguson
congregational diversity is associated with greater action on social justice issues.
It is difficult to discuss what role resources play in whether or not congregations
are perceived as fighting for social justice in Ferguson as we found no statistically
significant relationship between income and whether or not a respondent views his or
her congregation as active in fighting for social justice. I also found no statistically
significant difference between Protestants and Catholics in answering this question.
Recall that our second research question is to address whether religious
institutions in Ferguson tend to encourage or discourage participation in protest or civil
disobedience. In order to try to answer this question we asked respondents, “If you
practice a religion, does your congregation encourage civil disobedience or protesting?”
For this question, we provided three answer options: “Yes”, “No” and “I Don’t Know”.
Once again, we are only able to look at voter perceptions of their congregations,
however we find that, overall, 31.8 percent of our sample say that their congregation
encourages civil disobedience or protest, 42.7 percent say that their congregation does
not encourage civil disobedience or protest, and 25.5 percent responded that they do
not know.
When we break down responses by race we find much less cohesion than we did
on the social justice question. Whites in our sample were far less likely to respond that
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their congregation encourages civil disobedience than non-whites. A large majority (72.4
percent) of white people said that their congregation does not encourage civil
disobedience or protest, while Black respondents were split on the question with a
plurality (37.7 percent) responding yes, 31.9 percent responding no, and 30.4 percent
answering that they do not know [chi2(8)=19.10; Pr=0.01]. This difference is statistically
significant. Please refer to the graph below.

Figure 5.4 2

There is also a gap in response to this question based on party identification.
While Democrats are split on whether or not their congregation encourages civil
disobedience (36.4 percent said “Yes” while 35 percent said “No”), no respondents who
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identify as Republican answered in the affirmative; this difference is statistically
significant (chi2(2)=9.52. Pr=0.01).
Next, we turn to whether or not these congregational behaviors translate into
divisions on policy attitudes relevant to the Black Lives Matter movement. One question
that we were particularly interested in during the drafting of our exit poll was public
perceptions of the events leading up to Michael Brown’s death. Specifically, we asked if
Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson was seriously injured during his confrontation
with Michael Brown. This question is important because believes that Wilson was
seriously injured support a police narrative while a belief that Wilson suffered no serious
injuries supports a Black Lives Matter narrative of the event. Therefore, answers to this
question act as an indicator to whether respondents make inferences that favor one
narrative or the other. This question works well for this task because in the weeks after
the killing, Darren Wilson went into hiding for all intents and purposes. He did not speak
to the press until after the grand jury decision not to indict him. Consequently, the
general public did not know if he was injured or not. In the end, it was revealed that he
was not seriously injured, although that fact was not revealed to the public until after
the exit poll was conducted. In our previous work, we revealed racial and geographical
cleavages on this question with 71 percent of white respondents responding that they
believe that Wilson was seriously injured, while only 9 percent of Black respondents said
the same (Udani et al. 2014; Udani 2014).
Here, I examined responses to this question across values for whether or not a
respondent says their congregation is active in fighting for social justice in regards to
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race, as well as whether the respondent’s congregation encourages civil disobedience or
protest. Remember, that there was little racial division to the congregational social
justice question. We also did not find any statistically significant differences in
perceptions on whether or not Wilson was injured along respondent identified levels of
congregational social justice. However, the data reveals that of those who belong to a
congregation that encourages civil disobedience only 16.1 percent believe that Darren
Wilson was injured, while 36.6 percent of those whose congregation does not
encourage civil disobedience said the same [Chi2(6.36); Pr=0.04]. This provides evidence
that one who attends a church that encourages civil disobedience might be more
distrustful of the police and less likely to accept police narratives on racialized statesanctioned killing.
We also asked respondents what they believed the most important issues facing
the community were. We gave them seven options: Crime/drugs, Police-Community
Relations, The Economy, Race, Education, Transportation. To examine which individuals
prioritized the race and police issues that came to light in the wake of Brown’s death I
used a cross-tabulation, to again find no statistically significance difference on
prioritizing these issues across those who claim that their church is very active in
fighting for social justice. However, I found that of those who claim that their
congregation encourages civil disobedience or protest, 71 percent said either race or
police-community relations were the most important issues facing the community,
while a weaker majority 53.3 percent of those who said that their congregation does not
encourage civil disobedience said the same [chi2(2)=8.06; Pr=0.02]. These results
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suggest that churches encouraging civil disobedience promotes the prioritization of
justice issues among their members.
Those who attend congregations that encourage civil disobedience also have
overwhelmingly unfavorable views on the police. We asked respondents to share their
opinion on police, providing them the answer options of “Favorable”, “Unfavorable”, or
“No Opinion.” The results show that 67.7 percent of those who said their congregation
encourages civil disobedience have an unfavorable opinion of the police, while only 36.4
percent of those whose congregation does not encourage protest feel the same
[chi2(4)=26.22; Pr=0.00]. Once again, we found no statistically significant difference
among those who said that their church is active in fighting for social justice.
While we found that individuals who attend congregations that encourage civil
disobedience to have less favorable opinions of police, that did not necessarily translate
to policy preferences. The results show no statistically significant difference across
responses on the congregational social justice question or the congregational
encouragement of civil disobedience question on individual preferences for a policy
requiring police to wear body cameras. Nor did we find statistically significant
differences on the topics of welfare or affirmative action. Please see the table below
for a break down on how perceived congregational encouragement of civil disobedience
influences attitudes on racialized issues.
Congregations and
Congregation Encourages
Racialized Attitudes in
Protest
2014 Pilot Study
% who believe race and/or 71%
police community relations

Congregation Does Not
Encourage Protest
53.3%
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are the biggest issue facing
the community
% who have an
67.7%
36.4%
unfavorable opinion of the
police
% who believe that Darren 16.1%
36.6%
Wilson was severely
injured by Michael Brown
Note: All of these differences are statistically significant at the .05 criterion of
significance
Table 5.4 1

The findings from our pilot study indicate that the perceived behavior of
congregations is related to the attitudes of the congregant, specifically if a congregation
encourages civil disobedience or protesting then congregants are much more likely to
be skeptical of the police and to believe that race is one of the most important issues
facing the community. This is consistent with inspiration theory. Some religious
institutions are able to prime congregants to fight for Black political advancement and
social progress.

5.5 2016 Survey
The second survey was conducted in the spring of 2016, coinciding with
municipal elections. The number of polling places and sample size was quite larger for
the 2016 survey. We sampled at 11 different polling places across the Ferguson
municipality and Ferguson School District. Our sample contained 399 total respondents.
For median responses to demographic variables such as race, income, and birth year
please see the table below or consult Map 5.6.1 for a graphic representation of racial
demographics by polling place, while Figure 5.6.1, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3 display additional
demographic information.
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Snapshot of 2016 Ferguson Exit Poll Respondents (Median Responses)
First-Time Voter
No
Party

Democrat

Ideology

Moderate

Income

$40,000-$49,999

Education

College Graduate

Sex

Female

Race

Black

Birth Year

1964

Table 5.5 1
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Map 5.5 1
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Figure 5.5 1
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Figure 5.6 1

Figure 5.5 2
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Figure 5.5 3

Our results again show that Ferguson is a fairly religious community. A plurality
of respondents said that they attend religious services at least once a week (44.5%)
which is much higher than the national response that Pew records which has hovered
around 37% for several years (Lipka 2013). The median response for frequency of
church attendance was “Once or Twice a Month”. A plurality of both Black and White
respondents said that they attend church at least once a week. However, white
respondents were significantly more likely to say that they never attend religious
services than Black respondents (31.8% compared to 11.7%) [Chi2(4)=19.13; Pr=0.00]. A
majority of respondents said that they pray at least once a day (52.8%). Black
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respondents were significantly more likely to say that they pray at least once a day
(63.8%) compared to White respondents (24.4%) [Chi2(6)=74.15; Pr=0.00]. A majority
of respondents (66.2%) said that religion is “Very Important” in their life, while 20.3%
said “Somewhat important” and 13.5% said “Not very important”. Once again Black
respondents are more religious on this measurement than White respondents. 75.6% of
Black respondents said that religion is “Very Important” compared to 46.2% of white
respondents [chi2(2)=44.61; Pr=0.00].

Figure 5.5 4

In regards to religious tradition, Ferguson is dominated by Christians. A plurality
of respondents identify as Non-Catholic Christians (46.00%), 21.7% identify as “Other”,
17.4% as “None”, 14% as Catholic, .57% as Jewish and .29% as Muslim (see the graph
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below). Broken down by respondent race, White respondents in our sample were fairly
evenly split between identifying as Catholic (31.9%) or as Non-Catholic Christian (38.5%)
while Black respondents overwhelmingly identified as Non-Catholic Christians (49.8%)7.
White respondents were significantly more likely to be Catholic than Black respondents
[chi2(5)=49.06; Pr=0.00].

7

When I discuss racial demographics throughout the evaluation of the survey I mostly
discusses differences between respondents who identify as either Black or white,
without much discussion on respondents who identify as Hispanic, Asian, or Other. I do
this for two reasons. First, the number of responses that we received from respondents
who identified with categories outside of Black/African-American or White is very small.
Our sample only has two respondents that identify as Asian, four who identify as
Hispanic, and nineteen who identify as other. Second, most of the tension within
Ferguson that has received international media attention has revolved around
differences between Black people and white people.
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Figure 5.5 5

However, one variable from the survey might indicate that Ferguson residents
do not let faith influence their politics. Over half of respondents strongly disagreed with
the statement that a candidate’s religion is a factor that they consider when voting. On
the other hand, about twenty percent either strongly or moderately agreed with the
statement. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the 2016 primary was one in which
religion has not played as central a role as it has in previous elections when Mitt
Romney’s membership in the Latter Day Saints church and controversies surrounding
the content of President Obama’s preacher’s sermons (or for that matter unfounded
rumors that President Obama practices Islam) were part of the national conversation.
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Another possibility is that perhaps the wall of separation between church and state is
not so high for some Ferguson voters. This should not dissuade us from continuing to
look for a religious connection to social and political issues in Ferguson as one’s faith can
prime values while not necessarily translating to a need to consider the religion of a
candidate when voting.

Figure 5.5 6

In the 2016 survey, I asked some of the same questions that were featured in the
2014 survey. Importantly for my research question, I asked whether respondents
believed their congregations were fighting for social justice in regards to race and
whether or not respondents felt that their congregations encouraged civil disobedience
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or protesting. For these questions, I found similar responses to that of the pilot survey.
I found that almost a majority of respondents said that their congregation fights for
social justice (49.9%) and no statistically significant difference on the question by race
[N=293: chi2(8)=13.90, Pr=0.08]. On the question of whether or not respondents felt
that their congregation encourages civil disobedience or protest only a quarter (25.4%)
of respondents said that their congregation does encourage civil disobedience or
protest while 49.2% responded “No” and 25.4% said that they were unsure. This is
lower than what was found in the first study (31.8%) which was conducted before the
grand jury decision not to indict Darren Wilson that incited an uprising that caused
considerable property damage.
When we look at responses by race, white respondents were significantly more
likely than Black respondents to say that their congregation does not encourage civil
disobedience or protest [N=266; Chi2(2)=11.61; Pr=0.00]. This cross-tabulation also
shows us that Black respondents are fairly evenly split as to whether or not they feel
that their congregation encourages civil disobedience. As in the pilot study, there is also
a statistically significant difference between Republicans and Democrats in how they
answer this question. While 46% of Democrats said that their congregation does not
encourage civil disobedience or protesting, a strong majority of Republicans (72.4%) said
the same [N=255; Chi(2)=7.17; Pr=0.03].
Respondents were also asked about their evaluations of local clergy.
Respondents were asked to provide whether they had favorable or unfavorable
opinions of various political institutions. Included on the list were municipal courts,
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President Obama, and “Religious leaders in your Community”. Respondents were given
three response options: “Favorable”, “Unfavorable”, and “Don’t Know”. Gauging
attitudes toward religious leaders is important given the literature describing clergy as
“opinion leaders”. A thin majority (50.6%) of respondents responded “Favorable” while
20% responded “Unfavorable” and 29.4% respondent “Don’t know”. There is no
statistically significant difference to responses of religious leader favorability by
respondent race, party identification, or by whether or not one’s congregation
encourages civil disobedience. This could be an indicator that clergy play it safe within
the confines of the community and that religious efforts to shake the status quo in
Ferguson have come from outside the community itself; see the distance variables from
the clergy study for more on this idea.
As in the 2014 survey perceptions on whether congregations emphasized
social/racial justice and whether or not congregations encouraged civil disobedience or
protest varied by race and tradition. Following the 2014 survey, Black respondents were
less likely to say that their congregation does not encourage civil disobedience than
respondents who do not identify as Black (Chi2=9.9697; Pr=0.007). Furthermore, as the
graph below shows, Black respondents were much more likely than non-Black
respondents to say that their congregation is “very active” in fighting for social justice in
regards to race (Chi2(2)=6.5468; Pr=0.038). These findings are statistically significant.
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Figure 5.5 7
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Figure 5.5 8

Whether or not one’s congregation encourages civil disobedience also seems to
touch racialized issues in Ferguson less in 2016 than they did in 2014. Whereas in the
pilot study I found relationships between whether or not one’s congregation encourages
civil disobedience and attitudes on racialized issues such as police favorability, I did not
find that to be the case in the 2016 survey. There was no statistically significant
difference between those whose congregations encourage civil disobedience and those
whose congregations do not encourage civil disobedience on police favorability,
whether or not one considers race an important issue facing the community, or whether
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or not a respondent believes that Darren Wilson was severely injured by Michael Brown.
Map 5.6.2 graphically depicts responses on whether one’s congregation favors civil
disobedience across precincts, also noting predominantly Black/African American
precincts while Map 5.6.3 displays attitudes towards the police.

Map 5.5 2
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Map 5.5 3

In our sample, Catholics were about twice as likely to think that Darren Wilson
was severely injured by Michael Brown (59.6%) than non-Catholic Christians (24.3%).
This is statistically significant (chi2(5)=37.69; Pr=0.000). This could be because Black
respondents are significantly less likely to be Catholic. However, when we control for
race by examining just white respondents we see that Catholics are still more likely to
believe that Darren Wilson was severely injured (75.9%) than Christian-Non-Catholics
(62.1%)[chi2(4)=13.11; Pr=0.01. Conversely, 24.1% of white Catholics in our sample said
that Wilson was not severely injured compared to 37.9% of white Christians who do not
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identify as Catholic. Religion is not a significant indicator of whether or not a
respondent thinks Wilson was injured among Black respondents.

Figure 5.5 9
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Figure 5.5 10

I ran a binary logit model in order to test whether or not religion was still a
significant indicator of believing that Darren Wilson was severely injured when
controlling for other variables. I used a dummy variable indicating whether or not a
respondent is Catholic and a dummy variable indicating whether or not a respondent is
Black as my main predictor variables. I also used income, education, party
identification, and year born in my model as controls. The model, Model 1, had 280
observations, an AIC of 245.52 and a BIC of 270.96. I found that religion, race,
education, and year born were all significant indicators at the .05 criterion of
significance. Factors such as race, education, and year of birth have a negative
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relationship with believing that Wilson was severely injured, as might be expected.
Being Black, having more education, and being younger all seem to make one more
likely to reject the self-defense narrative and show distrust of the police. However,
being Catholic is positively related to thinking that Wilson was severely injured. In fact,
going from being non-Catholic to being Catholic increases a respondent’s odds of
thinking that Wilson was injured by a factor of 3.4, while going from being non-Black to
Black decreases one’s odds by a factor of .18. See the table below for a graphic
breakdown of predicted probabilities of religion and race. Map 5.6.4 displays responses
to this question across Ferguson polling places.
Predicted Probability that Respondent Believes Darren Wilson was Injured
Black

Not-Black

Catholic

.27

.68

Non-Catholic

.099

.38

N=280; Pseudo R2=.27; AIC =245.52; BIC= 270.96
Table 5.5 2
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Map 5.5 4

I refit the model, adding in a predictor variable for whether one’s church
encourages civil disobedience. This is a binary variable with 1 indicating that a
respondent’s church does encourage civil disobedience and 0 indicating that their
church does not encourage civil disobedience, or they are unsure. This was the only
change in the model. This model (Model 2) fits the data better than Model 1 with an AIC
of 188.40 and a BIC of 215.94. The outcomes are similar as well. Race, year of birth and
education are all negatively related to saying that Wilson was injured in his
confrontation with Michael Brown (the first two are statistically significant at the .05
criterion). Therefore, since this poll was conducted in 2016 these indicators are
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negatively related to believing a debunked police narrative around the death of Michael
Brown. Whether one’s congregation supported civil disobedience was also negatively
related the dependent variable, although not statistically significant. Although they are
not statistically significant at the .05 criterion of significance, I thought it would be
useful to demonstrate the direction of the predicted probabilities for race and
congregational support of civil disobedience in the table below. The direction of the
predicted probabilities is consistent with the hypothesis that congregational
encouragement of contentious politics may dismantle the acceptance of pro-police
narratives.
Predicted Probability that Respondent Believes Darren Wilson was Injured
Black
Congregation supports civil .089
disobedience
Congregation does not
.12
support civil disobedience
N=231; Pseudo R2=.33; AIC =188.40; BIC= 215.94

Not-Black
.37
.45

Table 5.5 3

5.6 Discussion
There are several important findings in the 2016 survey. First, the survey
provides evidence that while most congregants feel that their church fights for social
justice, racial and political rifts still exist as to whether or not one’s congregation
encourages civil disobedience or protest. Additionally, among Black respondents the
answer to the latter question is still a mix.
Second, the survey seems to show that whether or not congregational behavior
is related to attitudes on policing and racialized issues seems to diminish over time. That
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might be too bold a statement to make based on exit-poll data, but the statistically
significant relationship found in the pilot study does not exist in the 2016 survey. This
may be due to several reasons. It might coincide with Emerson and Smith’s argument
that religion is unable to make a great lasting impact on racialized society. Religion can
help make some progress with surface level issues but ultimately cannot be the sole
reconciliatory defeater of the racial divide in America. It could also be due to the fact
that these issues were not as “hot” in 2016 as they were in 2014. Media coverage had
shifted away from police brutality and Black Lives Matter and towards the presidential
election. Perhaps, the congregations’ interests have also shifted. It is likely that in 2014
religion “provided the moral force for people to determine that something about their
world so excessively violates their moral standards that they must act to correct it”
(Emerson and Smith 2000; 18). However, in 2016 the division may have shifted from a
protest against a clear entity, the Ferguson Police Department and local government, to
a more broad one: racialized society and racist government systems. This would
demonstrate the idea that “The structure of religion in America is conducive to freeing
groups from the direct control of other groups, but not to addressing the fundamental
divisions that exist in our current racialized society” (Emerson and Smith 2000; 18).
Finally, the larger sample size of the survey could be showing us that there was no
relationship to begin with. However, it is important to note that racialized differences
do not entirely go away.
Third, the survey indicates that how religious groups process information on the
racialized society and police killings of Black men may be subject to confirmation bias.
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Specifically, that Catholics within Ferguson are more likely to believe that Darren Wilson
was severely injured by Michael Brown, and therefore acted in self-defense.
This study finds evidence to support both inspiration theory and opiate theory
within Ferguson. While among survey respondents social justice seems to be perceived
almost universally as a positive goal for the church to work toward, Black respondents
were fairly split as to whether or not their congregation encourages contentious politics
in the form of civil disobedience or protest. This shows that some congregations, even
within the Black community, choose not to go to such radical steps to work for Black
political advancement.
Additionally, this study shows a cleavage in opinion on whether or not Darren
Wilson acted in self-defense during his confrontation with Michael Brown based on
religious tradition. Catholics have a higher predicted probability than non-Catholics in
thinking that Wilson was severely injured. This may be due to the fact that, according
Wald and Brown (2014), the Catholic Church has “developed and occupied a distinctive
centrist position in American political life” (Wald and Brown 2014; 243). There is a
wealth of articles within the St. Louis Review, the St. Louis Arch-Diocese publication that
shows that the local Catholic church was working in response to the death of Michael
Brown including creating a Peace and Justice Commission and holding special masses
(St. Louis Review). While representatives from the Catholic Church participated in
marches organized by Black Lives Matter protesters, they also focused on ministering
and providing chaplaincy services to the local police (St. Louis Review). Another Catholic
news source, The National Catholic Reporter, documents demands from Black Catholic
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leaders that the church be less ambiguous in its response to police shootings of Black
citizens during the annual Archbishop Lyke Conference in which Black Catholics from
across the nation gather to worship and discuss pressing issues (Feuerherd 2016). These
anecdotal data alongside the local nature of this study indicate that the local attitudes
unearthed in this study cannot be projected onto the entire Catholic tradition.
However, there is a clear relationship between being Catholic in Ferguson and
accepting a police narrative on the Death of Michael Brown. At the time of the 2016
survey, being Catholic made one significantly more likely to be supportive of then
Mayor, James Knowles III, 57.14% compared to just 27.68% of non-Catholics
[Chi2(2)=14.7147; Pr=0.001]. Just two years prior to the death of Michael Brown, the
city of Ferguson under the leadership of Knowles purchased the Good Shepherd Catholic
Church from the St. Louis Archdiocese in a $1.5 million deal (Gillerman 2012). Another
potential explanation for the Catholic gap narrative acceptance may be location. As the
map below shows, Catholics in Ferguson are more likely to live in predominantly white
precincts, and therefore may have fewer interactions with Black people. The evidence
in this survey shows that the Catholic church in Ferguson may function as an institution
that facilitates the centering of whiteness within Ferguson politics.
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Figure 5.6 1
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Map 5.6.1

Finally, one aspect that stood out from both surveys, that certainly will not be
shocking, is that there is a clear racial divide in responses to the shooting of Michael
Brown among Ferguson residents. We see this divide in perceptions of congregational
response to the shooting, attitudes on policies and institutions, and acceptance of
narratives about what happened, even in the 2016 survey when the narrative that
Wilson was severely injured had been disproven.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This work started with an exploration of literature on the different classifications
of how the religious sphere interacts with the political sphere. Ultimately, the study
finds evidence for both inspiration theory and opiate theory. The Ferguson Moment
clearly awakened both religious leaders in the St. Louis region as well as the people of
Ferguson to the idea of persistent racial injustice in St. Louis and the United States
today. However, the response to this focusing event has divided the community as well
as the rest of the nation into two camps: one which seeks racial justice and one that has
not only accepted the status quo but has doubled-down on support for the current
systems of criminal justice under which Michael Brown was slain.
This study utilized interviews with clergy from throughout the St. Louis region.
All of the subjects displayed a mindfulness of racial inequities in the city. However, not
all of them identified race or injustice in policing as a major issue facing St. Louis.
Furthermore, the language and evidence that these leaders use to discuss the Ferguson
Moment sometimes reflected an anti-racist perspective and at other times clearly
showed an acceptance of the status quo or support for police. They were also varied as
to the reactions they took to crisis in their community or in neighboring communities.
Some insulated themselves and are playing a game of catch up when it comes to racial
justice. Others took care of tangible needs through providing resources like food or
meeting spaces. Others utilized public speech to prime values within their congregation.
Very few participated actively in protest or tried to directly influence the political
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sphere. Many clergy felt mixed pressures from their congregations and some took
those pressures as cues informing them of the parameters of their role.
All of the clergy demonstrated a clear passion for their faith and their role as
faith leaders. The teachings of Jesus and the Bible were important in informing them of
how to respond to the racialized crisis around them. However, each read their Bibles
with different presuppositions, different personal characteristics, and different socialwork environments. Each held different ideas on the mission of Jesus, which informs
their worldview and, therefore, their political attitudes. A complex mix of theological
beliefs, religious practices, congregational community, tradition and denomination,
personal characteristics, and even location all seem to play into the responses that the
clergy chose.
While the clergy response to the Ferguson moment seems to indicate that
Christianity acted as an opiate in Ferguson, the high religiosity coupled with a
widespread belief by voters in the community that their church favors social justice may
show that the Church at least has the potential to be a force for racial justice in St. Louis.
Indeed, many of the voters in our sample feel encouraged to participate in contentious
politics because of their faith.
However, at the same time, the study provides evidence that religious
congregations can be centers of power that reinforce whiteness within their own
communities. In Ferguson, Catholic respondents were more likely to believe police
narratives about the death of Michael Brown in 2014 when misinformation was
rampant and then again in 2016 when more information had been released to the
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public. High levels of Catholic support for Ferguson’s former white mayor, James
Knowles III, provides more evidence for how the church operated in this way.
The work conducted in this study has only become more relevant in the year
2020 when several acts of violence against Black people have made national news and
inspired widespread protests and counter-protests throughout the United States. Since
the death of Michael Brown Black Lives Matter has gone from a small organization or
controversial slogan to an idea supported by a majority of all Americans (Thomas and
Horowitz 2020). The Church is still divided in its response with many reinforcing support
for law and order while others advocate for anti-racism and racial justice. Many
Christian media outlets have dedicated much of their articles to responding to the
deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and others with jeremiads. Many sermons have
done the same. However, others have overemphasized the violence that has rarely, but
sensationally, accompanied protests. In the year 2020, the author of this text has
observed at different churches both sermon series on racial justice as well as “Hero
Days” supporting law enforcement during this contentious time. The question that
social science must evaluate and the church must answer is will it be an inspiring force
for racial progress or an opiate to the masses reinforcing the status quo.
Racialized state-violence continues to haunt St. Louis. In 2017, when a judge
declared former St. Louis police officer, Jason Stockley, not-guilty after his 2011
shooting of a 24 year old Black man, Anthony Lamar Smith, protests erupted across the
city leading to tense confrontations with police. During one such confrontation, video
footage show police coopting a Black Lives Matter chant, “Whose streets? Our Streets?”
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demonstrating the divisive relationship between the police in St. Louis and the
communities that they are charged with protecting (Edwards 2017). In 2020, protests in
reaction to George Floyd’s death led to violent uprisings which caused property damage
as well as the shooting death of four police officers. Further research is thus needed as
understanding the factors that have led to the continued division between law
enforcement and their communities might help lead to peace and progress.

6.1 Areas for Further Research
This project creates several avenues for future academic work. I believe the
findings from this paper to be useful across disciplines including in the fields of political
science and sociology, as well as for those outside of the academy working as faith
leaders or activists. However, there are still many questions that remain around this
topic that this paper was unable to address. Here, I will discuss some areas of further
research that I may pursue or that may be picked up by other researchers.
One question that may be pursued following this work is how nationally
recognized faith elites respond to racialized focusing events. This study looked locally at
individuals and leaders of congregations. However, this study was not able to look at
Christian leaders on a national scale. I would hypothesize that there is a gap between
how nationally recognized faith elites respond to racialized crises compared to the
response of local faith leaders and rank-and-file practitioners. There are a few different
ways that this can be approached. One option is to analyze the output of the flagship
news publications representing the major Christian traditions in the United States. One
could then examine the publications of powerful denominations within traditions.
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Comparing differences and similarities between the two can help determine the
comparative influence of tradition and denomination. For example, Christianity Today is
an online and in-print news and lifestyle magazine that caters broadly to an evangelical
readership. While the Baptist Press is the denominational news source for the Southern
Baptist Convention, one of America’s largest evangelical denominations. This work has
been initiated by Nancy Wadsworth who examines the racial politics of evangelicals
through examining Christianity Today (Wadsworth 2014). However, this work can be
broadened to see how the four major Christian traditions (and beyond) have interacted
with the modern push for racial justice.
Another option for studying the reaction of nationally recognized Christian faith
leaders is to use data-mining of social media. Network analysis using twitter is an
emerging source of sociological and political science data that can be utilized to examine
both the content and influence of political speech made by Christian elites. The really
powerful aspect about this type of research is that it allows us to see how political
messages are being dispensed and accepted across a vast amount of people. Its strength
lies in its ability to tell us who accepts or rejects specific political messages. Using
sentiment analysis alongside a database of twitter networks one could effectively
measure whether Christian leaders have a pacifying or inspiring effect on social justice
issues. However, this form of analysis does not do a good job at telling us whether or
how those messages translate into political action beyond generating additional political
speech.
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This study was local in nature addressing a tragic moment in St. Louis history and
how St. Louisans responded to it. However, racialized tragedies are not merely a local
problem, rather there is a wealth of evidence of systemic racial injustice in the United
States. Additionally, while the Ferguson Moment was a local tragedy, it became a
national focusing event. This project does not necessarily speak to how religion might
influence responses to racialized violence in other places and in other contexts. For
instance, in the exit poll portion of this study, it was found that being Catholic made a
respondent more likely to accept the police narrative around Michael Brown’s death. In
Ferguson, the Catholic Church and the Catholic School are prominent institutions within
the community that could be said to have real civic influence. Therefore, the Catholic
church may operate very differently in other communities, and perhaps other traditions
would act as centers of whiteness in communities instead. Additionally, the interplay of
region with religion may be important in analyzing how faith influences reactions to
racialized violence. For instance, the response of faith leaders may be much more
influential in the Bible Belt than on the East Coast. The urban and rural context may also
make a difference. Indeed, in the future, I wish to explore the rural response of churches
to national discussions on racialized state violence.
Mentioned in this study was Djupe and Calfano’s study of “God Talk” or the use
of religiously coded messages by political figures. These messages work as cues to the
faithful that the politician identifies with religious individuals within their audience, but
they are not likely to be picked up by those who are not religious. While this study
examines how faith elites respond to incidents of racialized crisis, it does not examine
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how political actors might use religion in order to communicate in such incidents. How
local and national political leaders use religiously coded messages during and after racial
crises would be a great avenue for further research. This can be done following Djupe
and Calfano’s work through experiments to see how influential these cues may be in
communicating messages around racialized politics. Additionally, a researcher could
examine speeches, news articles, and other sources for instances of god talk in order to
understand what politicians are using this tool, how the use it, and to what ends they
employ it.
Finally, this study focuses specifically on how faith in the predominant Christian
traditions interplays with reactions to racialized violence. Because this work was
focused on how Christian beliefs and practices interplay with racialized politics, it was
not able to focus on how non-Christian faith systems may influence individual reaction
to racial tragedies and controversies. Additionally, it was not able to look at how
marginalized groups within the broader Christian tradition responded, but rather
focused on the four major traditions within American Christianity. Further research
should focus on how faith leaders and individuals from marginalized Christian traditions
and non-Christian traditions respond to such events. While today the Christian religion
is dominant in the American social and political sphere, America is diverse in its faiths
and worldviews and understanding how groups outside of these powerful traditions
may give us more insight into the power of religious belief, belonging, and behavior in
the realm of politics.
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There is much more work to be done and the work is more important than ever.
It cannot be ignored that faith, politics, and race are three powerful forces in American
life. While there is a considerable body of work in the social sciences examining these
forces, their interaction is still under-studied. Continued research into these not-soseparate spheres is necessary for advancing our understanding of American politics.
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